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Abstract 
 
This research is demarcated according to two modes, one conceptual – state sovereignty 
- and two - distant proximity – the ideal of regional integration. When these are 
juxtaposed in the state sovereignty-regional integration complex, they resemble a 
complex picture of what is under construction. The nation state currently exists, so it is 
an important variable. The research examines what happens to the nation state variable, 
in respect to its policy preferences, interests and ideational content as the process of 
regional integration evolves. Put differently, does the nation state remain indivisible or is 
it evolving as the process of regional integration deepens?  
 
The research has found that the policy preferences and interests of states in Southern 
Africa converge and/or diverge not so much based on the SADC objectives and norms. 
The convergence and/or divergence of policy preferences among states in SADC is 
informed by the constant negotiation and engagement among states - yielding not so 
much a zero-sum regional integration arrangement nor is it leading to the demise of the 
nation state – but around a range of factors including: perceived economic gains and 
losses; persuasion and influence among state and non-state actors; political solidarity 
among state actors; external and internal political and economic pressures. The notion of 
state sovereignty is invoked by many states when all the factors above have yielded 
inadequate results for the particular state.  
 
The research has found that a constructivist process of co-determination and co-
constitution and solidarity, albeit very loose and not legaly binding, is taking place in 
Southern Africa. This process, the research has found, is pointing to an intergovernmental 
regional integration arrangement wherein certain policy areas or competencies reside at 
the regional level and some at the nation state level. The process of inter-state action 
and behaviour, the dissertation has found, is underpinned by the interests, preferences 
and choices of states in their discursive relationship to one another in the process of 
regional integration.      
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CHAPTER 1 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY   
______________________________________________________________________ 
1.1 Introduction       
 
Amongst a range of possible options for regional integration in Southern Africa is the 
incremental intergovernmental development cooperation along sectoral lines, the 
unfettered state driven and linear development approach, as well as the supranational 
regional institutional arrangement (Krapohl & Muntschick, 2009). All these approaches to 
regional integration offer different permutations in relation to historical context, the 
nature of politics, the character and the type of institutions, and the political economy of 
development of the countries in the region (Krapohl & Muntschick, 2009). The challenge 
for the Southern African region is how to create a binding and overarching institutional, 
political and economic arrangement that will incrementally link and accelerate balanced 
regional development. This research examines the development of an institutional, 
political and economic arrangement that is anchored on a minimum programme of 
incremental, limited, pragmatic, focused and scalable projects that will bring significant 
changes to the economies of all member states in Southern Africa (Tralac, 2014).  
 
The research examines the rationale for the choice for an incremental approach to 
regional integration in Southern Africa. In this way, the research examines whether 
incremental intergovernmental cooperation that aims to cumulatively link the region - 
building on the reality of national economies – can yield maximum results. This approach 
to regional development is concerned more with the development impact than with the 
achievement of a Free Trade Area (FTA) or a Customs Union (CU) (Ohlson & Stedman, 
1994). A key research focus of the dissertation is the examination of the role of the nation 
state in the institutionalisation process of regional integration. Explicitly, the research 
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examines what happens to state sovereignty as the process of regional integration 
deepens.     
 
1.2 Background to the Study  
 
The significance of regional integration in Southern Africa derives from both economic 
and non-economic factors to provide the region’s citizens with opportunities for political 
participation, socio-economic development, trade, investments, and access to markets 
for the development of the region (Achola & Msimuko, 1987; Ake, 1981). However, the 
rationale for regional integration in Southern Africa is often viewed as difficult, as most 
national markets are small and inadequate to sustain large-scale economic operations 
(Maasdorp & Whiteside, 1992). In spite of this, regional integration “is essential for 
catalysing Southern Africa’s human and physical development” and in the realisation of 
the prime objectives of accelerated and shared economic growth as well as reducing 
poverty (RISDP, 2002: 82).  
 
Regional integration has a fairly long history in virtually all parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). The first generation of regional integration schemes was motivated partly by the 
vision of African unity, but also as a means “for providing sufficient scale for import 
substitution industrialisation policies” (Ake, 1981: 146). These policies did not address 
the challenges of regional development for the same reasons underlying the national 
import substitution industrialisation policies: “national markets were too small and too 
poor, high input costs adversely affected transformation of exports, causing foreign 
exchange shortages and overvalued currencies, domestic monopolies and trade 
protection contributed to rent-seeking and ‘nationalistic’ lobbies” (Mistry, 1996: 83). 
 
As countries progressively switched from import-substitution industrialisation to export-
substitution industrialisation in the early 1980s, “the second generation of regional 
integration schemes in SSA became characterised by open regionalism” (Ake, 1981: 146-
147). This culminated into renewed political commitment to sub-regional integration from 
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government and private operators throughout the SSA as well as from the international 
donor community and the development finance institutions (DFIs). Thus, regional 
integration is not a simple phenomenon or “easy enough” but often has quite divergent 
political, economic and social justifications and objectives (Ake, 1981:160). At the Arusha 
Conference in July 1979, a strategy was initiated by the leaders of the Frontline States to 
launch the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).  
 
In April 1980, Botswana, Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe met at Summit level and “declared their commitment to pursue 
policies aimed at economic liberation on the basis of a sustainable integrated 
development of their economies” (le Pere & Tjonneland, 2005: 5). Whilst these regional 
initiatives were happening in Southern Africa, a great deal of similar movements was also 
happening in the rest of Africa (Ake, 1981). In this regard, the initiatives in Southern 
Africa were seen as reinforcing a groundswell of development approaches spawned by 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Lusaka Declaration, entitled “Southern 
Africa: Towards Economic Liberation” was adopted at the aforementioned Summit. The 
aims of the SADCC included: 
 
To mobilise and coordinate development assistance; and facilitate regional 
cooperation through joint development projects; to reduce dependence on 
apartheid South Africa; and achieve and secure international co-operation within  
the parameters and framework of the strategy for economic liberation (Mandaza 
& Tostensen, 1994: 17-28). 
 
The above also included that member states should pursue policies that are enshrined in 
the SADCC Programme of Action (Amin, Chitala & Mandaza, 1987). The key defining 
features of the SADCC Programme of Action were its emphasis on sectoral cooperation. 
This is argued to have been geared towards enhancing a sense of ownership of the 
organisation (Amin, Chitala, & Mandaza, 1987). The reason for the formation of SADCC 
is contested in literature with some researchers locating its genesis from “intense lobbying 
by Botswana” of other Frontline States (Angola, €Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
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Mozambique, Swaziland Tanzania and Zambia) to form the regional block (Amin, Chitala 
& Mandaza, 1987:8). On the other hand, Leys (1994: 23) argue that, “there was strong 
encouragement from Western countries” who wished to draw the region closer to the 
West and away from the ‘communist threat.’ The structure of the SADCC Programme of 
Action reflected “a loose regional grouping with emphasis on national priorities as the 
starting point in any cooperative effort” (Amin, Chitala, Mandaza, 1987: 10). The position 
was reiterated by former Vice-President of Botswana:        
  
The baseline for SADCC’s growth in the coming years will remain the perceived 
interests of our member states, their own measure of what must be done, and 
their own order of priorities. We now have a good programme of cooperative 
actions underway which will when implemented, further integrate our national 
economies” (Amin, Chitala, Mandaza, 1987: 10).    
 
In 1992, the SADCC was transformed into the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). The emphasis was on moving away from coordinated development towards 
development regionalism. This had the effect of transforming what was a loose coalition 
based on specific programmes to an organisation with a formal and legal status. The 
SADC Treaty is explicit in its elaboration of the priorities of the new body including:  the 
achievement of economic and human development through integration, harmonising and 
endorsing complementarity between regional and national programmes as well as the 
development of common political and democratic values to enable the region to promote 
and defend regional peace and security (SADC Treaty, 1992).  
 
In this sense, regional development, security and unity featured high on SADC’s agenda. 
Against this history, SADC’s country membership is currently standing at fifteen member 
states from the original founders, nine member states. The membership of SADC is as 
follows with the year that each country joined the body indicated in the brackets: Angola 
(1980), Botswana (1980), the Democratic Republic of Congo (2005), Lesotho (1980), 
Madagascar (2005), Malawi (1980), Mauritius (1995), Mozambique (1980), Namibia 
(1990), Seychelles (1998), South Africa (1994), Swaziland (1980), Tanzania (1980), 
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Zambia (1980), Zimbabwe (1980). The SADC is a major regional body in Africa. SADC‘s 
objectives or Common Agenda as outlined in the 1992 Treaty revolved around:  
 
Promoting development, poverty reduction and economic growth through regional 
integration; Consolidating, defending and maintaining democracy, peace, security 
and stability; Promoting common political values and institutions which are 
democratic, legitimate and effective; Strengthening the links among the people of 
the region; and Mobilisation of regional and international private and public 
resources for the development of the region (SADC Treaty, 1992).         
 
The SADC Common Agenda gave the new organisation a stronger focus to broaden the 
scope and dimension of regional integration in Southern Africa. This dissertation examines 
the process of regional integration with an awareness that states in the region are at 
different levels of development. Given this, the investigation of the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa is attentive to both an understanding of the position of 
states in relation to each other as well as their perceived interests in terms of benefits in 
the process of regional integration. The dissertation therefore, examines how states re-
define or re-shape sovereignty in relation to their policy preferences in the process of 
regional integration. The changing character or the evolving nature of state sovereignty 
is examined as the institutionalisation of the process of regional integration deepens.  
1.3 Research Problem  
 
The process of regional integration in Southern Africa is aimed at achieving regional 
development through progressive harmonisation of state policy competencies towards a 
normative regional ideal (RISDP, 2003). The SADC process of regional integration 
involves steps that will result in the convergence of [some] areas of state policy 
competencies into regional competencies or regional agency (RISDP, 2003). The 
approach to regional integration in Southern Africa – intergovernmentalism - is important 
for understanding how the ultimate outcome of integration in Southern Africa may evolve. 
Equally important, is the understanding of the role of the fifteen constitutive member 
states of SADC – whose sovereignty is relatively new – in the process of 
intergovernmental integration.  
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Given the above, this research examines the extent to which the institutionalisation of 
the process of regional integration in Southern Africa changes or influences the choices, 
interests and preferences of states. Inversely, the research examines how the states in 
Southern Africa shape the regional integration outcome in the region (Mandaza, 1993; 
Mhone, 1993; Shaw, 1998). By examining the extent to which state(s) sovereignty 
evolves in its attempt to define mutually constitutive regional integration outcome, the 
research pursues mutually reinforcing research purposes: one theoretical and the other 
empirical.  
 
1.4 Purpose Statement  
 
The purpose of this research is to explore regional integration in Southern Africa from 
what is provided in the SADC strategic and constitutive provision. This research purpose 
argues that “regions” are social constructions, and it is necessary to develop a dynamic 
conception of what constitutes a particular region (van Nieuwkerk, 2012:5). The “region” 
of Southern Africa will therefore, not be taken as “given”, but as a process under 
construction. Examining how “regions” are being constructed is not the same as arguing 
for the dismantling of ‘regional boundaries’. The study is concerned with explaining by 
whom, for whom, and for what purpose the boundaries and delimitation of the “region” 
are reconstructed. This is what van Nieuwkerk (2012:5) calls the “capacity to act, or 
‘actorness.’”   
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the political economy of regional integration 
in Southern Africa in the post-apartheid, post-Cold War era, with a key focus on why, and 
by whom, and for what purpose do various state actors determine policy preferences in 
the process of regional integration. The purpose of this research is also to explain how 
the social construction of the “region” of Southern Africa is influenced by the policy 
preferences or behaviour of states making the “region”. This research purpose posits that 
since the “region” of Southern Africa is not a “natural” or “given” phenomenon (Hettne & 
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Soderbaum, 2000:10), there can be no regionalist interest outside a process of social 
interaction and intersubjective engagement among the states making the region (Hettne 
& Soderbaum, 2000:36). Hettne and Soderbaum put the matter succinctly: 
 
It should be noted that there are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, and what  is 
referred to as region with regard to economic relations may not always be a 
 relevant delimitation seen from, for instance, a political perspective. It is 
therefore fruitful to maintain an eclectic and open-minded definition of regions 
(2000:10).          
 
In the post-Cold War era, a useful examination of the Southern African “region” needs to 
take account of the changing and evolving geo-strategic interests of states. Given this, it 
is useful to deploy an analytical perspective that takes account of these different modes 
in the choices that state actors make in the construction of the region, particularly with 
regard to how they are related and by whom, for whom and for what purpose they are 
erected. In a more abstract way, the research is an examination of power and the study 
of ideas in the construction of the Southern African region.   
1.5 Conceptual Approach and Framework  
 
A more rigorous conceptual and analytical framework for studying states and their role in 
the process of regional integration in Southern Africa is needed. This kind of conceptual 
and analytical framework should transcend the inclination to look at the qualitative 
appearance of the state and focus at the quantitative sources of decisions and policy 
preferences among states. The rationale for examining the concept of the state is to 
provide for clear conceptual framework on the primary unit of analysis in the research. 
By examining the role of the state in the process of regional integration, it is useful to 
clarify the conceptual underpinnings of the state. It is for this reason that the analysis 
below is provided to give a concise conceptual and analytical account of what has been 
written and theorised about the state in Africa.       
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Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, problems of the African state ceased 
to be a secret. The crisis of the African state has been the emblem on which much 
scholarship fixated to understand the increasing poverty of the continent. Crawford Young 
(1988: 26-28) has attempted to delineate the dimensions of this crisis which include: “the 
unraveling and conflictual character of state-civil society relations, the bloatedness and 
overconsumption of the state, the ‘anemic’ development rates, debt, inadequate aid 
packages, drought, incompetent political leadership, and the politics of the Cold War.”  
 
Young (1998:36) classifies the “legacy of the colonial state” in its post-independence 
institutionalisation as central to the disastrous position of Africa’s contemporary states. 
The post-independence African state clasped the institutions bequeathed from the 
colonial state which were designed as a tool for domination of society and the extraction 
of resources for the benefit of the metropole. The peculiarities of the colonial state as a 
subspecies of the European states are that, it was a “dependent appendage of an 
externally located sovereign entity,” it was “alien to its core” and its “inner logic was 
shaped by the vocation of domination” (Young, 1988: 37). The post-independence African 
state absorbed these tendencies.  
 
There are opposing perspectives that have argued that conceptions of regional 
integration in Southern Africa have not grasped the importance of the state in the process. 
In contention with Young’s perspective, Herbst (2000:75) presents a more benign view 
of colonial authority over Africa. He contends that the carving up of territory at Berlin was 
simply a way of precluding other European forces “from contesting a piece of territory it 
[colonising force] had claimed as under its sphere of influence” and that colonialism 
cannot be regarded as a hegemonising project. In fact, the shape of rule, as outlined in 
Berlin, was to proceed in a minimalist fashion, according to this view. Uncertain of the 
economic returns due from Africa, colonial forces were not prepared to incur huge costs 
in its rule. Colonial regimes were established with scanty resources and hence were fragile 
rather than dominant and all-encompassing. Herbst (2000:83) notes that: 
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[The] Africans recognised that the system of indirect rule was … a familiar one 
rather than an invention originating in a grand cultural project.  
 
 
Mamdani (1996: 24) argues that the scramble for Africa represented the completion of a 
project evolving from a “civilising mission to a law and order administration, from progress 
to power….” Notions of “indirect rule” as conceptualised by Herbst are termed 
“decentralised despotism” by Mamdani. Here, the “modern” law of the center coexists 
with some “customary” law of the tribe, constructed as static and unchanging. Mamdani 
did not necessarily see the colonising powers as having huge resources to throw into the 
rule of Africa. In a post-Cold War context in Southern Africa, the efficacy of the state in 
fuelling regional integration has been challenged by the ideology of globalisation.  
 
In the midst of the debate on the state in Africa, globalisation emerges describing a 
context within which there is a heightened movement of capital across borders, 
stimulated by, amongst others, revolutionary advances in information and 
communications technology (Mishra, 1999). The process of globalisation is viewed by 
some writers as a natural evolution of economies, whilst seen by others as ideologically 
driven through liberalisation (Amin 1997; Castells 1996; Keet 1998). The state is 
considered to have outlived its historic usefulness as a means to organise political and 
economic life (Boyer & Drache: 1996). In its place, a generic and omnipotent market is 
conceptualised, that has the capacity, if left unfettered, to organise economic growth. 
However, the state remains resilient. According to Keet (1998: 7): 
 
Statements about the demise of the roles of government [state] are a political 
obfuscation of the very different international impact of powerful, less powerful, weak 
and weakest governments [states], and the very different weight of their respective 
national, economic and strategic interests in the new international order. 
 
The process of globalisation and its neo-liberal policy lubricant are “highly uneven” 
according to Davies (1996: 520) with the degree of economic power of states a “major 
determinant of the level of market access granted and demanded.” As sophisticated and 
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advanced as the South African economy is in relation to the economies of Southern Africa, 
and as much political credibility South Africa wielded in the period of post-apartheid 
euphoria, the “EU-SA FTA will, in itself, be beneficial to EU economic interests, but it will 
also inevitably influence regional policies and the direction of future relations between 
the entire Southern/African region and the EU” (Keet, 2005:3). While the EU would 
provide South Africa with 7 percent additional duty free access to its market, South Africa 
is expected to reciprocate with 40 percent of its imports from the EU (SA-EU TDCA, 2001).  
 
At the same moment as neo-liberalism ‘attacks’ the state from above, from below, the 
state is under attack from irredentist and ethnic groupings seeking independent 
representation and territory partly as a result of increasing material inadequacies of the 
state itself (Mishra, 1999). These processes have significant implications for African 
statehood. Statehood in Africa, according to Jackson and Rosberg (1982), has relied in 
the main on “juridical” or internationally recognised bases of state sovereignty in the face 
of severely limited “empirical’’ or domestic foundations for statehood.  
 
The very artificiality of the African state has meant that it relies heavily on external 
recognition for its legitimacy and continued presence. The greater the fragility of the state 
in relation to its internal logic, the more African leaders were compelled to derive 
legitimacy and ensure survival from an international system of states that upheld state 
sovereignty. Nkrumah’s prediction of impending neocolonialism and balkanisation without 
pursuing African political unity derived increasing legitimacy as African states became 
“competitors in an inchoate struggle for external resources” (Clapham 1996: 6). Clapham 
(1996: 23) expands on this proposition, claiming that: 
 
For so long as statehood remained an important asset in bargaining with the 
international system, rulers could be expected to seek to consolidate the power of 
their own states, along with their own control over them. 
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An additional pressure on African states inheres in the process of what Bayart (2009, 74-
75) calls “extraversion” and the client status of many African states. “Extraversion” was 
derived through states’ participation in Cold War politics, which has duly come to an end, 
and with it, the strategic value of those states as states. According to Villalon (1998: 8), 
“African states in the 1990s stand poised between the threat of disintegration and the 
unknown terrain of reconfiguration.” Villalon adopts the notion of a ”critical juncture” to 
express the historic moment in which African states find themselves after the end of the 
Cold War, where politics has been rediscovered as an independent variable in 
development.  
 
The critical juncture is conceived as a time of momentous change and responses to that 
change “produce distinct legacies” within the constraints of the past, of the state’s 
“antecedent conditions” (Villalon, 1998: 9-10). By using the concept of “critical juncture” 
Villalon locates change and possibilities within the realm of distinct choices that can be 
made. This choice, for Villalon, occurs in the domain of protecting what should surely 
disintegrate, or boldly remoulding the state. Thus, the critical juncture, far from initiating 
responses of developing alternative political units, has seen the emergence of new states 
(such as Eritrea and South Sudan) which can claim only a “colonial justification” (Villalon, 
1998: 24).  
 
The choices that were made at the moment of a “critical juncture” that independence 
wrought have grown a legacy of division and competitiveness between African states 
themselves. The very decision for regional integration at the launch of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 was made in order to grapple with 
Villalon’s critical juncture. The choices that are made in relation to the current critical 
juncture that encompasses both the demise of Cold War politics and the emergence of 
globalisation have critically impacted on the region’s choices and future. In this regard, 
Herbst (1997: 150) give voice to the central complexity: 
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Given the erosion of the international underpinnings of the African state system, the 
question becomes whether Africans themselves will finally end the regime by changing 
their commitment to boundary stability. 
 
This research examines the extent to which state sovereignty will be negotiated in the 
process of regional integration – at least at the policy level – towards the normative ideal 
of regional integration in Southern Africa. The research grapples with Villalon’s critical 
juncture in relation to the state and the process of regional integration. This brief 
conceptual outline is useful to provide context on the state sovereignty-regional 
integration complex. The research examines the relation of SADC states’ policy choices 
in that complex. That some states in Southern Africa are fragile in terms of economic 
political development is not in dispute. With the publishing of the World Bank’s Berg 
Report in 1981, further scramble for analysis and perspective on the African state 
continued.  
 
The Berg Report fore-grounded the state as key to the development crisis in Africa (World 
Bank, 2001), central to the problems of deficient economic performance registered. The 
Bank’s 1989 report looked more closely at notions of governance proposing the resolution 
of Africa’s crisis as an abandonment of authoritarian practices prevalent on the continent. 
By implication, the Berg analysis was extended to the sphere of the political with the state 
not being regarded as simply a facilitator of economic relations. Again, a proliferation of 
analysis emerged, this time pertaining to concepts of ‘governance’ and the African state. 
Bratton and Rothschild (2001: 274) consider governance as involving “the reconciliation 
of institutions and state practices with domestic public values and aspirations.”  
 
Zartman (1966: 109) considers appropriate ways of reconstructing the empirical 
legitimacy of the African state in relation to the redrafting of its boundaries. Although 
written in 1966, his perspective resonates with the “critical juncture” within which 
Southern Africa is currently rooted. He concludes that there are only “two other 
alternatives [are] left: regional unity [integration] and tribally based irredentism.” 
23 
 
However, these alternatives can equally occur simultaneously in line with the impulse of 
contemporary challenges facing Africa and the world.   
 
This impulse at once reveals an atomisation and contraction of polities and at the same 
time participates in an expansion and enlargement into regional entities. For over one 
hundred years, the “colonial and post-independence states in Africa have lacked 
legitimacy” (Ranger & Vaughan 1993:1). Moreover, the contemporary state in Africa “has 
few defenders and seems totally to lack legitimacy” (Ranger and Vaughan, 1993: 258). 
Its over-consumption, lack of empirical legitimacy and shallowness has led many scholars 
to characterise it as a “vampire state” (Frimpong-Ansah: 1991), or as “shadow state” that 
performs state functions without state responsibility (Clapham: 1996: 14).  
 
On the other hand, the discourse on economic growth since the 1980s has focused on 
the neo-liberal ideology of market driven regional development. A possible alternative to 
that orthodoxy resides in strategies based on regional integration that strengthens states 
and regions through the creation of larger markets and enhanced bargaining power in 
multi-lateral institutions based on a common developmental agenda (Keet, 1998). In the 
absence of strong regional groupings, according to Weeks (1996: 107), “investors have 
been able to play one government against the other to extract concessions on taxes, 
labour regulations, and implicit subsidies.”  
 
At the same time as the boundaries of African states have come under challenge from 
within, they have also been affected by the decline of the international consensus 
which had previously supported them (Clapham, 1999: 58). 
 
The 1990s “critical juncture” heralded a wave of democratisation across the continent. 
Authoritarian regimes were swept from power in a frenzy of ballots and international 
accolades. However, democracy in the absence of any substantive decision-making 
capacity is self-defeating. The “democratic deficit” that inheres in social formations where 
wealth determines access and where international financial institutions (IFIs) determine 
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the trajectory of macro-economic policy, is nowhere more apparent than in Africa (Mishra, 
1999). Democratisation requires strengthened states. And African states can be 
strengthened by making them more able to develop people’s capacities and human 
development to arrest the scourge of poverty in the region. According to Souley (1999: 
72): 
 
Insufficient emphasis is given to the fact that democratisation of African political 
systems is coinciding with an acute financial crisis. The situation renders the state 
incapable of performing its most elementary tasks, including those inherent in the 
exercise of sovereignty … As a result, the state, for want of resources to 
redistribute, has lost all legitimacy… 
 
The double crisis of the African state is firstly its weakness, and its illegitimacy in relation 
to its domestic environment. In relation to this crisis, the state in Africa has been ‘forced’ 
along the road to democratisation. And secondly, the very international order to which it 
clamoured for support of its sovereignty is claiming that the state is no longer a unit for 
organising the economic and social life of citizens (or consumers). This order, dubbed 
globalisation, erodes political boundaries and international financial institutions, create 
laws governing the movement of capital that is often out of sync with the aspirations of 
national citizens. Democratic deficits emerge in relation to the increasing alienation of 
people from centers of political decision-making. In this context, a “legitimacy crisis 
threatens” (Pauly, 2000: 2). The clash between internal demands for democracy and 
globalisation’s rolling back of that very democracy locks African states in a very tricky 
corner.  
 
The African state finds itself in a position where it is being assaulted from inside and out 
– a double crisis. The attack though is for very different ideological reasons: the juridical 
attack is about neo-liberal free market economics and the domestic attack seeks the 
strengthening of the state to serve the interests of the ruling elite (and not ordinary 
people). The juridical attack is about the further erosion of democracy and the domestic 
attack seeks the extension of it for the few ruling elite. Regional integration, for Weeks 
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(1996: 116) “offers a vehicle for re-establishing the policy integrity of national 
governments” where integration “is not primarily for trade but to establish mechanisms 
for regulating capital flows, labour standards and behaviour of international 
corporations.”  
 
Regional integration in Africa, however, requires an even more radical approach that 
seeks to re-position the state itself. 
According to Darbon (1999: 41): 
 
The increasing inability of African states to meet their obligations and international 
responsibilities and to manage and lead their own societies, coupled with the 
financial bankruptcy and socio-economic collapse of most of them, makes it 
necessary to re-examine the relevance of the state model in Africa and to 
reformulate the apparently ‘hackneyed’ theories of regionalism. 
 
Considering the precarious condition of the state in Africa, coupled with a growing 
international trajectory that favours regionalism as a mechanism for the dual purpose of 
protecting and expanding markets, the state itself needs to be reconceptualised and in 
relation to that, notions of regionalism and regional integration need to be infused more 
social and contextual content. The concept of regional integration internationally has been 
based on an understanding of states, boundaries and territoriality. But the state itself 
stands condemned in Africa today. It is condemned by analyses that routinely speak to 
its ‘crisis’, which begs its removal, and an international neo-liberal discourse that regards 
the state as irrelevant. The dissertation examines not whether regionalism is a means to 
destroy the state, but whether regional integration can be deployed as a mechanism 
towards the renewal and strengthening of the state, albeit within very different territorial 
relations. As Clapham (1999: 53) posits: 
 
The international rules of boundary maintenance, laid down initially by the League 
of Nations, taken over by the United Nations, and enthusiastically adopted by 
African states … reinforced an ideology of state sovereignty which in turn pushed 
the quest for integration into a particular political form: the creation of inter-state 
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organisations … the fate of which was at every turn to raise the implicit tension 
between the states which belonged to the organisation. 
 
In the context of states with uneven levels of development, both politically and 
economically, this inter-state premise of regionalism can only create equally weak 
regional institutions. Ravenhill (1988: 301) questions the prospects for a voluntary re-
ordering of Africa’s polities through regional integration. However, his prognosis for this 
effort is profoundly pessimistic: “[T]he effects of regional economic schemes on state 
reordering will be marginal at best” (Ravenhill 1988: 302). His cynicism emanates from 
the experience of Africa’s integration schemes. They have been numerous, more than 
any other region in the world and all have been characterised by intergovernmentalism 
rather than establishing a supranational agency that will facilitate the institutionalisation 
of regional integration.  
 
For every wholly negative perspective on Africa’s prospects, there are equal numbers of 
buoyant and optimistic forecasts. Mazzeo (1984:2), for example, in one of the first major 
works on African regional organisations, asserts the intimate bond between the processes 
of regional co-operation and decolonisation. For Mazzeo, the integration of African polities 
“signifies the potential to extend beyond the trajectory of colonial social and political 
relations (1984:23).” He contends further that, in Africa, “the idea of regional co-
operation on a continental or sub-continental scale easily took root in the fertile soil of 
pan-Africanism” (1984:5).  
 
Hurrell (1995: 357) posits that the constructivism theoretical framework on regional 
integration in Southern Africa “provides a theoretically rich and promising way of 
conceptualising the interaction between material incentives, intersubjective structures 
and the identity and interests of the [state] actors.” This dissertation examines the state 
sovereignty-regional integration complex in Southern Africa by deploying a multi-
dimensional theoretical perspective of constructivism and some aspect new regionalism. 
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However, the examination in this dissertation transcends the constructivist emphasis on 
“social and inter-subjective meaning” also suggesting the “importance of materialist 
incentives” (Hettne and Soderbaum: 1989:14) in the construction of regional integration 
in Southern Africa.  
 
Cox (1986:31) argues “theory is the way the mind works to understand the reality it 
confronts.” Hettne (1995:8) on the other hand, argues, “all theory ultimately has to adapt 
to changes in the real world.” Gill (1988:79) is more apt in his analysis of the challenges 
facing the Southern African state: “sovereignties, political associations and forms of state 
are redefined to reflect this new categorical imperative.” The dissertation examines how 
the process of regional integration will “redefine” and “reflect” the policy space that is the 
domain of decision and preference making of states under the concept of state 
sovereignty.  
1.6  Demarcation of the Study  
 
The research is demarcated according to two modes, one conceptual – state sovereignty 
- and the other is what Rosenau (1989:46) refers to as “distant proximity” – the normative 
ideal of regional integration. When the two are juxtaposed in the state sovereignty-
regional integration complex, they resemble what Rosenau depicts on the one hand as: 
“a picture of the earth taken from the moon, a blue sphere seemingly suspended in 
timelessness and expressive of the large extent to which all humans are confined to the 
same limited space and thus bound by the same vulnerabilities” on the other: “is an ultra-
uterine photograph of foetus, the beginning of life set to evolve its own identity and to 
trace its own unique course” (1989:47).  
 
Putting the pictures together, the former depicts state sovereignty whilst the foetus 
resembles the process of regional integration that is underway in Southern Africa. It is 
the symbiotic relationship of both aspects of the picture that is important is this 
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demarcation of the study. State sovereignty reflects a bounded territory whose autonomy 
is provided in law.  
 
The process of regional integration whilst guided by collective protocols signed by heads 
of state and government is still dependent on the state for its evolution. Ironically, in the 
evolution of regional integration (foetus), the dissertation examines whether regional 
integration poses a threat “to the limited space” thus putting into question whether the 
region is “[bounded] by the same vulnerabilities” (Rosenau, 1961:47). The dissertation 
examines the relationship between state sovereignty and the process of regional 
integration - with regionalism integration defined as a general phenomenon projecting 
the desire for a normative regionalist order. Regional integration on the other hand, 
denotes “the empirical process … a strategy of regionalization … with increasing levels of 
regionness” (Hettne et.al., 1999:9).   
 
Given the fact that the process of regional integration in Southern Africa is driven by the 
state, it becomes more important to examine the character and nature of the state as 
increasing levels of regionness in Southern Africa are achieved. The research covers the 
fifteen members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which are 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. However, given the complexity of the regional integration as well as the 
number of states involved, the study will cover three policy areas: foreign 
policy/diplomacy; SADC-EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs); as well as the 
security policy architecture in the work of SADC. Therefore the research examines a select 
number of countries’ experience in relation to the three cases studies and the practical 
examples of state action in terms of how state policy preferences converge or diverge 
from the SADC’s normative objectives and goals.    
 
The aim of using case studies and the examples of state action is to get to an in depth 
analysis of the motivations of state actors in making policy preferences in the process of 
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regional integration. In other words, by examining a few cases in depth, the study allows 
the researcher to trace the changes of state preferences as well as government policies 
in the process of regional integration. The periodisation in the study starts at the height 
of the Cold War in the 1980s when SADCC was formed.  
 
Examining the state sovereignty-regional integration complex from this period gives an 
in depth reflection of intersubjective interaction of states in the process until the present. 
Given the fact that, the study is concerned with “distant proximity” (Rosenau, 1989:46) 
– the process of regional integration underway - the examination is conscious of the fact 
that both the global and regional policy framework of states in which decisions are made 
is not static. There’s constant policy change and this is true of policy in all states, but 
perhaps even more, for states in Southern Africa, where change can be rapid and 
unpredictable. 
 
1.7 Conclusion  
 
A research investigation on the process of regional integration in Southern Africa thus 
requires a thorough methodological outline of the political and institutional challenges 
confronting individual states in Southern Africa. The next chapter develops practical 
methodological guidelines for a qualitative inquiry on regional integration in Southern 
Africa. It recognises that qualitative research inquiry is inherently an interpretative 
exercise (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
 
In this regard, the interpretative exercise reflects both the documented experience and 
narrative reflection of those who have been involved in the process of regional integration 
in Southern Africa. The choice of the qualitative research methodology and techniques 
for the analysis of data is anchored on the objectives of the research as well as the 
questions that the research aims to answer. In this way, one is able to ascertain what 
methods of qualitative data collection are utilised.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this methodology chapter is to outline and describe the methodological choices 
and motivations for carrying out this study. It is also done to assist the research 
investigation to better comprehend and research the process of regional integration in 
Southern Africa. This section provides a framework for making comparisons in qualitative 
research methods. Implicit in this framework is the typology of research data collection 
methods, interpretation and analysis methods that will be deployed and why. The study 
will be based within the qualitative research approach that is traditionally associated with 
anti-positivist research opposed to the “upholding of the natural-scientific method as the 
norm for human behavioral research” (Wellman, et al. 2005:6).  
 
Accordingly, qualitative anti-positivist researchers have argued that it is inappropriate to 
follow strict quantitative methods when collecting and interpreting data on human 
behavioral phenomena (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Attention has also been given to key 
aspects of methodology as defining characteristics of qualitative research (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000; Miles & Huberman, 1994). These key aspects involve: the overall research 
paradigm, research design, approaches to the analysis and interpretation of data, and 
“the kind of outputs that are derived from qualitative research” (Wellman, et al., 2000:7).        
 
The qualitative research methodology that this study is based involves disclosure of 
choices and the thinking in making these choices as essential in clarifying the assumptions 
and theoretical dimensions of the methodology (Patton, 2002). Even more, qualitative 
research conceives of research investigation as occurring within a context that 
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significantly shapes the research itself (Greenwood & Levin, 2000). This is important in 
that it provides a useful way of explaining how this investigation will project ways of 
explaining the process of regional integration without insulating policy choices and the 
context within which state actors make such choices.  
 
2.2 Research Questions  
 
The research is anchored and is broaching two fundamental and related research 
questions. The research questions are both designed to investigate the dialectical 
relationship between the fifteen member states of SADC and its process of regional 
integration. Explicitly, the research questions intend to probe the process of regional 
integration and its relationship to the national states in SADC.     
 
i. what drives/motivates states in SADC to bend their policy preferences, interests 
and policies consonant to SADC normative objectives and goals; 
 
ii. what drives/motivates SADC states to abide to national laws, policies and norms 
in contradiction to SADC norms and objectives.   
 
 
The research utilises the constructivist framework to understand, explain and evaluate 
the subject matter. In the examination of the above research questions, three 
constructivist research assumptions are evaluated to establish the causal direction of 
state behaviour and preferences – to look at what drives states in SADC to make decisions 
and policy preferences the way they do. The following three constructivist research 
assumptions are utilised in the research through the use of practical real life examples of 
incidents where state action and behaviour is projected:   
   
1. the more congruent states’ [interests, values, motivations] preferences are, the 
less likely they are to prefer divergent policy [military] actions in the [security] 
choices they make; 
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2. states will make policy security, [diplomatic, trade] policy preferences in relation 
to self-interest, preferences will be made in relation to utility derived; 
 
 
3. the less clear the external threat to regional security, [diplomacy, trade] the less 
likely that countries would achieve mutual security [diplomacy, trade] (Hull, 1996: 
38). 
 
2.3 Research Design  
 
The research design on an investigation of the process of regional integration in Southern 
Africa requires much thought and reflection, and an appropriate research methodology 
would definitely facilitate this process. In order to avoid becoming overly ambitious and 
less focused on the subject – the evolving nature of state sovereignty in Southern Africa 
as regional integration progresses – the research methodology section highlights key 
elements of qualitative research paradigm that will be deployed for this research (Ritchie 
& Lewis, 2005).  
 
This research utilises a combination of case study method as well as semi-structured 
interviews to gather and collect data. The appropriateness of these methods for collecting 
and probing documented data is that they provide useful tools and techniques for social 
science research setting (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). The analyses of text and secondary 
and primary documents focused on material on government departments dealing with 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) in all the fifteen member states. This 
will be done to comprehend the substantive content or to illuminate deeper understanding 
of issues engaged and how these address the research questions (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995).  
 
These are in the main public documents which are available in public libraries, 
government departments, and at the SADC Secretariat. The primary utility of text and 
document analysis for this study is that it will provide a great deal of insight “to history 
of events, or experiences [that have] relevance” in the research but these cannot 
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thoroughly be probed through “direct observation or questioning” alone (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995).  
 
Semi-structured interviews are based on conversation with the focus on the researcher 
asking questions and interviewee answering (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001). A combination 
of both narrative and semi-structured interviews were undertaken to probe the research 
questions. The target group consisted of thirty government officials and other civil society 
leaders dealing with SADC regional integration: including Ministers and/or Deputy 
Ministers and their respective Directors General of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry 
in all the fifteen member states of SADC; heads of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
as well as leaders of multinational and non-governmental organizations.  
 
The idea of narrative interviews is motivated by a critique of the question-response-
schema of most interviews (Flick, et.al., 1991). In the question-response mode the 
interviewer is imposing structures in a threefold sense:  a) by selecting the theme and 
the topics; b) by ordering the questions; and, c) by wording the questions in his or her 
language (Flick, 2001: 23). Such data reveals more about the interviewer’s own interests 
and preferences than about the issues under investigation. The narrative interviewing 
technique that is deployed in the research requires that the researcher familiarise oneself 
with the field. From this, the researcher draws up some themes, topics and accounts to 
be presented during the narration with the interviewee (Schueltze, 1977).  
 
When the narration ends, the interviewer opens the semi-structured phase. This is the 
moment when attentive listening bears fruit. The questioning phase starts after the 
interviewer has sufficiently probed the end of the main narrative (Schueltze, 1997). In 
order to achieve empirical examination of the research problem on state sovereignty and 
regional integration, the case study approach is also used. Three policy areas: namely 
the SADC-EU EPAs; the regional security architecture; and regional foreign policy in the 
work of SADC (protocols) and that of member states is examined to trace trends in policy 
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preferences and decision of states - towards regional harmonization or the consolidation 
of state interests.  
 
By examining few cases in depth, the case study method allows one to trace the changes 
in state preferences as well as in government policies in the process of regional 
integration. Data analyses involves organising what has been seen, heard, and read so 
that sense can be made of what is learned (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Since data analyses 
takes place throughout the entire research process, the research is shaped and reshaped 
as the study proceeds, and data is gradually transformed into findings. “Each qualitative 
study is unique, the analytical approach used will be unique” argue Miles & Huberman 
(1994: 443).  
 
In addition, each researcher has his/her own preferences, strengths and weaknesses and 
must determine what works best. There is consensus in scholarship that the analysis of 
narrative interviews and semi-structured interviews is only useful when one separate in 
the transcript specific from generalised statements (Schueltze, 1997; Bauer, 1991). The 
first step in processing the data collected is transcribing the recorded interviews to a level 
of detail which is required for the research. It depends on the aim of the study how 
transcription involves elements of data beyond mere words used (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995).  
 
Ryan and Bernard (2002) identified thematic analysis as one of the most fundamental 
tasks of qualitative research. Themes can be described as “broad” concepts that are 
identified by the researcher before, during and after the data collection process. Themes 
can also be identified by reviewing the original field notes. Ryan and Bernard (2002: 23) 
offer the following techniques for identifying themes: 
 
Word analyses (word repetition, keywords in context); reading of larger units; 
secondary data analysis; physical manipulation of data; intentional analysis of 
the linguistic features.   
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The first and third data analyses techniques mentioned above relate to the data that is 
gathered through narrative and semi-structured interviews and in the secondary 
document analysis that is carried in the study on the process of regional integration in 
Southern Africa. It is appropriate that this study engage the thematic analysis strategy 
as a way to categorise, structure, and format key aspects of the data to link evidence 
based response to each research question: also to provide evidence through collaboration 
and triangulation in the analysis of documented texts (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).  
 
2.4 Limitations of the Study  
 
The study is undertaken with a large number of information being produced on the 
process of regional integration underway in Southern Africa. Given this, the study has no 
illusions about what is examined. The study takes off from an understanding that social 
scientists researching regional integration in Southern Africa with analytical tools that 
have dominated European integration studies - provide a partial understanding of the 
process of contemporary regional integration. The study provides an in depth examination 
of the state sovereignty-regional integration complex, albeit, in a global policy context 
that is changing. Another limitation to study is the challenging issue of access to senior 
policymakers in government.  
 
The dynamic condition in which regional integration occurs has implications for the 
process itself as well as the states – the catalyst for regional integration in Southern 
Africa. How this picture changes in the years to come until complete integration in 
Southern Africa is something that the research can only predict. The recommendations 
and conclusions of the research however, provide a useful springboard from which to 
build on the much richer theory of regional integration in Southern Africa. Progress in 
scientific development is rarely attained in just one single attempt (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1998). More than one step must be taken. The research explores the usefulness of the 
constructivism perspectives to regional integration in which social and intersubjective 
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forces are as important as material conditions in the process of regional integration 
(Wendt, 1994).   
2.5 Organisation of the Study 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
 
The first chapter of the study provides an outline of the problem that is examined. The 
motivation or case in terms of the theoretical and methodological tools to be deployed to 
research or examine the problem is made. The demarcation and limitation of the study is 
provided. The aim of the study is to provide a clear statement of the problem and how it 
is researched and with what kind of research tools.     
 
Chapter 2: Research Methodology  
 
The second chapter gives an overview of the research methodology and methods that 
will be utilised in the research. The aim of this chapter is to provide clear indications of 
the methods and techniques to be used to gather data, how that data will be analysed 
with what kind of research tools. This research methodology chapter also provides a brief 
explanation of the subject matter to be researched. It broaches briefly the research 
questions that the study utilises to investigate relationship between state sovereignty and 
regional integration in Southern Africa.  
 
Chapter 3: Conceptualising State Sovereignty and Regional Integration  
 
The second chapter provides a detailed description and outline of the concepts that are 
deployed in the study. The aim of the chapter is to make sure that a much clearer 
understanding of how the study is conceptualised does assist by elucidating the key 
concepts in the study. The chapter does examine the terms “state”, “sovereignty”, 
“regionalism”, “regional integration” and “regionalisation”. The intention is to examine 
the meaning of these terms. What is the relationship between “state sovereignty” and 
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“regional integration”? What is the meaning and relationship of the other terms and 
concepts in relation to the key concepts of the study?      
 
Chapter 4: State Sovereignty and Regional Integration: A Literature Review   
 
This chapter explores the theoretical literature to regional integration in relation to state 
sovereignty. The following contending international relations approaches in the literature 
are analysed in terms of how they theorise regional integration and the state:  
functionalism-neofunctionalism; realism-neorealism, new regionalism, liberal 
institutionalism, and constructivism. The aim here is to make sure that a clear theoretical 
delineation between these theories in terms of how they explain regional integration and 
the state is done. An argument is also developed for what is a more suitable theoretical 
approach, among these, for a theoretical examination of the Southern African region.           
 
Chapter 5: SADC’s Common or Collective Security  
 
This chapter explores the security policy processes that the SADC has developed to 
provide for a framework towards collective diplomacy in the region. The primary aim here 
however, is to examine how states’ foreign policy framework converge and/or diverge 
towards or away from the normative ideal of collective diplomacy. In this way, the chapter 
aims to provide empirical evidence in terms of which the study makes a determination in 
its findings about the process of regional integration and state sovereignty.  
 
Chapters 6: SADC’s Trade Relations with the European Union (EU) 
 
The chapter explores the (Interim) Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between 
the European Union (EU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
This chapter examines the nature of the interests that have driven some SADC states to 
sign and some not to sign the EPAs. The aim here is to explore the basis of the decisions 
made in the light of the SADC provisions that are providing a framework on how SADC 
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states should deal with third parties. A key question is whether disparate reactions to 
EPAs by SADC states is the function of what is provided in the SADC framework or it is 
merely states exercising sovereignty over trade with the EU.  
 
Chapter 7: SADC’s Common or Collective Diplomacy 
 
This chapter explores the nature of regional common or collective diplomacy framework 
and the SADC norms and objectives. The aim of this chapter is to explore whether the 
collective diplomacy framework, is applied and how it is applied by different states in the 
region. This chapter will draw on SADC standing provisions on internal and external 
diplomacy, by analysing and explaining their meaning in relation to what individual states 
in SADC are doing in the area of diplomacy.      
 
Chapter 8: Research Findings 
 
This chapter provides an elaborate synthesis of the study. The chapter provides in the 
main the findings of the study. The chapter provides a systematic link of the thesis 
emerging in the theoretical section with the empirical findings that are emerging in both 
the case studies as well as in the interviews. The findings provide thick evidence on the 
process of regional integration and how it modifies or alters the state – at least in terms 
of their (state) policy reactions to it.  
 
 
Chapter 9: Research Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
This chapter provides concluding remarks on the dissertation. The chapter in not intended 
to rehash or rewrite the dissertation. The chapter is not intended to provide the statement 
of what the research has found. The chapter is intended to bring what was raised in the 
introduction – in respect to the objective of the study - with closing statements and 
remarks that attest to it being proven, tested or found.  
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2.8 Conclusion  
 
Given the complex nature of qualitative inquiry, it is reasonable to expect that a sound 
research methodology will assist a great deal in sketching how the research objectives 
are to be achieved, what research design is to be constructed, and the data collection 
and analysis techniques that will focus the research investigation. These actions 
cumulatively will make the project more focused and feasible to carry out. Although there 
are guidelines on literature reviews, the qualitative paradigm’s emphasis on interpretation 
and emergent design provides no precise formula on how to proceed with the review.  
 
Each project is unique and ultimately it is up to individual researcher with assistance from 
the supervisor to determine what works best. Since the researcher is the primary 
‘instrument’ of data collection and analysis, reflexivity is deemed essential. This has 
entailed that careful consideration be given to the research methodology as well as the 
ways the researcher’s own assumptions and bahaviour may be impacting on the inquiry. 
Although convincing on theoretical level, the detail is in the structure of those narrative 
and semi-structured interviews – particularly the topics, themes and categories as well 
as the questions that the study has posed to the interviewees to probe the research 
questions.  
 
The next chapter of the thesis looks at the case of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). The analysis in the chapter is at three levels: i) an analysis that looks 
at the socio-economic and political structure of the SADC countries; ii) providing a brief 
institutional analysis of the SADC iii) the third level is the discussion of the concepts of 
state sovereignty, regional integration, and regionalism in terms of their usefulness or 
operationalisation in the study. The intention in explaining the concepts and terms is to 
enable the reader to place proper meaning and context of the terms and concepts in 
relation to the primary objectives of the study.      
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CHAPTER 3 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
CONCEPTUALISING STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
____________________________________________________________________ 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is regarded as an example of a 
developmental regional integration scheme because of its primary goal of the eradication 
of poverty (RISDP, 2002). The organisation has put in place a number of protocols, 
programmes and policies with significant focus on economic and socio-political 
development. It has also adopted a number of protocols and treaties in the areas of 
development co-operation with a potential to enhance high levels of regional 
development. The 15-member body has also tried to open the policy space for civil society 
participation in its programmes. The institutional reforms that took place at SADC during 
2003-4 period were intended to enhance the organisation’s capacity to drive regional 
integration and thus achieve its overarching goal of eradicating poverty (Tostensen, 
2008). 
 
SADC has its birth from a coming together of some countries in the region in the 1980s 
to reduce their economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. This solidarity under the 
name Frontline States Initiative (FLS) transformed into a more structured attempt at 
regional co-operation with a strong focus on sectoral development under the Southern 
African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC). Today, SADC bears the 
hallmarks of both phases of its evolution, a complex balance between political solidarity 
and a comprehensive agenda for developmental integration (Tralac, 2014).  
 
This section looks at how SADC views its model of regional integration. The chapter is 
looking at SADC’s shifting focus from dealing with South Africa towards overcoming 
critical development challenges posed by poverty, underdevelopment and uneven 
development among southern African countries. In the process, SADC has given 
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prominence to developmental objectives as the motivation behind its regional integration 
agenda with political and security programmes seen as creating conditions for social and 
economic development in the region (SADC, 2014). SADC views its approach to regional 
integration as evolving developmental model of regional integration. The rationale for 
incremental regional integration, SADC argues, is derived from its desire to deal with 
comprehensive and long-term social and economic development goals such as poverty 
eradication, trade, infrastructural development, and human development (Krapohl & 
Muntschick, 2009).   
 
While the regional integration process in Southern Africa began as a response to the 
presence of a strong but hostile South Africa, with time it drew its inspiration from the 
evolving continental integration agenda. This is the agenda that followed the formation 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and consolidated through a number 
of regional initiatives that promoted collective self-reliance including the Lagos Plan of 
Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Communities 
(1991).  
 
The idea of extricating African countries from perpetual marginalisation in the world 
economy and economic dependence on former colonial powers was part of the logic of 
what has been termed ‘old regionalism’. This was to be achieved through strong political 
solidarity and better economic co-operation among countries in Africa’s sub-regions 
(Akokpari, 2008). For this purpose, a number of regional economic communities were 
established and in the process the Frontline States Initiative transformed in the co-
operation conference, the SADCC, and later a regional integration scheme in the SADC.  
 
In conformity with general trends on the continent, regional integration in southern Africa 
has evolved from old regionalism to a new regionalism, a post-Cold War concept that 
denotes a multi-dimensional process of regional integration.  This concept captured the 
move away from rigid ideological focus of regional schemes and their narrow focus on 
security co-operation towards a more holistic rationale for integration (Hettne et. al., 
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1999). The new regionalism recognized the important role of non-state actors like 
business, the informal sector and civil society in the integration process. It also refers to 
willingness of the regional organisation to address issues of economic development, 
human security and social policy, resource governance, environmental protection, and 
regional self-sufficiency. Despite the distinctions between old and new regionalisms, the 
latter builds on rather than displacing the foundations of old regionalism.  
 
The evolution of SADC represents a bold embrace of new regionalism without discarding 
the negative tendencies of the old, especially state-driven integration. Its predecessors 
like their counterparts in other parts of the continent were generally inward-looking, 
introverted, and purely state-centered. In contrast, the SADC embraces the dominant 
neo-liberalism paradigm of economic liberation and active integration of the region into 
the world economy. In keeping with modernisation theory, it defines the problem 
primarily as one of marginalisation from the globalizing economy and it aims to better 
integrate the region into this economy. In this sense, typical of the post-Cold War new 
regionalism, SADC is extroverted and outward-looking in its orientation (Ikome, 2007). 
 
Another element of new regionalism that is worth noting is the idea of integration from 
below. While this idea is generally associated with the regional projects driven exclusively 
by non-state actors, in the southern African region it denotes attempts by states to 
provide space for civil society to participate actively as partners in the acceleration of 
regional integration. Although SADC integration remains state-led, there have been 
efforts to include other actors and constituencies in SADC. For this reason, at the very 
inception SADC called for a full participation by peoples of the region in the integration 
process. This ideal was first pronounced when the SADCC was formed in 1980, but had 
not been advanced at all (SADCC, 1980).  
 
There is a general consensus that the idea of regional integration that has evolved in 
Africa since independence is a good thing in that it encourages otherwise poor economies 
to pool together their resources and expertise to achieve noble common interests and 
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reduce their vulnerability to the vagaries of a globalizing economy. Studies indicate that 
the balkanization of Africa and the economic power imbalance between Africa and its 
northern partners on whom it depends worsens the vulnerabilities of its small economies 
and limited markets (Edo, 1997). The acceleration of globalization in the period after the 
energy crisis of the early 1970s also threatened to further marginalize Africa (Edo, 1997).  
 
Ikome (2007) supports that the greater co-operation around economic and political goals 
would enhance regional development and help overcome a myriad of problems facing the 
post-independence African state including conflict, poverty, and external economic 
dependence. Concluding its study of regional integration in Africa in 1993, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) noted that “so serious are the challenges facing southern Africa 
that governments cannot afford to ignore … the limitations which national boundaries 
impose on their prospects for economic recovery and growth (AfDB, 1993:1).” The way 
to do this, according to the AfDB, is to accelerate and deepen regional integration.  
 
Regional integration is often used to depict a group of countries with common 
characteristics and a shared political and economic project of integration (Hettne et.al., 
1999). This is the definition that SADC has adopted to explain its expansion into central 
Africa with the admission of the DRC, eastern Africa through Tanzania, and the Indian 
Ocean by admitting Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles. The common vision of building 
SADC into a strong economic integration scheme with maximum benefit for citizens of 
these countries is part of the so-called shared future paradigm at SADC (SADC Treaty, 
1992).   
 
Through regional integration, geographically proximate countries come together in a 
formal scheme to pursue common economic interests by adopting common policies that 
promote regional development. In his seminal work, Asante, (1997: 21) employed the 
concept of regional integration to define: “… a process where two or more countries in a 
particular area voluntarily join together to pursue common policies and objectives in 
matters of general economic development or in a particular economic field of common 
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interest to the mutual advantage of all participating states.” Hettne (1995) argues that 
this happens regardless of whether those countries are actually contiguous or even close 
to each other.  
 
The most useful definition is by Schneider, which describes regional integration as “the 
expression of a common sense of identity and purpose combined with the creation and 
implementation of institutions that express a particular identity and shape collective 
action within a geographical region” (Schneider, 2006: 9). Regional integration schemes 
generally do the following functions, which also help further deepen regional integration: 
 
the strengthening of trade integration in the region; the creation of an appropriate 
enabling environment for private sector development; the development of 
infrastructure programmes in support of economic growth and regional 
integration; the development of strong public sector institutions and good 
governance; the promotion of security co-operation or collective responsibility for 
security in the region; the development of social and economic problems to 
eliminate poverty, social exclusion and disintegration in the region; and the 
strengthening of the region’s interaction with other regions of the world (Van 
Langenhove & De Lombaerde, 2007: 377). 
 
Regional integration takes various forms, principally, market integration and 
developmental integration. The latter describes a holistic approach to regional integration 
whereby countries agree to progressively harmonize their economic and social policies, 
enhance political co-operation and develop a common regional identity. The former, 
which is increasingly prominent in the SADC agenda, is associated merely with the 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and commercial relations between a 
subset of countries. This latter form of integration evolves through a number of logical 
stages, namely (Hartzenberg, et. al., 2012: 10): 
 
a Free Trade Area (FTA) established through a free trade agreement by which 
participating countries agree to remove all tariffs and quota that apply among 
them; a Customs Union where FTA countries agree to establish a common external 
tariff regime to apply to countries falling outside the Union; a Common Market 
when these countries agree to ease the mobility of the factors of production and 
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trade; an Economic Union where the participating countries harmonize all their 
economic and trade policies and cede to the center the power to develop binding 
common policies in these areas; and a Community, which results from a complete 
integration of political, economic and social policies and institutions to create a 
single entity to run the entire area to which it applies.  
 
According to this typology, the SADC is at the infancy of regional integration, having only 
decided in 2008 to form an FTA and planning to establish a Customs Union in 2010 to be 
followed by a Common Market in 2015. Hartzenberg (2012) has identified two levels of 
regional integration—lower and higher levels. The former is often associated with 
theoretical schools of thought commonly called intergovernmentalism, while the latter is 
based on neo-functionalist theory and the idea of supra-nationalism (Amitav, Chitala & 
Mandaza, 1987).  
 
Neo-functionalists believed that integration was inevitable where there are various groups 
of interests that deepen their interactions starting with co-operation into integration 
(Asante, 1985). They saw the creation of a political union of states or federations as the 
ultimate phase of integration that transcends nation states. For them, a key driver of this 
process would be the existence of a political authority above nation states with sufficient 
executive powers and technical competence (Ashely, 1984).  
 
For neo-functionalists (Mistry, 2000, O’Neill, 1996), the success of integration depends 
on the willingness of nation states to cede their sovereignty to new political authority 
through a process of transferring loyalty in a process that results in supra-nationalism. 
Intergovernmentalism is a critique of neo-functionalism that proceeds from the 
assumption that integration goes as far as member states want it to go and it is driven 
by their deliberate will to satisfy their interests and achieve their own objectives. The 
convergence of these varying interests propels the integration process and does not lead 
to the transfer of sovereignty (Mistry, 2000).   
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The success of such interaction depends on the capacity of states to bargain in ways that 
enhance their respective positions and meet the key interests of groups at the national 
and regional levels. Intergovernmentalism describes the current stage of most regional 
integration schemes such as SADC (Asante, 1985).  It explains why there has not been 
much progress towards meeting the objectives of integration, especially in areas where 
member states are reluctant to cede authority to regional organizations.  
Intergovernmentalism illustrates the common problem of regional integration without a 
common regional vision and identity that continues to bedevil the SADC (Asante, 1985).  
 
Critics of SADC (Asante, 1985, Ikome, 2007) tend to use the supranationalist argument, 
noting that having created central institutions, SADC member states have failed to 
demonstrate political will to empower these institutions to function effectively and 
optimally for the common good. This is captured in the attempts by member states to 
constrain the SADC Secretariat and the continued efforts to usurp the powers of the 
regional body over co-ordination and implementation of regional policies. Although this 
chapter is underpinned by neo-functionalist ideas that are in line with constructivist 
paradigm on regional integration, it recognises that supra-nationalism is a gradual rather 
than an abrupt process of ceding sovereignty by member states (Ujupan, 2006: 87).  
 
3.2 Regional Integration/Cooperation Approach 
 
Regional integration in southern Africa has generally followed the logical progression from 
co-operation to integration. Regional co-operation refers to any form of working together 
by various countries to achieve common adjectives without sacrificing their diverse 
individual interests (Akokpari, 2008). The Frontline States Initiative was formed by 
independent states in southern Africa after the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and 
Mozambique in 1975 in support of liberation struggles in Namibia, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (Asante, 1985). In 1980, as Zimbabwe attained its independence, the initiative 
was transformed into a regional development co-operation institution under the name 
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Southern African Development Co-operation Conference (SADCC). The end goal was to 
reduce the region’s economic dependence on apartheid South Africa (Asante, 1985).  
 
When SADCC was replaced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 
1991, the Conference had made some headway to its end goal. Economic dependence 
on South Africa had lessened a little and the region’s relations with other parts of the 
world like China, India, the EU, and the USA had increased (Ikome, 2007). This was partly 
the result of a deliberate push for trade promotion and encouragement of private sector 
development, foreign direct investment and industrial production.  
 
It was the SADCC that began in the 1980s that started the drive to boost food production 
and build a regional food reserve, liberalisation of agriculture and agricultural trade and 
to enhance the regional transport infrastructure (RISDP, 2003). Ironically, this progress 
was also an outcome of South Africa’s regional destabilization campaigns that tended to 
disrupt economic activities between the country and its markets in the region, forcing 
regional countries to look for alternative sources of goods and services (Asante, 1985). 
In the process, the profile of investors in the region began to diversify. But South Africa’s 
economic dominance continued with the country accounting for 30 percent of imports in 
the region, while the region was the source of only seven percent of the country’s imports 
by 1991 (Lee, 2003:52).  
 
Co-operation is often the means to integration. Indeed, SADCC laid a good basis for a 
successful SADC integration agenda. In the Windhoek Declaration (1992) that formalised 
the establishment of the SADC¸ the SADCC founders noted that the organization’s 
greatest contribution to regional development, in spite of its many failures, was in “forging 
a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among countries and peoples of 
southern Africa” (Lee, 2003: 57). This was shaped by common positions adopted under 
the SADCC on what would later become the engines of SADC integration, namely: a 
regional food security framework, transport infrastructure, promotion of hard-core 
industries and services, and encouraging responsible exploitation of natural resources. 
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SADC built upon these foundations in pursuit of an explicitly integrationist agenda (Tralac, 
2014).  
 
It was at the inception of the SADCC that regional states declared that to be successful 
their efforts needed to be rooted in popular ownership (Lee, 2003). In fact, the founding 
Lusaka Declaration called upon the peoples of the region to partner with the SADCC to 
achieve the common goal to promote regional development by participating fully in its 
activities (SADCC, 1980). Of course, the Conference and member states failed to provide 
space for people and for civil society organisations to play a part. The SADC bequeathed 
this commitment and has been trying various ways of actualising it.   
 
SADC is different in various ways. It was given a legal status as a regional organisation, 
duly mandated to represent the region in international relations in terms of international 
law. Article 3 (1) of the SADC Treaty stipulated that the organization “shall have legal 
personality with capacity and power to enter into contract, acquire, own or dispose of 
movable or immovable property and to sue and be sued (SADC Treaty, 1992).” This raised 
reasonable expectations that member states would cede to it sufficient sovereignty for 
the organisation to be an effective international organisation.  
 
The SADC Treaty established an additional sixth organ to the five that existed under the 
SADCC, namely: the SADC Tribunal (Oosthuizen, 2006). This was established to help 
interpret the Treaty, adjudicate disputes over the application of the Treaty and the 
functioning of the organisation where political solutions fail. The SADC Tribunal has 
recently started functioning and its work has received a great deal of political scrutiny 
from the Heads of State and Government in the recent months. A more detailed analysis 
on the SADC Tribunal that is underpinned within the constructive paradigm in the 
research is provided below. 
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3.3 SADC’s Institutional Framework and Vision  
 
The SADC’s vision and mission directed SADC towards a holistic and developmental 
approach to regional integration. Expressly, its mission is to “promote sustainable 
equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive 
systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance and durable peace and 
security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international 
relations” (SADC Treaty, 1992).  
 
Its overall goal is to eradicate poverty. This is to be achieved through several objectives, 
among which includes enhancing the standard and quality of life of the peoples of the 
region; promoting self-sustaining development and collective self-reliance; ensuring 
productive utilization of natural resources; achieving complementarity between national 
and regional policies and strategies; and strengthening the affinities between the peoples 
of the region (SADC Treaty, 1992).  
 
The guiding principles are sovereign equality of member states; solidarity, peace and 
security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC Treaty, 1992). While these principles 
were common, SADC did not adopt the principle of non-intervention, even though it did 
not support non-indifference either. But this allowed space for regional states to act 
decisively against violations of human rights and aggression (SADC Treaty, 1992). Of 
course, SADC has only used this space sparingly, such as in the case of a military 
intervention to prevent a coup in Lesotho in 1997 and the support that its members 
provided to a beleaguered Laurent Kabila government in the DRC (Southall & Petlane, 
1995).  
 
The development content of the SADC integration is to be found in its eight priority areas 
of intervention:  
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achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially 
disadvantaged through Regional Integration; evolve common political values, 
systems and institutions; promote and defend peace and security; promote self-
sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-
dependence of Member States; achieve complementarity between national and 
regional strategies and programmes; promote and maximise productive 
employment and utilisation of resources of the region; achieve sustainable 
utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; 
strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural 
affinities and links among the people of the Region. (SADC Treaty, 1992).    
 
This constitutes what SADC calls a ‘Common Agenda.’ This agenda is comprehensive and 
broad, covering every major area of life and normal policy area. There was deliberate 
focus on developmental question, limiting political and security issues. This is contrary to 
typical market integration schemes where the focus is on narrow issues of trade and 
economic growth at the exclusion of matters of social development. The same could be 
said of regional integration initiatives that have a strong emphasis on security co-
operation (Vale, 1997).  
 
In this sense, SADC is particularly developmental in its approach to regional integration. 
If fully implemented, its common agenda has a possibility of addressing the felt needs of 
the peoples of the region. But, a comprehensive development agenda runs the risk of 
prioritising everything and achieve nothing because of shortage of resources and capacity 
to implement these grandiose ideas and plans (Asante, 1985).  
 
This is precisely one of the major shortcomings of SADC: implementation capacity and 
impact. The broad strategies employed by the SADC in its pursuit of its mission are 
various. Some draw from the paradigm of market integration. These include developing 
policies to progressively eliminate tariffs and quotas; the removal of obstacles to free 
movement of labour, capital and factors of production; mastery of technology and 
innovation; and improving economic management and performance through co-operation 
(Asante, 1985).  
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The idea is to create conditions for “free market activity” in the hope that this would boost 
the weak regional economies and “thereby help reduce poverty and underdevelopment” 
(Keet, 2005: 123). Other strategies seek to deepen development through efficient 
distribution of growth dividends; enhanced institutional capacity to provide services; 
measures to improve human capability through human resource development; and 
harmonization of economic and social policies among member countries. The idea of the 
SADC playing a primary role to coordinate the conduct of international relations with a 
view to mobilizing international resources in support of regional development is an noble 
strategies, but one that is much less prominent in practice (Keet, 2005) .  
 
Although political priorities are intrinsically linked to developmental objectives, the SADC 
recognised that development would not happen in conditions of conflict, political 
instability, and oppression (Van Nieuwkerk, 2008). This matter was not prominent at the 
outset, but has since become a major element of the SADC agenda. The SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation is arguably the most powerful organ (RISDP, 
2003). It is driven at the highest level by Heads of States/Government. The Inter-State 
Defence and Security Committee established in 1995 to replace the old one formed as 
part of the FLS rivals SADC’s Council of Ministers in its powers and influence (RISDP, 
2003). In 2004, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation entered 
into force, thus providing a policy framework or this area of operation (Asante, 1985).  
 
The SADC has typical political organs to provide direction to its work. The highest 
decision-making body is The Summit of Heads of State/Government. The Council of 
Ministers oversees the functioning of SADC and advises the Summit on policy matters 
and the development of SADC. It develops the organization’s substantive agenda and 
sets its strategic priorities and targets (RISDP, 2003). The Integrated Committee of 
Ministers (ICM) was created in 2003 to replace the sectoral committees of ministers. Its 
responsibility is to direct the work of four directorates at SADC charged with socio-
economic issues. This committee also replaced the original commissions. The Standing 
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Committee of Officials functions as a technical advisory committee to guide the Council 
on its responsibilities as well as to form as link the Council and the ICM (Oosthuizen, 
2000).  
 
The Secretariat and the Executive Secretary are the principal administrative and executive 
institutions of SADC. The Secretariat is tasked with providing strategic planning and 
management for the organization, implementing its decisions and coordinating the 
policies and strategies of member states to ensure synergy with regional policy positions 
(SADC Treaty, 1992). As the head of the Secretariat, the Executive Secretary manages 
the consultation between governments and SADC, SADC interface with other regional 
organizations, organizing the meetings of the Summit and Council, and overseeing the 
public administration machinery at SADC (Legum, 2000). 
 
The bulk of the implementation and coordinating work in relation to the substantive 
agenda of SADC was conducted by the Sectoral Coordinating Units (SCUs). The SCUs 
coordinated the implementation of policies and plans of each sector and a sector implied 
each priority area of intervention (Leistner, 1997). The SCUs were hosted by different 
member states, giving such states coordinating powers over sectors they hosted. For 
instance, South Africa hosted and, therefore, drove the implementation of programmes 
of trade, finance, and investment (TIFI) sector, while Zimbabwe coordinated the food 
security, agriculture and natural resources (FANR) sector (RISDP, 2003). Each member 
states had a SADC National Contact Points (NCP) for communication with the Secretariat 
as well as a national secretariat on SADC for co-ordination of national SADC agenda. By 
2002, there were 22 SCUs as the large sector had been sub-divided, fourteen NCPs spread 
over the entire membership of the SADC (RISDP, 2003). 
 
As early as 1993, SADC members were aware that the organization was institutionally 
weak and inefficient. This arose from various assessment reports released in 1993, 1994 
and 1997. The latter was commissioned by a committee of four member states to consider 
what these reports found as weaknesses in the Secretariat, the SADC National Contact 
53 
 
Points (NCP), and Sectoral Coordination Units (SCU) (SADC 1993). All these report came 
to the same conclusions, namely: SADC’s decentralized structure was not working well; 
there were significant gaps in the management and the capacity of different SCUs; the 
national status of SCUs made it difficult for the Secretariat to pull these institutions 
together in a concerted regional response to common mandate (RISDP, 2003), The 
Secretariat lacked management capacity to clearly articulate and monitor common goals, 
strategies and time frames; national policies and strategies lacked a regional dimension; 
there was poor communication and co-operation between SCUs and the Secretariat 
(RISDP, 2003). 
 
Further review confirmed the fact that the performance of SCUs varied considerably, with 
some even outperforming the Secretariat itself, while other barely functioned. SCUs were 
managed and run differently depending on the resources and expertise each host country 
was able to invest in it (RISDP, 2003). For this reason, the SCUs tended to encourage 
disintegration and incoherence in the implementation of the SADC agenda. They also 
tended to develop their own separate agendas, often linked to national priorities of host 
countries, thus weakening the common SADC agenda. There was considerable 
disjuncture between plans at the center and programmes and projects implemented by 
SCUs (SADC, 2003).  
 
The further audits also confirmed that the Secretariat itself was institutionally weak and 
ineffective in carrying out its mandate (SADC, 2001). Weak strategic management, 
administrative systems and technical competence weakened the Secretariat’s capacity to 
co-ordinate national policies and implement regional policy positions (SADC, 2002). It 
was inadequately and inappropriately staffed and under-funded. The staff morale was 
found to be very low and the staff turn-over was high. The relationship with the Council 
and the Committee of Officials was also found to be fragile. This meant that the center 
of SADC business was generally weak and ineffective. This undermined the entire 
business of SADC (RISDP, 2003). 
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The internal assessments also discovered that there were many problems pertaining to 
the role of national governments as the key implementers of the SADC agenda. The 
original idea was that SADC as a supranational authority would provide policy guidance 
and direction in pursuit of regional integration and development by developing regional 
policies, adopting regional agreements and designing regional programmes of action 
(Lee, 2003). The actual implementation of these is meant to happen at the national level 
and the member states’ governments were expected to put measures in places and drive 
the implementation of regional policies through national service delivery machinery. They 
also needed to mainstream the regional agenda through a deliberate process of ensuring 
that there is harmony between national and regional policies (RISDP, 2003).  
 
Besides this, national governments were expected to allow SADC space to influence their 
national agenda (Le Pere & Tjonneland, 2005). The national secretariat was responsible 
for coordinating a concerted national effort to implement SADC programmes, but many 
of these were either non-functional or weak. Where they existed they consisted of small 
desks in departments of foreign affairs and/or regional co-operation. They did not include 
civil society and business as required. Member states had neglected a major element of 
realizing the common goals they adopted at SADC Summits (Lee, 2003). They allowed 
the process to be state-led even when SADC had opened space for the participation of 
non-state actors and the people. As a result, although SADC had developed many 
laudable programmes and projects, most of them remained unimplemented. As many of 
these depended on donor funding and technical support, the SADC approach was thus 
transformed into projects-driven implementation (RISDP, 2003).  
 
These tended to be narrow and short-term in nature. It is difficult to measure the impact 
of such disjointed efforts even if well-meant. SADC had by 2004 “a plethora of treaties 
and protocols as the legal basis of its common position” (Interview, 2012). These covered 
virtually every priority sector and plan at SADC. Many of these legal instruments were 
signed after protracted negotiations, spanning years in some cases. The all-important 
Trade Protocol was negotiated over a period of four years before it came into force in 
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2000 (RISDP, 2003). The Protocol was aimed at 
boosting intra-regional trade, which until 1995 
amounted to a mere 5 percent of all trade among 
member states, excluding South Africa. The SADC 
members needed to agree on the formula for 
elimination of tariffs. This was a very difficult 
matter in regard to the sensitive sugar and textile 
industries (Lee, 2003).  
 
Once signed the Protocol implementation was 
complicated by trade negotiations between South 
Africa and the EU, which culminated in the signing 
of the Trade, Development and Co-operation 
Agreement (TDCA). The TDCA strained relations 
between South Africa and SADC member states 
(DTI, 1999). The SACU members automatically 
became members of the agreement, even though 
they were not part of negotiations, by virtue of 
being members of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) with South Africa (RISDP, 2003). 
They were aggrieved because free access to the 
South African market for EU goods meant there 
would be lower SACU revenues. Non-SACU 
members were worried about the possible 
infiltration of their goods by illegal EU goods due to 
poor border and customs controls (RISDP, 2003).  
 
The challenge was that most of these protocols had 
not been implemented. The internal reviews in the 
early 2000s found that this was partly to do with 
Select SADC Protocols 
1. Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community 1993 
2. Protocol Combating Illicit Drugs 1996 
3. Protocol on Forestry 2002 
4. Control Protocol on the of Firearms, 
Ammunition and Related Material 2001 
5. Protocol against Corruption 2001 
6. Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport 
2001 
7. Protocol on Fisheries 2001 
8. Protocol on Development of Tourism 1998 
9. Protocol on Education and Training 1997 
10. Protocol on Energy 1996 
11. Protocol on Health 1999 
12. Protocol on Legal Affairs 2000 
13. Protocol on Mining 1997 
14. Protocol on Trade 2000 
15. Protocol on Transport, Communications 
and Metereology 1998 
16. Protocol on Shared Watercourses 2003 
17. Protocol on the Facilitation of Free 
Movement of People  2005 
18. Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation 2004 
19. Protocol on Immunities and Privileges 
1993 
20. Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and 
Law Enforcement 2003 
 
Other Treaties 
21. SADC Mutual Defence Pact 2003 
22. MoU on Macroeconomic Convergence 
2002 
23. MoU  on Co-operation in Taxation and 
related Matters 2002 
24. Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
2003 
Source: SADC Website; http//www.sadc.int 
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the institutional weaknesses at SADC that accounted for weak implementation of other 
SADC policies, plans and programmes. The greatest challenge was and still is the failure 
of member states to translate these protocols into binding national laws as agreed 
(RISDP, 2003).  
 
On the basis of these reviews, SADC decided to overhaul the institutions that had been 
found wanting by the assessments, that is, the Secretariat, SCUs and National Contact 
Points. The main thrust of these reforms was the collapse of SCUs, which were 
consolidated into four directorates within the Secretariat (RISDP, 2003). These new units 
were to be responsible for coordinating the region-wide implementation of clustered 
sectoral plans (RISDP, 2003). These clusters or directorates were Trade, Investment, 
Finance and Industry (TIFI), Food security, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR), 
Social and Human Development (SHD), and Information and Science (IS). To enhance 
management capacity within the Secretariat two new positions of deputy Executive 
Secretary were created and a division on strategic planning was also established (RISDP, 
2003). To complete the overhaul, SADC replaced NCPs and secretariats with new entities 
known as National Committees (NC). The guidelines on the NCs were to be constituted, 
elaborated, and circulated in member countries (RISDP, 2003). The NCs were supposed 
to comprise of various relevant government departments, representatives of civil society 
and business, charged with national implementation strategies and plans as well as to 
oversee national responses to SADC policies, programmes and decisions (RISDP, 2003). 
 
National committees consist of key stakeholders, namely; government, the private sector, 
civil society, non-governmental organizations, and workers’ and employers’ organizations. 
Each SADC national committee is supposed to reflect the core areas of integration and 
co-ordination in their composition.  Their responsibilities are to: 
 
provide input at the national level in the formulation of regional policies, strategies, 
and programmes of action; co-ordinate and oversee, at the national level, 
implementation of SADC programmes of action; National Committees have served 
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as a platform for closer co-operation between SADC and its member states and 
are a key step towards deepening integration (RISDP, 2003: 34). 
 
The governing structures of the SADC were also transformed. The sectoral committees 
of ministers that had mirrored the SCUs were dissolved and replaced by the Integrated 
Committee of Ministers (ICM) with the responsibility to attend to substantive policy issues 
by sector to give guidance and direction to the Secretariat. The SADC also created a 
Troika system whereby the current chairperson of SADC was to work together with the 
outgoing and incoming chairs in a troika (RISDP, 2003).  
 
The SADC Troika was given the responsibility to provide overall direction to the work of 
SADC in-between SADC Summits, deal with major challenges and crises that might arise 
and act on behalf of SADC in major international meetings and events. This Troika was 
mandated to meet regularly to consider whatever matter may need their attention. The 
same governing structure was established for the SADC Organ. The two Troikas 
combined, called the Double-Troika, and had the overall responsibility over the 
organisation (RISDP, 2003).  
 
These were drastic changes. They helped in many ways to modernize and plug obvious 
gaps in the SADC bureaucracy. The new governing structures have helped ease the role 
of the chairpersons of SADC and of the Organ. In fact, the Troika system encourages 
consultation dealing with critical matters that arise in the region and thus ensure a quicker 
response by the region to these issues than before (RISDP, 2003).  The case in point is 
the Double Troika’s response to the degeneration of the political situation in Zimbabwe 
in March 2007. Within a week, the Double Troika had met, made consultations and 
appointed a mediator to facilitate talks between the ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This helped avert a violent meltdown of the 
political situation in Zimbabwe and assisted the parties to reach power-sharing settlement 
currently being implemented (RISDP, 2003).  
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However, the institutional reforms have failed to overcome the problems of institutional 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness at the SADC level and the attendant challenges of weak 
implementation capacity. The reform process should have ended in 2003, but it was still 
incomplete in 2008. Although a new organogram has been adopted and new posts 
created, many of these remained vacant for years (RISDP, 2003). The feedback in the 
semi-structured interviews confirmed that “SADC Secretariat is unable to attract 
competent staff due to low salaries and complexities relating to the quota system which 
restricts the number of personnel per member country” (SADC Report, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, key aspects around performance were in following way: “old staffs have 
remained in its positions regardless of its performance because political considerations 
take precedent over imperatives of good governance and sound public administration 
(SADC Report, 2003: 23). The dominant in the interaction with SADC staff was that the 
morale at SADC headquarters at that stage “… was low and the staff overworked, but 
underpaid” (SADC Report, 2003).  
 
The staff at the SADC Secretariat viewed the quota-based recruitment process “as a major 
contributor to the inefficiency of the SADC” (SADC Report, 2002: 34). In keeping with 
recommendations of the Council of Ministers of Health in Dar es Salaam in August 2003, 
a point based quota system was developed and approved at the Council of Ministers 
meeting in Mauritius in February 2005 (SADC Communique, 2005). The quota system in 
based on the following principles: 
 
… no country should have more than one position in the top posts from Director 
to the Executive Secretary while others are not represented; before any selection 
or interview, the status of 50% target for women in positions at the Secretariat 
should guide benchmarks for selection and interviews; for the top 3 positions of 
Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive Secretary and Chief Director, at least one 
of the position should be occupied by a female candidate (SADC, 2004). 
 
The SADC Secretariat undertook a benchmarking exercise with 5 other international 
organizations that use the quota system. The other organizations that were benchmarked 
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against include: African Union, ECOWAS, COMESA, East African Community and Namibia 
Public Service Commission.  However, in ECOWAS, COMESA and East Africa Community, 
the quota only applies to Statutory and senior positions.  The rest of the positions are 
filled on a competitive, meritocratic basis to ensure the recruitment of the best possible 
candidates from the region (SADC, 2004).    
 
In SADC, most countries have utilised their portion of the quota, with the exception of 
South Africa (no representation), and Madagascar and the DRC with only one 
representative each (SADC, 2004). For Madagascar and the DRC, language and cultural 
differences are the main barrier (with English being the main language in SADC), this 
believed to be “the main reasons for lower levels of representation from those countries” 
(SADC Report, 2004: 12).   SADC recruitment processes are often long and tedious, with 
an average position taking more than six months to fill (RISDP, 2003). 
 
The new directorates took a long time to start functioning with the result that it was 
“difficult to indicate whether they are overcoming the problems encountered by SCUs” 
(SADC Report, 2003: 22). These directorates that took over co-ordination responsibilities 
for large clusters of policy areas are thinly staffed with some directorate functioning at 
less than 40 percent of their capacity by early 2008 (SADC, 2008). There is a drastic 
shortage of technical and expert personnel necessary for the directorates to handle the 
new and complex responsibilities, i.e. strategic planning and management (SADC, 
20078). This meant that SADC could not start doing the co-ordination work in earnest, 
neither could it effectively monitor nor guide the national implementation of SADC 
programmes (SADC, 2006).  
 
The filling of the SADC Secretariat position and of the deputy Executive Secretary and the 
Executive Director, these were aimed at improving co-ordination and implementation of 
SADC policies (SADC, 2007). The executive director co-ordinates the work of the four 
directorates and provide leadership in the implementation processes (RISDP, 2003). This 
post was created to give the secretariat a sort of an internal driver of the cop-ordination 
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work and to remove operational responsibilities from the Executive Secretary (RISDP, 
2003).  
 
The National Committees (NC) that replaced the NCPs and national secretariats are also 
barely functioning (RISDP, 2003). Few countries, if any, have properly constituted the 
NCs. In most cases, their responsibility is still done by the old Contact Points or SADC 
desks that should have been done away with by now. The sentiment among many SADCD 
staff, “few cases where NCs exist, they are government dominated instead of being multi-
stakeholder forums as expected” (SADC Report, 2003: 12). Furthermore, very few even 
have different government departments, many being dominated by departments of 
foreign affairs and/ or regional co-operation.  
 
The co-ordination between the new Secretariat and the NCs remains weak, partly because 
NCs are yet to be fully constituted and the Secretariat is weakened by poor capacity 
(RISDP, 2003). The co-ordination of national role-players is also poor because of 
weaknesses in the NCs. The interface between the Secretariat and other stakeholders 
including development partners and civil society remains inadequate. The most 
fundamental problem, which cuts across all of the above-mentioned problems, is the 
inability of member states to capacitate institutions of SADC to implement their mandates 
(RISDP, 2003). Member states are unwilling to strengthen national contact points or NCs 
partly because they prefer to co-ordinate elements of the SADC business themselves in 
the first place.  
 
Many states resisted the review reports of the late 1990s, fearing that if implemented 
they would empower various elements of the SADC agenda (SADC, 2003). No valid 
reasons have been offered for the failure of member states to establish NCs, for instance 
(SADC, 2007). There is a perception in the Secretariat that member states “… are refusing 
to cede any element of their sovereignty to the SADC to empower it to act on its mandate 
and accelerate the integration of regional economies” (SADC Report, 2002: 14). This 
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reluctance to share sovereignty with fellow member states is conceived as major source 
of the delay in the regional integration in the SADC region (SADC, 2012).  
 
3.4 SADC Programmes: RISDP and SIPO 
 
The most innovative outcome of the reform process was the adoption in 2003 of a 
regional development vision called the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP). The Plan was the first coherent articulation of what development means for 
SADC and how it would be achieved (RISDP, 2003). It was a product of decades of 
developmental experiments on the continent that had produced the Lagos Plan of Action, 
the Abuja Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) among other 
development initiatives. SADC and its predecessors had long committed themselves to 
eradicating poverty through a combination of specific developmental interventions and 
tackling the political challenges of conflict and instability (SADC Treaty, 1992). But 
hitherto SADC had not developed a concrete and comprehensive regional vision for 
development. 
 
The RISDP begins with a reflection on the fundamental problems that bedevil the region, 
the central one being uneven development in the region with seven states classified 
among the least developed countries in the world (SADC, 2004). The DRC, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia are particularly weak economies with heavy 
dependence on primary commodity exports and narrow production bases. In the past five 
years, these have been joined by Zimbabwe which has regressed from a regional bread 
basket into an economic and political wreck due to international isolation and internal 
political troubles. On the other end, there is Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa who 
boast much more diversified economies of scale as well as more democratic political 
systems and domestic stability (RISDP, 2003).  
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The remaining five states (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and Tanzania) fall 
in between the two extremes and are characterized by moderate economic growth and 
development and relative political stability (RISDP, 2003). The Plan concedes that there 
is lack of convergence among regional economies and very little trade between them, 
excluding South Africa (RISDP, 2003). There is generally high dependency on aid as well 
as on asymmetric trade with South Africa and exports of primary commodities to the 
developed world (RISDP, 2003). Then there is a social crisis in the form of deep levels of 
poverty and food insecurity and high incidence of disease especially HIV and AIDS 
(RISDP, 2003).  
 
The RISDP also boldly concedes SADC’s own failures. Chief among these is the failure to 
forge a regional identity and to ensure a demonstrable commitment to a common vision 
of regional integration. This means member states concede that they have failed to 
sufficiently look beyond narrow national interests to build a better future for the entire 
region. A number of states belong to more than one regional grouping at the same time 
which raises doubts about their loyalty and commitment to SADC. The weak SADC 
Secretariat has to do, in part, “with the failure of the member states to cede some power 
to the institution to enable it to enforce agreed decisions and programmes for common 
good” (SADC Report, 2002: 44).  
 
During the last reforms and reviews of the RISDP itself, “member states could have given 
the office of General Secretary more leeway to execute decisions and co-ordinate 
implementation by member states” (SADC Report, 2004). In the process, the Secretariat 
could have acquired some political authority to keep member states on their toes and 
thus effectively champion the SADC agenda. Instead, member states have vehemently 
resisted this. They have, instead, created own institutions like the Integrated Ministerial 
Committee to supervise the secretariat even on matters relating to staff appointments. 
The reluctance to ratify and implement the plethora of protocols and flagship projects 
“serves as another brake in the implementation of the SADC programme of action” (SADC 
Report, 2004: 23).  
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The RISDP is not only a vision and policy, but a catalyst for energizing regional efforts in 
twelve priority areas through a combination of broad strategies and time-bound targets. 
This is in keeping with the latest thinking in development planning. Each priority has a 
goal, strategy and targets to be achieved in the five-year period. The following is a select 
set of priority and targets: 
 
For poverty eradication, the target is to achieve 7 per cent annual GDP growth and halve 
the population that lives on less than 1 US$ per day by 2015. On combating HIV and 
AIDS, the target is to ensure that by 2010, 95 percent of young people have access to 
information and that member states will have reduced the proportion of infants infected 
by HIV by 50 percent (RISDP, 2003). The gender equality and development priority has 
8 targets including the development and strengthening of national gender policies and 
institutions by 2003; a regional gender policy by mid-2004; and a repeal of gender 
discriminatory provisions in national laws by mid-2005 (RISDP, 2003).  
 
In science and technology, among 7 targets, SADC has been urged to develop policies 
and strategies for regional co-operation including technology transfer by 2005. Another 
target was to establish a regional institutional framework for co-operation in this area by 
2006 (RISDP, 2003). In the same year, SADC should have developed programmes on 
regional research and development as well as programmes promoting public 
understanding of science and technology. For environment and sustainable development 
goals, the targets include the need to finalise a legal instrument for regional co-operation 
in environment and natural resources by 2006 (RISDP, 2003).  
 
By 2008, environmental standards and guidelines should be in place. A SADC Plan of 
Action on implementation of the World Summit for Sustainlable Development (WSSD)  
outcomes was also due in 2005 (SADC, 2003). In the area of statistical development, 
SADC was expected to develop a legal framework on regional statistics by 2006; 
indicators for monitoring and evaluation by 2005; and harmonized SADC statistics by 
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2015. On trade, there are 7 targets. Key among these is to complete negotiations for the 
SADC Customs Union by 2010; Common Market by 2015; and Monetary Union by 2016. 
Other targets such as achieving single-digit inflation rate by 2008 are part of promoting 
economic convergence (RISDP, 2003). 
 
Infrastructural development for poverty reduction is divided into 4 areas. On energy 
targets include establishing energy data banks by 2005. On tourism, emphasis is placed 
on the implementation of the Tourism Protocol by 2005 (RISDP, 2003). On the transport 
sector, a key target is to liberalize the transport markets in the region by 2008. For the 
water sector, SADC was expected to begin with a regional water policy and strategy by 
March 2004 and follow through with centers of excellence in water research by 2005, 
among other things (RISDP, 2003).  
 
On the challenge of sustainable food security, activities are divided into food availability, 
food access, nutritional value of food, and institutional responses. Among targets are to 
halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015, at the same time, halve 
the proportion of children under 5 years who are underweight and establish a technical 
facility to support land reform programmes by 2005/6. SADC also aims to double the 
cropland under irrigation from 3.5 to 7 per cent by 2015, increase fertilizer use from 44.6 
kg per hectare of arable land to 65 kg by 2015, and develop an integrated regional 
agricultural information system by 2005 (RISDP, 20003).  
 
Finally, on human and social development, the SADC plan targets the implementation of 
MDG's such as universal primary education by 2015, eliminating enrolment gaps between 
boys and girls by 2005, reduction of maternal mortality by three quarters and halve under-
fives mortality by 2015 (RISDP, 2003). The priority areas were not new and neither is the 
plethora of strategies and activities mentioned in the Plan. What was new was the bold 
and ambitious targets in the RISDP.  
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SADC programmes and protocols have always been very clear and far-sighted, but the 
challenge has been the translation of commitment into action at national level (RISDP, 
2003). So targets are an attempt to cause that leap from decisions to implementation. 
The desired ends are lofty and deadlines are tough (RISDP, 2003). A number of key 
deadlines were actually a few months away when the Plan was finally adopted in 2003. 
More targets fell in the two-year period thereafter, 2004-2005, “thus challenging SADC 
member states to implement from the word go. All targets are a form of pressure” (SADC 
Report, 2005).  
 
Targets are putting enormous pressure on member states as implementing organs of the 
SADC programme. These ambitious targets also put a strain on the “weak coordinating 
mechanisms in Gaborone to be more focused and delivery-oriented in their efforts” (SADC 
Report, 2002). RISDP marks a shift from a general discourse about regional integration 
which pre-occupied SADC in the earlier period of the implementation and delivery of 
goods. It was expected that member states would not be measured by whether or not 
they meet deadlines, but by how much they move in that direction (RISDP, 2003).  
 
The SADC Secretariat has in 2010 undertaken an internal review of the RISDP aimed at 
establishing progress that SADC has made and mapping out the challenges ahead. The 
SADC internal desk assessment was finalised in 2011. The RISDP internal desk 
assessment has acknowledged that SADC has made substantial progress in meeting some 
of its targets such as the Free Trade Area in August 2008 (RISDP, 2003). However, the 
RISDP desk assessment makes an important distinction between the attainment of the 
target and the attainment of the inherent objectives of the target. The RISDP desk 
assessment is very candid about challenges that SADC encountered resulting in the 
postponement of the SADC Custom Union target of 2010. The RISDP desk assessment 
does identify quite a number of areas that SADC where more work is needed:  
 
financial liberalisation; competitive economic development increased investment; 
lack of human, financial and technical resources; private sector capacity to supply 
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services; full implementation of customs and trade facilitation instruments; and 
building capacity and institutions to assist SADC Secretariat (RISDP, 2011). 
 
 
At the recent Tralac Conference in Cape Town in May 2014, the RISDP was reviewed as 
part of the SADC mid-term review process:  “the Conference was unanimous in 
recognizing the divergence that exist between political ambition and the reality of regional 
integration in African in general and SAD in particular” (Tralac, 2014). The conference 
called for the “rethinking of the region’s approach to regional economic integration in line 
with the competitiveness demands of the 21st century” (Tralac, 2014: 2).   
 
3.5  The Role of Civil Society   
 
Targets have come handy also for civil society formations keen to find legitimate 
indicators for measuring member states’ delivery record and SADC performance in 
general. This is partly the reason the RISDP has generated a lot of interest among civil 
society organisations even on the sidelines of SADC Summits. Civil society formations 
closely watch not just the politics of SADC, but also how member states and SADC 
institutions are responding to the benchmarks set out in the RISDP.  
 
Convened on the sidelines of the SADC Summit in Lesotho in August 2006, a major civil 
society forum focused on implementation of SADC agenda through the RISDP (SADC 
Communique, 2006). Civil society representatives and ordinary people put their views 
across on three substantive areas: poverty eradiation and food security, economic and 
trade issues, and human development questions. The civil society groups argued that 
these areas be given greater priority and for civil society to have a greater say in planning 
and implementation phases (SADC, 2006). While the RISDP is seen as an expression of 
aspirations of the people of the region, there are doubts if it will make a meaningful 
impact primarily because of lack of capacity, i.e. capacity to co-ordinate at SADC 
headquarters and capacity to implement at member states level (SADC, 2006).  
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Even SADC has accepted the fact that an unintended consequence of reforms is that they 
have seriously weakened the Secretariat and destroyed capacity to deliver on SADC 
business at national level by doing away with the useful Sectoral Co-ordination Units. The 
Secretariat is under-staffed two years after SADC decided to fully staff it (SADC 
Communique, 2004). Hence, the four directorates that have taken over from SCUs the 
sectoral co-ordination (Trade Investment Finance and Industry; Food Agriculture and 
Natural Resources; Social and Human Development; Infrastructure and Services) are 
presently ill-equipped to take forward an ambitious developmental programmes 
embodied in the RISDP. Even if there was adequate financial resources deficiencies in the 
implementation and coordinating capacity will still prevent delivery on the promises by 
SADC and member states (SADC Communique, 2008).  
 
Besides technical capacity, in the final analysis the secretariat’s incapacity relates to lack 
of political authority to champion SADC programmes and policies. The appointment of 
the previous SADC Secretary, Tomaz Salomao, a former minister in Mozambique, SADC 
hoped the office will acquire some authority to hold governments to account and 
politically champion its agenda. Studies of regional institutions in Africa, (Asante, 1985, 
Ikome, 2007) indicate that heads of states are weak at promoting regional agenda 
because “they represent national interests of their own governments, so regional 
organisations require own political champions to provide political leadership for the  
implementation of regional policies and programmes.”   
 
The problem for civil society is that, in spite of recent reforms, SADC remains dominated 
by governments, leaving non-state actors and the public in general alienated. There is no 
gainsaying that SADC is by nature an inter-state organisation, but since its inception the 
organisation has also aspired to become people-friendly. Time and again, SADC leaders 
have stressed the need for citizens of the region to buy-in into the organization’s vision 
and programmes. It seems that SADC erroneously hoped that member states will 
voluntarily open up to engagement with the citizens and make concerted efforts to 
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popularize SADC. SADC hoped that states will encourage public participation in the 
implementation of its agenda at national levels. This is so in spite of the fact that a large 
number of SADC states are yet to develop open political systems. In counties such as 
Zimbabwe and Swaziland whatever “space for public participation in their government 
existed is shrinking fast” (Interviews, 2012).  
 
Although several summits recently have called for consultation of the people of the region 
on major policy issue, the organization has not put together a strategy or policy for 
encouraging such interface with the people (SADC, 2009). There is no evidence of 
summits ever making an assessment of the extent to which member states engage 
citizens as agreed. Neither is there any indication that the coordinating institutions of 
SADC ever evaluate the engagement of the public as per summit decisions. All this points 
to an institutional culture embedded in state-to-state interface at the core of which is an 
assumption that governments in themselves adequately embody popular sentiments 
(SADC, 2010).  
 
Civil society organisations have expressed a desire to seize the opportunity presented by 
such summit decisions, but are frustrated by lack of proper and effective structures for 
them to engage SADC on issues of policy and programmes alike. Contrary to expectations 
in some quarters the new Executive Secretary has not introduced a new ethos in the 
SADC headquarters, especially in terms of making SADC people-friendly. In his many 
public statements, the target audience has almost exclusively been governments, donor 
community and the private sector. While the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the SADC 
NGO remain alienated, SADC has established a healthy working relationship with a 
recently established private sector forum called the SADC Chamber of Commerce (SADC, 
2003).  
 
The SADC coordinating structures such as the Secretariat - whose duty it is to ensure 
implementation by member states of SADC decision – have found that taking bold steps 
on the SADC decision to engage the people cannot be done outside the framework of the 
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nation state. This situation has created delays in coming up with a programme or manual 
to guide the popularisation of the organisation. The SADC member states on the other 
hand, have been reluctant if selective to place the SADC agenda in the national policy 
arena. The SADC secretariat has been challenged in the area of forging strong partnership 
with the peoples of the region. This has culminated into slow responses from 
governments to the challenge of expediting programmes. As one delegate at the Maseru 
Civil Society Conference put it, to ordinary people the SADC is an aloof entity that has 
annual ceremonies called summits for government leaders (SADC, 2001).  
 
At the risk of becoming irrelevant for the 250 million people, the SADC is finding it difficult 
to balance its role as an inter-state agency (SADC, 2011). It draws its legitimacy ultimately 
from the national states. Secondly, intergovernmental regional integration is challenging 
both the agents (member states) of integration as well as the outcome itself. This means 
SADC cannot impose its ways over member states’ authority in order for it to exercise its 
regional authority on regional matters. The SADC Secretariat is merely established to 
create coordinating forums for engagement with state and non-state actors and the public 
in general on SADC matters.  
 
SADC has attempted to create mechanisms for structured engagement with legitimate 
civil society formations and national parliaments as organised voices of the people on the 
ground (RISDP, 2003).  At best, the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the SADC NGO forum 
should be restructured and should “have an official relationship with SADC” (Interview, 
2012). Thirdly, it is incumbent upon SADC also to engage member states to increase 
public participation in national responses. The sooner that National Committees are 
established with representation from civil society the better. These structures should be 
required interface with the citizens as part of their core responsibilities. But it is also 
incumbent upon structures that represent like civil society, traditional formations and 
national parliaments to engage SADC to chisel spaces for public participation in SADC 
business (RISDP, 2003).  
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3.6 Poverty Eradication Strategies 
 
The eradication of poverty is central to the SADC’s integration agenda. According to 
Article 5 of the SADC Treaty, regional integration is seen as catalyst for accelerating 
economic growth, eradicating poverty and achieving a sustainable pattern of 
development. According to the RISDP, the goal is to promote sustainable and equitable 
economic growth and socio-economic development that will alleviate poverty and 
ultimately lead to its total eradication. This will only be possible if the region achieves 
economic growth rates of at least 7 percent per year.  Such levels of growth will reduce 
by half, the proportion of the population that lives on less than US$1 per day by 2015.   
 
In order to address this problem, SADC seeks to create opportunities for the poor to 
create wealth for themselves.  This entails building up capital assets of the poor, 
redistributing natural assets, constructing and maintaining infrastructure and promoting 
knowledge and health in poor areas; protecting the environment and reducing economic 
inequalities. Poverty in all its dimensions constitutes a major development challenge 
facing the SADC region (RISDP, 2003). Poverty indicators include the low levels of income 
and high levels of human deprivation.  Statistics indicate that about 70 percent of the 
regional population lives below the international poverty line of US$2 per day while 40 
percent of the region’s population of 76 million people lives below the international 
poverty line of US$1 per day (World Bank, 2000).  Figures from the ADB and World Bank 
show that about 80 percent of the population in some Member States such as 
Mozambique and Zambia is estimated to be living in extreme poverty. 
 
The 1995 World Summit on Social Development described poverty as having various 
manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure 
sustainable livelihoods; hunger and, malnutrition; ill health; limited access of lack of 
access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from 
illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social 
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discrimination and exclusion (World Bank, 1995). It is also characterised by a lack of 
participation in decisions-making and in civil, social and cultural life. Absolute poverty is 
also a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including safe 
drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends 
not only on income but also on access to social services. SADC admits that these features 
are prevalent in the region, in both urban and rural areas (SADC, 2003).   
 
Poverty eradication is high on the SADC development agenda. In 2002 the SADC 
Consultative Conference was held under the theme, SADC Institutional Reform for 
Poverty Reduction through Regional Integration, which theme exemplified the 
organisation’s commitment to the goals of reducing poverty levels.  In April 2008, the 
SADC hosted an International Consultative Conference on Poverty and Development held 
in Mauritius (SADC, 2008). Held under the theme, Regional Economic Integration: A 
Strategy for Poverty Eradication towards Sustainable Development, the conference 
served as a platform for interaction between Heads of States and Government and key 
stakeholders such as civil society, international cooperation partners from the region and 
elsewhere to reflect and adopt innovative approaches to the region’s poverty eradication 
strategies (SADC 2008).   
 
The conference also served as a platform for the SADC to engage the international 
community on commitments made towards poverty eradication in an effort to meet the 
targets of the Millennium Development Goals.  A major outcome of the conference was 
the declaration by Heads of State to ‘work towards the establishment of a Regional 
Poverty Observatory to monitor progress made in the implementation of actions in the 
main priority areas of poverty eradication’. Since the idea of its creation was only 
endorsed in April 2008, it is difficult to make an assessment of progress made with respect 
to the establishment of and location of the SADC Poverty Observatory (SADC, 2008).  
The SADC Summit decision in 2012 resolved that the Regional Poverty Observatory be 
launched by September 2013 to provide adequate and meaningful monitoring services 
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(SADC, 2013). The Regional Poverty Observatory will function as a forum where all the 
stakeholders working in poverty eradication at the regional and national levels meet to 
evaluate and monitor the implementation of the Regional Poverty Reduction Framework. 
It is designed as a multi-stakeholder consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, 
targets and actions identified within the SADC poverty reduction programme (SADC, 
2013). 
The monitoring and evaluation of the process of the poverty observatory covers income 
poverty, infrastructure, education, health, and social safety (SADC Website, 2012). 
Poverty analysis and monitoring will be beneficial to all countries and will stimulate 
progress in the fight against poverty. The objectives of the Regional Poverty Observatory 
are to: 
… help member states through harmonisation of standards, methods and 
indicators; speed up reforms and execution of national poverty reduction 
strategies; provide regional best practices to supplement the benchmarks of the 
millennium development goals; allow comparative performance analysis across 
Member States (SADC, 2013) 
Considering that poverty eradication is a priority focus of SADC, it is important to ensure 
that adequate monitoring of poverty and progress toward the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Access to reliable information on poverty is important for all 
development initiatives in the SADC region. Monitoring is a critical component of poverty 
reduction strategies, and an area where there is a compelling need for harmonisation or 
standardisation of indicators across member states. Monitoring compliance with agreed 
regional policies is also an important element of the mandate of regional organisations 
such as SADC (SADC, 2010). 
In addition to these initiatives, SADC has adopted a number of strategies to address the 
poverty situation in the region. For example, several SADC Member States drafted and 
adopted Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRPs) which stipulate how they intend to 
address poverty (SADC, 2009). Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zambia each prepared PRSPs in broad consultation with stakeholders continue to monitor 
73 
 
poverty reduction and growth strategies. PRSPs support policies that aim at helping the 
poor so that they can benefit from growth by expanding their opportunities, with focus 
on safety nets, pro-poor economic growth emphasizing productive sectors and 
employment creation, building human, physical and other capital assets of and for the 
poor, good governance and a conducive macroeconomic environment (SADC, 2009). 
 
South Africa is no longer the common enemy, although concerns about its economic and 
political dominance in the region persist and impact on development of a regional identity. 
In the process, SADC has given prominence to developmental objectives as the motive 
behind its regional integration agenda with political and security programmes to create 
conditions for social and economic development in the region (SADC, 2009). This chapter 
argues that SADC exemplifies an evolving developmental model of regional integration 
because of its prominent social and economic goals and also because, over the years, it 
has developed a comprehensive developmental framework including trade, infrastructural 
development, and human development (SADC, 2009).   
 
3.7 Overview of SIPO    
 
In 2004, the heads of state and government adopted the strategic indicative plan of the 
organ (SIPO I) to provide for policy direction and guidelines in the daily operations of the 
Organ. SIPO I was also established to ensure that there is significant alignment between 
SADC’s and the African Union’s (AU) peace and security objectives (SADC, 2001).  SIPO 
provides a framework that is important for a much deeper analysis of how security is 
conceptualised, established and what structure of decision making among states is 
envisaged, with what strategic instruments of enforcing alignment and compliance is 
critical. It is this latter aspect that the dissertation is concerned with – how do state 
preferences converge or diverge towards the common and mutual regional security 
objectives envisaged in the SIPO I and II.  
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The Organ is guided by the following objectives: protecting the people; promoting 
political, security and defence cooperation; developing common foreign policy approaches 
and collective security capacity to respond to external threats; peacekeeping and 
resolving intrastate and interstate conflicts; promoting the development of democratic 
institutions in member states; implementing the United Nations (UN), AU and other 
international conventions; upholding international law; developing cooperation between 
police and security services in combating domestic and cross-border crime; and disaster 
management. The intentions and objectives of the Organ are quite ambitious indeed 
(SADC, 2012).     
 
The Organ is composed of two major components: the directorate or secretariat and the 
troika. The Organ’s directorate is located at the SADC Secretariat headquarters in 
Gaborone, Botswana. There are six intergovernmental levels at which the Organ 
operates, namely: i) the chairperson of the troika or chairperson of the Organ; ii) the 
Ministerial Committee of the Organ – the committee reports to the chairperson of the 
Organ; iii) the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); iv) the Inter-State 
Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); v) ad hoc committees established by the 
Ministerial Committee; vi) and the Organ directorate (SADC, 2001). The objectives of the 
Organ “… emphasise the relationship between development and security and the need 
to balance state behaviour and human security” (ISDSC, 2003).  
 
The difference between the ISDSC and ISPDC committees is basically that of focus and 
orientation in the arena of security issues. ISDSC is mainly concerned with defence, public 
security and state security including military and intelligence systems whilst ISPDC is 
focused on good governance, human rights and diplomacy (Cawthra et. al., 2007). In 
this arena of policy and organisation coordination the state and not regional spirit is 
looming large. However the arena of state action wherein these ambitious policy 
frameworks is implemented is the most critical aspect of this investigation. The five year 
strategic plan (SIPO I) provides a framework for the implementation of the OPSDC. Given 
the importance and sensitivity of the matters pertaining to SIPO’s mandate, the SADC 
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Ministerial Committee undertook an evaluation of the SIPO I in 2007, 2009 and in 2012 
“which led to the development of SIPO II” (SADC, 2007).  
 
The reason and objective of the evaluation of SIPO was that “it lacked coherent 
benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation of progress and contained too many priorities 
thus precluding proper sequencing and implementation” (SADC, 2012). SIPO II was 
ratified by the Summit of Heads State and Government in Windhoek Namibia on August 
2012. The “secrecy” surrounding the publicity or non-publicity of SIPO II has raised much 
speculation. The major concern has been that the document (SIPO II) is “too internally 
focused with not input from civil society” (SADC Report, 2010: 34). The document also is 
charged for “lacking to come-up with solution to the problem that the Organ has with 
International Cooperating Partners (ICP)” (SADC Report, 2009: 87). More closely, SIPO 
II is criticised for its rigid approach to what it considers as “strategic” areas that must be 
exclusively funded and controlled by its member states and leaving “non-strategic” 
designations to the ICP (SADC Report, 2006: 35).  
 
3.8 Definition and Operationalisation of Concepts and Terms  
3.8.1 Regional Integration  
 
This section of the chapter is intended to provide an overview and explanation of the key 
concepts and terms that are utilised in the research. This exercise is important is the 
sense that it provides both the meaning as well as context within which the concepts and 
terms deployed in the study are operationalised. A common definition of regional 
integration states that it is the shifting of certain national activities toward a new center 
(Haas, 1958). Integration therefore is a form of collective action among countries in order 
to obtain a certain goal. This goal can be as grand as political unification or a free trade 
area, custom union and monetary union as found in the objectives of the SADC.  
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Lindberg (2003: 85) theorises regional integration by proposing that it is “an evolution 
over time of a collective decision making system among nations.” Lindberg posits if the 
collective arena becomes the focus of certain kinds of decision making activity, “national 
actors will in that measure is constrained from independent action” (Lindberg, 2003: 84). 
More simply, “it is a series of voluntary decisions by previously sovereign states to remove 
barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, services, capital or persons” (Khan, 2002). 
Keet (1998: 38) contends that the current situation in Southern Africa provides a more 
favourable arena for the strengthening of the state through the integration of political 
institutions into regional integration, in other words, can be conceptualised variously as 
a “defensive response to the detrimental aspects of free trade or a strategy used to 
promote multilateral trade liberalisation” (Gibb, 1997: 70).  
 
This research examines the state sovereignty-regional integration complex and how the 
delegation of some aspects of state sovereignty occurs as the process of regional 
integration unfolds. Sidaway and Gibb (1998: 178) contend that rather than integration 
efforts signaling the possibility for reshaping the state in Southern Africa, regional 
integration “might be read as a part of the set of processes by which sovereignty is 
confirmed.” Cold War politics elevated the inalienable sovereignty of nation-states as a 
cornerstone of the international system on which weak and incapacitated African states 
relied for their very existence. With its “demise and the elevation of anti-statism, regional 
integration becomes a means to sustain the juridical presence of the African state”. In 
their analysis, Sidaway & Gibb (1998: 179) argue that:  
 
… formal participation in [regional organisations] is another way whereby states 
seek to confirm, fix and secure the appearance and power of ‘sovereignty’… 
participation in fora such as SADC is a way in which the state is actively 
represented as a real, solid and omnipresent authority. In doing so, the fact that 
it is a contested, socially constructed… object is obscured, and states would have 
us take them for granted as the natural objects of governance and politics. 
 
This view has been reinforced by Mistry (2000: 554) who claims that “Africa’s commitment 
to integration appears to have been visceral rather than rational, more rhetorical than 
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real.” Echoing the negativity in relation to Africa’s regional integration experience, 
Leistner (1997: 113) argues that while the expectation of sub-Saharan African countries 
has been that regional integration would “reverse the continent’s economic decline, 
promote development and strengthen Africa’s position in the world at large” this has not 
been the case. In taking some of the more workable experiments seriously, though, there 
is the potential for gaps to be filled and integration models strengthened.  
 
The research examines regional integration and state sovereignty within the constructivist 
conceptual and theoretical tools that will underpin the importance of a theory of the state 
in Southern Africa as well as a useful conceptual approach to regional integration. The 
evolution of regional integration in Southern Africa is considered to be a pillar or one of 
the building blocks in the construction of complete integration in Africa (McCarthy, 2007). 
This functionalist approach to regional integration is also captured in the Constitutive Act 
of the African Union (2002: 3) thus:  
 
… achieve greater unity and solidarity among African countries and the peoples of 
Africa; defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of member 
states; accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the 
continent and its people; promote peace, security and stability on the continent; 
promote democratic principles and institutions; popular participation and good 
governance, and promote and protect human and people’s rights. 
 
3.8.2 The Region  
 
The meaning of the region in this research is important in that it assists in explaining or 
locating the scope of the manifestation of regional integration. Regions are 
conceptualised differently in many fields of study. International Relations theory 
conceives regions as clustering of countries “focusing on specific economic and political 
policies within countries” (Van Langenhove, 2003: 3). Other definitions of regions in 
political science include a vast literature on the geographical scope of countries and the 
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territorial characteristics of that geography and their impact on regional integration (Haas, 
1970). The difficulty in bridging the conceptual vagueness and contradictions in the 
conceptualisation of regions is that they tend to be explained in relation to regional 
integration.  
 
Hettne & Soderbaum (1998: 11) contend that “regions are obviously important to the 
study of regionalism. Given that regions necessarily involve geographical dimension, the 
main task of identifying regions implies making judgments about the degree to which a 
particular area in various respects constitutes a distinct entity, which can be distinguished 
as territorial subsystem (in contrast with non-territorial sub-systems) from the rest of the 
international system, that is, the degree of what we call regionness.” In the case of the 
SADC ‘region’ the international system denote the African continent with SADC being one 
region or what the African Union refers to as regional economic community (REC). As a 
subset in the institutional of continental integration, the SADC region is one among eight 
RECs that have been identified by the African Union as building blocks for the complete 
integration of the Africa (Abuja Treaty, 1991). The research argues that regions are not 
“natural” or “given” they a product of discursive interaction between different actors 
(Hettne & Soderbaum, 1998: 10).  
 
3.8.3 Regionalisation   
 
The process of regionalisation is conceptualised in this research as denoting “increasing 
levels of regionness” (Hettne & Soderbaum, 1998: 9). Similarly, the research views 
regional cooperation among states in the SADC ‘region’ as institutionalisation towards the 
normative cumulative ideal of regional integration. The regionalisation approach is 
qualitatively a new phenomenon in international relations theory. It refers to a 
phenomenon, still in the making, that began in the mid-1980s, in contrast to the ‘old 
regionalism that began in the 1950s and faded away in the 1970s. The old regionalism 
must be understood within a particular historical context, dominated by the bipolar Cold 
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War structure (Hettne, 1998). On the other hand, the current wave of regionalisation 
needs to be related to current transformations of the world. The new regionalisation 
phenomenon is associated with several and often interrelated set of factors caused by 
the structural transformation of the global system: 
 
the change of the bipolar Cold War structure and alliance systems towards the 
multipolar (or perhaps tripolar) structure, with a new international divisions of 
power (NIDP); the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a 
more positive attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism, at least in the 
form of ‘open regionalism’; the restructuring of the global political economy into 
three major blocs: the European Union (EU); the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and the Asian-Pacific, which are all based on different forms of capitalism; 
the erosion of the Westphalia nation-state system and the growth of economic, 
social, and political interdependence and transformational, which has triggered 
new patterns of interaction both among governments and non-state actors; the 
associated globalisation of finance, trade production and technology which has led 
to new international division of labour (NIDL); the end of ‘third worldism’ and 
changed attitudes towards (neoliberal) economic development and political system 
in the developing countries (Hettne & Soderbaum, 1988). 
 
The content of the renewed trend towards regionalisation traveling the world has also 
changed radically. New regionalisation is truly worldwide phenomenon that is taking place 
in more areas of the world that ever before. The ‘old regionalisation’ was generally specific 
about objectives and content, and often had a simple and narrow focus on free trade 
agreements and security alliances, whereas the number, scope and diversity of the new 
regionalization has grown significantly during the last decade (Booth & Vale, 1995). 
According to Booth & Vale (1995: 285), “Southern Africa is faced by the choice between 
two geopolitical courses, characterised by distinctive understandings of the future of 
interstate relations and unique appreciations of the region’s security problematics.” Policy 
convergence along these dimensions is not a natural process but a discursive social 
process of socially and politically steered actions.  
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3.8.4  Regionalism  
 
The research makes a distinction between regional integration and regional cooperation. 
These terms are widely used. They compound the general uncertainty of “whether 
regional conquerors and nation builders are also actors on the stage of regional 
integration” (Haas, 1970:3). Regionalism refers to the “general phenomenon as well as 
the ideology” of regionalism, that is, the explanation and logic of the regional order that 
is envisaged in particular geographical entity. Hettne and Soderbaum (1998: 12) contend 
that regionalism “covers too many phenomena to be useful as analytical tool, and should 
therefore be broken down into specific categories.” Hettne and Soderbaum are correct, 
it is important to utilise appropriate conceptual and theoretical tools in the analysis of 
regional integration. Although the research is focused on the constructivist framework for 
analysing regional integration in Southern Africa, it utilises to a degree some of the 
concepts and explanations that regionalism offers.   
 
And yet the terms are often used interchangeably, unintentionally conflated, or merely 
confused. Regional cooperation refers to the wide variety of sectoral agreements or 
arrangements between states to cooperate in the development or implementation of 
government policies (Hettne & Soderbaum, 1998). Regional cooperation is embodied in 
regional agreements, on cross-border interactions between official institutions of 
governments. Regional integration, on the other hand, can be defined broadly as a 
cumulative level (end-state) of convergence on trade, infrastructure and investment with 
the creation of integrated markets and advanced institutions. More importantly, the 
process leading to this cumulative level of regional convergence would also spell-out the 
difficult questions such as national sovereignty, national interests, and national security 
with which a regional model would be negotiated. What institutional model of cumulative 
regional convergence would be wrought through an intergovernmental (state-driven) 
approach to regional integration remains to be seen?    
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An approach to regional integration that facilitates the development of physical 
infrastructure between and within countries to improve the flow of goods, services, and 
workers can yield substantial benefits for the region. Establishing a SADC Customs Union 
(CU) model is critical, but will require significant investment in the harmonisation of 
administrative and trade procedures including infrastructure, regulatory framework, 
customs processes, and practices to facilitate the growth and expansion of regional 
business opportunities. The current approach or discourse on regional integration and 
development is more about regional cooperation – through a process of sectoral 
cooperation among member states – how it leads to the normative ideal of regional 
integration and to what end does the process yield for nation states in the region, is the 
focus of this research. 
 
3.8.5 Constructivism and State Sovereignty   
 
The conceptualisation and definition of concepts is a complex and fragile exercise in social 
science. This is because the social sciences, political science and international relations in 
particular, are very dynamic fields of study. Terms and concepts that were utilised and 
defined centuries ago for the first time have been re-defined a dozen times. This is the 
case with state sovereignty and regional integration. This chapter examines how the 
definition and conceptualisation of sovereignty and regional integration have been 
changing and how they are currently being defined in literature. Since theory is 
constructed for application in practice, the chapter shows how a much broader and 
reflexive conception and definition of sovereignty and regional integration are viable for 
this research. As Wendt (1994: 384) points out: “we need to be aware of the conceptions 
we use since they determine our perception of things.”        
 
The concept of sovereignty is expressed in literature in a variety of ambiguous, confusing 
and difficult ways. Sovereignty conjures an ambiguous and yet broad relationship 
between the state and its self-interest. The concept of sovereignty may refer to the 
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possession of international legal personality, or the possession of particular legal 
competence or powers. Wendt (1994: 388) refers to sovereignty as “highly open-ended 
institution … empowering states juridically to determine their own interest …“  
 
State sovereignty is about the sole right of states to make decisions without any 
interference from outside parties. Crawford (2006: 33) defines sovereignty: “as a legal 
term ‘sovereignty’ refers not to omnipotent authority … but to the totality of powers that 
states may have under international law. By contrast, as the political term, its 
connotations are those of untrammeled authority and power and it is in such discourse 
that the term can be problematic.”  
 
The indeterminateness or unboundedness of sovereignty is important to the research. 
The aim of the research is to examine the basis of the “forces disposing states towards 
particularism, sometimes confront others [states] disposing them toward collectivism” 
(Wendt, 1994: 388). State sovereignty has two fundamentally reinforcing qualities: 
“legitimacy” and “coercion” (Ruggie, 1993: 198). In this duality, the “internationalisation 
of the state requires the development” of clear identification in respect to its function “be 
it military, security, economic growth” (Wendt, 1998: 388).  
 
It also requires that the state build some legitimacy over “collective capacity to sanction 
actors who disrupt the performance of that function” (Wendt, 1998: 388). The aim of this 
chapter is not to contest these conceptions or definitions of sovereignty but to show that 
most accounts of sovereignty point to its “indivisibility”, “final authority”, and “supreme 
power” (Wendt, 1994: 21). Indeed the aim here is not to debunk the conceptualisation 
of sovereignty “as an institution that imparts to the state … meta-political authority” 
(Thomson, 1995: 214).  
 
The aim of the research is to examine how in the architecture of SADC regional integration 
– with sovereignty divided among its member states – is ‘regional sovereignty 
[integration]’ to be achieved. The member states of SADC in their finality are defined as 
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states “with indivisible sovereignty, fixed boundaries, established governments, clear 
identity, and democratic legitimacy” (Schmidt, 2003: 1). The SADC on the other hand, is 
conceptualised as a “regional state” in the process of development, with sovereignty 
divided between its member states, with variable boundaries in regard to policy and yet 
fixed with regard to geography. It is the former, the variability of policy boundaries that 
the research examines in terms of the modes of decisions of states over policy 
competencies.  
 
Wendt conceptualises sovereignty as composed of four qualities: international recognition 
from other states; autonomy with regard to the exclusion of external authority; control 
over activities within and across their borders; and exclusive power to organize authority 
within the polity (Sterling-Folker & Badie, 2012). In the light of this, the research 
examines how SADC member states are able to “pool their sovereignty in the process of 
Southern African integration” (Keohane, 1995). The research examines how and over 
what areas of policy competencies will SADC member delegate sovereignty.   
 
The research looks at the concept of state sovereignty and its relationship to the process 
of regional integration. This chapter guises at other concepts such as “state”, 
“regionalism”, “region”, “regionness”, “regionalization”, “regional sovereignty” and 
“interests”. The purpose is to make sure that these concepts are illuminated and 
explained so that their use in the study is understood. Conceptualisation is an important 
element of shaping discourse, by providing cognitive tools for making a persuasive 
argument. The research argues that, regional integration in Southern Africa is also a 
matter of discourse that serves to generate and convey ideas about its construction, 
mediated and negotiated through state interests.          
 
In an intensely legal examination of “the changing character of sovereignty” in 
international law Nagan & Hauman (2003: 1) posit: “there exist perhaps no conception 
the meaning of which is more controversial than that of [state] sovereignty. It is an 
indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into 
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political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally 
agreed upon.” It seems counterintuitive that this research, aims to examine whether new 
variations of such venerable concept are available. The examination of sovereignty in the 
process of regional integration in Southern Africa might enhance deeper collective 
understanding of this vital concept.    
 
The classical model of state sovereignty finds its historical origin in the Westphalian Treaty 
of 1648, following the Thirty Years War (Crawford, 1978).  Westphalia marked the rise of 
a model based on state sovereignty enshrined in mutually agreed treaty based obligations 
(Gross, 1988). However, Westphalia did not create a world of unrestrained sovereignty 
(Crawford, 1978). A number of guarantees for religious minorities were inserted, which 
reflected the religious dimension of the Thirty Years’ War. The use of force, while not 
ruled out, was subject to a number of conditions, and in particular dispute settlement 
conditions (Gross, 1948). International Relations theorists (Stein, 2001; Krasner, 1983; 
Smith 2000; Nye, 1968) have provided a great deal of explanation of the concept of state 
sovereignty.  
 
Critical writings among realists, neo-realists, liberal institutionalists and new regionalism 
theorists and constructivist have revived the concept of state sovereignty “from its 
abstract, arcane, and sterile treatment in the fields of international law and political 
philosophy” (Walker, 1988: 221). As the international system was recovering from Cold 
War bipolarity that froze the conception of the state as anarchic, constantly inclined to 
war, the Southern African state has “a keen instinct for survival and so adapted to new 
challenges – even the challenge of globalisation” (Krasner, 1999: 20).  
 
In the light of this, Hinsley (1986: 220) made a claim: “it is the state which wields 
sovereignty, and that structure, notional or tangible, which possesses it, is by definition 
the state.”  Given this, sovereignty is a quality that can only be associated with states. 
The research examines whether regional integration provides for a straightforward 
conceptualisation of state sovereignty in Southern Africa. Weber (1947: 7) defines the 
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state as “… a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory.”  
 
The use of this right by the state has two dimensions – one external and the other internal 
(Krasner, 1999). Internal sovereignty refers to the legitimate authority of the state and 
its institutions to use force and to defend the internal territory of the state (Krasner, 
1999). External sovereignty refers to the access of the state to the right of judicial equality 
and territorial integrity in the international system, which is based on the recognition of 
the internal sovereignty of the state by other states (Morgenthau, 1950).   
 
Laski (1967: 34) defines state sovereignty thus: “the modern state is a sovereign state. 
It is therefore, independent in the face of other communities. It may infuse its will towards 
them with a substance which need not be affected by the will of any external power. It 
is however, internally supreme over its territory it controls. It issues order to all men and 
all associations within that area; it receives orders from none of them. It's will is subject 
to no legal limitation of any kind. What it proposes is right by the mere announcement of 
intention.”  
 
The constructivist framework underpinning the conceptualisation of state sovereignty is 
what this research is focused on. Constructivism conceives of state sovereignty as 
mutually “co-constitutive” (Sterling-Folker & Badie, 2012:105). The constructivist analysis 
of state sovereignty conceives of states in the process of regional integration as agents. 
The interactions among states in Southern Africa are products of historical interactions. 
In this way, the structural process of regional integration has an inverse relation to the 
states as it does not only constrain them but also re-constitute their identity in the process 
of regional integration. The constructivist framework that is utilised in this research 
provides “… a systemic approach to understating state interests and state behavior …” 
(Finnemore, 1996:2).        
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Constructivism as the framework offers a strong explanatory power to depict the quality 
of interactions amongst states in Southern Africa. Wendt puts the matter this way: “it is 
through reciprocal interaction … that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring 
social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests” (1992: 406). 
Constructivism is placing important premium on states’ interactions and relationships in 
respect to their autonomy as sovereign states whilst at the same time balances this 
against the process of regional integration which “co-determines” that relationship. The 
constructivist framework of regional integration and the state in Southern Africa is that 
both the state and the process of regional integration are simultaneously co-determined 
“hence neither should be causally privileged in explanation” (Sterling-Folker & Badie, 
2012: 106). 
 
The section of the chapter provides definitional and conceptual explanation of the state 
sovereignty-regional integration complex, “… illuminating space within which to examine 
the continuing relevance” of contemporary conceptualisations of state sovereignty 
(Thomson, 1995: 210). In short, concepts and terms are better articulated in their 
appropriate contexts, and their variable meanings are given coherence when we 
appreciate the divergent contexts within which they are used. Constructivism offers 
important explanatory power in how norms, interests and identities are shaped is social 
interactions among states. The research examines state sovereignty in the evolution of 
the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. The conceptions and definitions of 
state sovereignty in literature project various meanings generating high levels of 
ambiguity.  
 
The research examines the balance of decision making processes by SADC member states 
as they serve in the progressive realisation of the regional integration end-state. In this 
regard, the research leans towards Lasswell & Kaplan (1950: 177) point thus: “… it is 
precisely this relation of power to the ‘legal structure’ which makes it necessary to invoke 
such concepts as sovereignty. It is this very concern with the ends and means of power 
which demands the inclusion of authority into the field of political inquiry.” The research 
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examines the dynamic aspects of state sovereignty; the meaning of it has thus been 
unpacked from the point of view of its actual operation in social practice. 
 
3.8.6 Intergovernmentalism  
 
The intergovernmental approach to regional integration has put the state at the center. 
The integration process is no longer considered as the process with its own logic, but as 
a process that member states influence and control according to their own interests 
(Moravcsik, 1991). Member states cannot be ignored when analysing regional integration. 
Moravcsik (1991: 75) puts the matter this way: “the primary source of integration lies in 
the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each bring.” The research 
examines the internal orientation of states in terms of decision making and the formation 
of state policy preferences in the SADC region.   
 
Nye (1990) observed that the success of integration depends upon the ability of member 
states to adopt and respond to cooperative agreements that define integration. His 
argument provides the foundation for the perspective that regards integration as a 
function of negotiations between states to produce cooperative agreements that evolve 
into further integration. Moravcsik (1995: 91) on the other hand, argues that integration 
is due to the “bargaining among the more powerful members of a regional group.” This 
argument continues the tradition that integration is a means for member states to obtain 
domestic policy preferences through regional negotiations (Keohane, 1988; Taylor, 2006; 
Wallace, 1994). Through negotiation, states converge policy competencies in order to 
alleviate negative economic externalities due to economic interdependence while 
retaining national sovereignty. Putman conceives of the formation of state preferences 
differently:  
 
The policies of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived at two-
levels. At the national level, domestic actors pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by 
88 
 
constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign development (1998: 434). 
      
This research examines the motivations and direction of state preferences in regional 
integration in Southern Africa. Putting it different, this research is concerned with: “why 
it is that states should invest in enterprises that result in de facto clipping of their 
autonomy” (Rosamond, 2000: 151). The institutionalisation of the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa aims to modify the nature of the state (RISDP, 2003). The 
research examines the areas and levels of motivation in the policy preferences of states 
as the region converges or diverges towards or away from the normative regional 
integration objectives.  
 
2.8.7 Supranationalism  
 
One of the major critiques of intergovernmentalism is that it ignores or underestimates 
the power of supranational institutions and transactional actors in the process of regional 
integration (Weiler, 2009; Gstohl, 2008). Supranationalism approach returns the direction 
of research back to neo-functionalist perspective (Weiler, 2009 & Gstohl, 2008). By 
including supranational institutions and a transnational actor, integration is again 
conceptualised as being self-perpetuating: the origins of integration lie in the outcomes 
of prior steps (Weiler, 2009 & Gstohl, 2008).  
 
The primary focus of the supranational approach to regional integration is captured by 
Hass (1968: 16) thus: “political integration is the process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities towards the center, whose institutions possesses or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national state.” Supranationalism benefited from the work by 
Lindberg (1963) which was written, in the main, as a response to Haas. Lindberg argued 
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that four conditions should prevail for the process of regional integration to be launched 
properly: 
 
Central institutions and central policies should be established and developed; 
because only they can assure that someone represents and promotes the ‘regional 
view’ as well as solves disputes between member states. Their tasks and capacity 
to implement those tasks should go well beyond the mandate of normal 
international institutions. Their tasks should be inherently expansive. There should 
be some link between the interest of member states and the process of integration 
(1963, 7-13). 
 
The most written explanation of supranational by Lindberg is the spill-over effect (1963). 
Lindberg defines the concept of the spillover thus: “spillover refers to situations in which 
a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can 
be assured only by taking further actions which in turn create further condition and a 
need for more action, and so forth” (1963: 10).         
 
3.8.8 The State and Globalisation  
 
Understanding the concept of the state is critical in the process of regional integration. 
The SADC states while having common historical ties, they are at the same time different. 
The regional integration process is an attempt at integrating states with “political and 
economic diversities … including their diverse production structures, trade patterns, 
resource endowments, development priorities, institutional affiliations and resource 
allocation mechanisms” (RISDP, 2002:3). Whilst post-independence experimentation of 
political and economic governance resulted in variety of state forms in Southern Africa, 
changes in the global environment also had sustained influence on the character and 
nature of the state. The most recent exogenous force that has had significant impact on 
the state in Southern Africa is the process of globalisation.  
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At the center of globalisation discourse is the notions about the “decline of the state” 
(Strange, 1996). Given the retreat, the requirements of global challenges in different 
regions of the world will require different state capacities. Similarly, the process of 
globalisation, it is argued, has limited the authority of the state to make decision over 
policy (Mishra, 1999). The research is not to provide a comprehensive evaluation of 
globalisation and the state in Southern Africa, but rather to show that the state is still 
existent years after globalisation was mooted. The research argues that perhaps the 
analytical tools used to make sense of globalisation in Southern Africa need Southern 
African-specific conceptual approach in the same way that the study of the political 
economy of regional integration in the Southern Africa would require.      
 
So, the challenges raised by globalisation as a process yield no easy answers. The process 
of globalisation strains the abilities of states and governments to confront them 
independently. The occasional food strikes and attacks on privatization in most 
developing countries is testimony that even historical alliances between governing elites 
and the civil society will tend to fail if not bring about serious contradictions, in the face 
of globalisation. The most important point about some of the fundamental shortcomings 
of the debate on globalisation have to do with what Cooper’s calls the “Banker’s Boast” 
(Cooper, 2001:192). Entailed in Cooper’s conception is the notion that the demise of the 
Soviet Union wrought about “globalisation’’ that “invokes time and time again to tell rich 
countries to roll back the welfare state and poor countries to reduce expenditure – all in 
the name of the necessities of competition in a globalised world” (Cooper 2001: 192).  
 
In most African states, Copper’s Bankers’ Boast is tantamount to macroeconomic 
fundamentals that are said to be in place in the economy, at the expense of jobs, 
education, and houses (Mishra, 1999). Even more, the irony in the whole situation, at 
least for African states is that, although sound macroeconomic fundamentals are in place, 
employment, growth and investment have not been forthcoming. The real question 
therefore, becomes not so much “whether globalisation is here to stay,” but that, if it 
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stays here, it cannot continue to do so in a form in which it continues to bring about 
serious disadvantages on the world’s poor (Bond, 2002). Another critical accusation 
against globalisation is that it assumes an end to the constructivist processes that are 
historical and unique to certain countries because it conceives of the modern world as 
shrinking to become a compressed global village.  
 
Confirming this situation, “globalisation is a phenomenon that we cannot deny. All we can 
do is accept it” (Bond, 2000: 2) assert the proponents of it.  Implicit in the point made 
by the proponents of globalisation is that globalisation is here to stay in spite of attacks 
on it. Even more curious, is an apparent sense of hopelessness and impotence on the 
part of most states. In their response to this situation, Michie & Padayachee (1997: 23) 
argue: “… globalisation has become a synonym for inaction, even paralysis, in domestic 
economic policy formulation and implementation.”  
 
In a nutshell, the problem that globalisation imposes goes further than merely an 
acceptance of it as being here. It actually reconfigures and changes the fundamental 
progressive principles that have been long dominant in society in favour of the neo-liberal 
straight jacket of free-market fundamentalism. Although the scope and implications of 
state diplomacy may be less clear in the post-Cold War era, the role of the state in conflict 
resolution as well as in dealing with the implications of globalisation and other processes 
has not declined (Strange, 1996).   
3.9  Conclusion  
 
The primary reason for studying regional integration is thus normative: the units and 
actions studied provide a living laboratory for observing the peaceful creation of possible 
new types of human communities at a very high level of organisation and the processes 
which may lead to such conditions. This research is concerned with the task, transactions, 
perceptions and learning in the actions and behaviour of states in Southern Africa. The 
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research explores some the aspects of state behaviour in respect to policy preferences in 
the process of regional integration in Southern Africa (Mazzeo, 1984).    
 
For this reason, the research deploys the constructivist framework as it offers a strong 
and coherent theoretical framework for the study of regional integration in Southern 
Africa. The research utilises constructivism as it offers a viable option for the study of 
regional integration with focus on intersubjective and discursive interactions of social 
actors. The constructivist framework posits a new way of thinking about relations 
between states and other social actors in the region (Wendt, 1994). The increased 
importance of interregional relations is also characteristic of the current wave of 
regionalism. Since we are dealing with the world order phenomenon the behavior of one 
state in the region has an impact on other states and in the process of regional integration 
itself (Hettne & Sonderbaum, 1998: 8).   
 
The next chapter of the research broaches central concepts of regional integration theory. 
The concept of ‘regionness’ constitutes a central component of the analytical discourse 
in the theory. It is a broad, open-ended theoretical and analytical framework for 
understanding processes of regionalisation in various geographical areas in a 
comparative, historical and multilevel way (Matambalya, 2000:124). Several more specific 
theories and theoretical perspectives needed for understanding the complexities of 
present-day regionalism are then discussed.  
 
An analysis of worldwide movement of regionalism is explored from a comparative 
perspective and makes a fresh, detailed and comprehensive survey of the most referred 
to an active ‘formal’ region in the world today. The process of globalisation has spawned 
a vast literature, very little of which is about an impact on the state (Hirst & Thompson 
1996: 196). The dissertation explores the multifaceted impact of regional integration on 
state sovereignty or on the ‘African state’. The focus in the research is to investigate state 
action and behaviour – in policy making – in the process of regional integration.  
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… does economic openness deprive nation states of their policy autonomy – the 
ability to shape social policy - and if so - what are the implications for system of 
social protection within regionalism? Does regional integration entail a downward 
spiraling of social standards – a race to the bottom – as nations vie with one 
another to compete in the international market place (Mishra, 1996: 120)? 
 
The next chapter of the research provides an extensive examination and consideration of 
the theories and perspectives on regional integration and state sovereignty. The historical 
and comparative perspective on the concepts and theories utilised within a range of 
paradigms in International Relations and International Politics is provided. The theories 
provide useful historical context and meaning on the concepts and terms such regional 
cooperation, regional integration and regionalism. More importantly, an understanding of 
how regional integration and state sovereignty is theorised and conceptualised in the 
literature is provided.  
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CHAPTER 4 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
STATE THEORY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the theoretical literature in the approaches to regional integration. 
Its aim is to illuminate and elucidate the different perceptions and treatments that these 
theories hold on a value-charged process of regional integration. The chapter provides 
an interpretation of the theories in the literature to understand the different levels and 
dynamic qualities of the regional integration phenomenon. These theories on regional 
integration also provides crucial understanding of how different theoretical arguments 
are pursued “… to arise above observation of specific events” (Caporaso, 1996: 34). Kuhn 
(1962: 15) posits that in the absence of a theoretical model “… all facts are likely to 
remain equally relevant.”  
 
The research examines both normative and narrative accounts of the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa in relation to the role of SADC’s central policy instruments 
and the influence of state-centric actors in setting the integrative agenda. Thus, many 
different stages in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa, as distinct from 
the normative ideal – ‘regional state’ – and the consolidation of the sovereign member 
states, are broached in the theories. In this way, different theoretical perspectives on 
how regional integration progresses towards what is being developed become clear sites 
of policy contestation (Mazzeo, 1984).  
 
The chapter also looks at the theories and literature on state sovereignty and regional 
integration. This section of the chapter is intended to examine the extent to which 
theories and conceptions of state sovereignty have modified, evolved, transformed to 
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reflect “multi-level governance” in the choices and preferences of states as regional 
integration progresses (Schmitter, 2004: 48). Political Science and International Relations 
scholars (Morgenthau, 1954; Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 2002; Wendt, 1994) have always 
crafted the epistemological foundations of the world within the intellectual traditions of 
various theories. These theories have been deployed in ways that convey the causal 
reasoning about how the world works. Various intellectual theoretical traditions in political 
science and international relations have sought to highlight certain types of issues, actors, 
structures and relationships between and within states (Mazzeo, 1984).  
 
The chapter provides different levels of theoretical analysis to convey disagreements in 
the theories about world politics an how we can understand it better by looking at 
characteristics of actors, the nature and structure of social relations, the norms and 
structure of interstate political system (Ikome, 2005). The chapter will explore the realism 
and neorealist theories of regional integration in relation to sources of international 
conflict: “… human nature or anarchic international system” (Hobson, 2000: 17). The 
chapter will also explore functionalism and neo-functionalism and how the two theories 
explain regional integration and predict the normative result of the process in the SADC 
region: towards “… supranational state or intergovernmental regime” (Corbey, 1995: 
255).  
 
The chapter will then proceed with an exploration of constructivism and neoliberal 
institutionalism ontological claims in terms of how these theories explain the “… logic of 
appropriateness” or the “… logic of consequences” in relation to SADC’s regional 
integration agenda (Sterling-Folker: 2000: 99). The chapter will explore what Breslin 
refers to as “… an inability of existing integration theories to adequately explain processes 
of regional integration …” by looking at the bourgeoning literature on new regionalism 
(Breslin et.al. 2002: 4). New regionalism provides a useful and multidimensional approach 
to regional integration that other theories of regional integration do not provide. The 
question however, is whether and how the multi-dimensionality of new regionalism 
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provides different and useful explanatory power to regional integration processes than 
other theories.                 
4.2 Realism and Neo-Realism   
 
The foundations of the realist theory of international politics are traced to the classical 
accounts of Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes as the first wave (Ashley, 1981; Barkin, 
2010; Booth, 1991; Donnelly, 2000). The basic assumption of the realist claims is that 
international relations should concern itself with national interests and security over 
ideological or moral concerns (Mastandumo, 1998). The international system of states is 
in constant state of anarchy, and “… international politics like all politics, is a struggle for 
power” (Morgenthau, 1948: 28). Realism views war and power as “… inescapable in a 
system where sovereign states compete for power and advantage to one another’s 
detriment” (Booth 1991: 527).  
 
Realists claim that there is no actor above the state capable of regulating state 
interactions (Booth, 1991). The relations between states, realists claim, are arrived at out 
of their own volition and that no higher controlling authority can dictate to states (Booth, 
1991; Barkin, 2010). Realism is against the cumulative regional integration process that 
would result in loss of state sovereignty (Donnelly, 2000). State sovereignty in the 
international system is what, in realist terms, gives states their meaning, security and 
existence (Badie, 2001). In pursuit of the national security states strive to attain as many 
resources as possible (Rosenthal, 1991). Realism also posits that states are rational 
unitary actors, each moving towards its national interest. The overriding “national 
interests” of each state is its security, derived by the levels of security and economic 
power (Gilpin, 1994).            
 
Realism views human nature as not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and 
competitive. In this sense, states are inherently aggressive (offensive realism) and 
obsessed with security (defensive realism) and that territorial expansion is only 
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constrained by opposing powers (Morgenthau, 1948). Accordingly, the orthodox realist 
view of the world is the world as is, rather than what it ought to be. In this regard, realism 
is an “… empirical rather than a normative paradigm” (Morgenthau, 1956: 4). The 
analytical utility of realism to the process of regional integration in Southern Africa where 
the normative ideal of the ‘regional state’ is negotiated is what this section of the study 
is broaching. Realism is also pessimistic about structural arrangements of “… power in 
the world that are resulting in conflicts, wars, and rivalries” (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007: 
60). In this inherently distorted realist interstate arrangement, the “… balance of power” 
and “… security dilemma” are among the core analytical instruments of realism (Buzan, 
1997: 53).  
 
Realism privileges dominant states in the world system with “… immense leverage to 
influence the system” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 17-18). For realist, regional security in 
Southern Africa, become a zero-sum game where relative gains can be made. With regard 
to power as the core analytical concept at the heart of realism’s views of international 
politics, “… realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the material structure 
of the international system” (Mearsheimer, 1995: 91). For Morgenthau (1965: 9) “… 
power may compromise anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over 
man … from violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls 
another.”  
 
Morgenthau’s conception of power has always put him at odds with other realists, 
because of its critical Foucaultian slant towards truth. Foucault argues that the task of 
intellectuals is to speak truth to power “… and expose of it for what it is” instead of 
succumbing to power’s pretense “… as the bearer of truth and justice in the hope of 
maintaining the existing order” (1990: 14-15). In his classic book, Morgenthau (1965: 8-
9) argues: “… the goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run 
the whole gamut of objectives a nations can ever pursue or might possibly pursue.”             
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Whilst realism locates the roots of the inherent international interstate conflict and war 
to an imperfect human nature, neorealism argues that the deep direction of causality is 
the anarchical international system (Waltz, 1979). In his path-breaking work on 
neorealism, Waltz (1979: 65, 74) criticises realism of “reductionism by failing to account 
for the patterns of international politics that constantly reoccur though the state actors 
and their character changes.” Waltz contends that the “anarchical international system” 
and not human nature as realist would posit, leads to “the logic of self-help and power 
politics” (Waltz, 1979: 82). Furthermore, Waltz argues that states who struggle for power 
are simply following the dictates of the international system in order to survive in an 
international order where there is no global Leviathan to offer protection. Focusing on 
system-level analysis, Waltz avoids what he calls “reductionism” in realist understanding 
of the international structure of politics (Waltz, 1979: 87).    
 
For neorealists, the anarchical structure of the international system determines the 
bahaviour of the units within it. In this situation, states in Southern Africa are continuously 
locked in competitions over power, interests and influence. Waltz (1979: 105) put the 
matter in this way:      
 
When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel 
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not, 
‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’ If an expected gain is to be divided, 
say in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to 
implement a policy intended to destroy the other. 
 
Realism and neorealism theories separate the systemic and unit level explanations of why 
states pursue power in the manner that they do. Realism privileges unit-level analysis 
over systemic-level analysis whilst neorealism is concerned with the opposite in explaining 
the bahaviour of states. Put differently, the difference between the realist and neorealist 
ontological framing of international politics lies in the fact that, realists privilege human 
nature as a basis of explaining the behaviour of states; whilst the neorealist offer an 
international structure of anarchy as a source of explaining the behaviour of states. In 
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this way, realism and neorealism offer structural and unit level explanations of 
international politics.       
4.3 Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism   
 
The theory of functionalism was developed in the 1950s with Mitrany as the primary 
thinker in the intellectual development of the functionalist theory of regional integration. 
Mitrany argued that regional integration will be achieved by joining: “… particular 
activities and interests, one at a time, according to need and acceptability, giving each a 
joint authority and policy limited to that activity alone.” (1965:135). For  Mistry, “the 
implications, costs, benefits and opportunities of integration were neither fully understood 
nor supported by all levels of government nor by a sufficiently broad spectrum of public 
opinion.” (2000:559). In the Southern African context, this explains the initial reluctance 
to subject sovereignty to a supranational institution.  
 
Functionalists sought to achieve “a peace by pieces,” a gradualist approach to integration 
(O’ Neill 1996: 32-35). Mitrany argued that sectors should be identified where it would 
benefit states to act cooperatively (1950). Through developing functional economic and 
social relations between states in particular areas, national loyalties would shift over time 
to international institutions. The central problem with the federalist and functionalist 
approaches was that they construed the separation of economics and politics. Neo-
functionalism surfaced later in an attempt to resolve the impasse. Neo-functionalism 
essentially considers the dialectic operative between politics and the economy and seeks 
a simultaneous path to integration (O’ Neill, 1996: 37-49).  
 
The formation of the SADCC was to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa. 
This was to be achieved through the development of infrastructure and political 
cooperation and solidarity among regional states. From the outset, SADCC focused on 
intergovernmental cooperation, and limited economic cooperation. This corresponds with 
the defining features or the conception of regional integration that political integration 
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leads to the establishment of a political community, albeit among states (O’ Neill, 1996). 
To achieve its objectives, SADCC opted for sectoral functional cooperation among its 
members. If one measures the above proposition against the experience of Southern 
Africa, the genesis of SADCC was underpinned by sectoral co-operation, especially, but 
not exclusively, in the field of infrastructural development (Mittelman, 1999).  
 
However, poor intra-regional infrastructure, counter-productive to the enhancement of 
intraregional trade and growth, is still a hallmark of the Southern African region (Mistry, 
2000). It could, however, be argued that SADCC achieved modest success in its regional 
sector cooperation, especially in the field of infrastructural development. For Mittelman 
(1999) the logic that underpinned SADCC at formation was neither security nor economic 
considerations. SACU members are the exception to this rule and have a well-developed 
infrastructure, which served specifically, but not exclusively, South Africa. 
 
Østergaard (1993) argues that interest groups have an important role to play in 
infrastructural development. Interest groups have, despite some integration so far, 
however, been excluded in Southern African integration efforts. Instead, national rather 
than regional development has remained the preoccupation of leaders in Southern Africa 
(Mittelman, 1999). South Africa earlier on, for instance, was more concerned with 
developing its own industrial base than that of other members of the Customs Union. 
Similarly, SADCC member states were more concerned with national as opposed to 
regional development and cooperation. How functionalism and neo-functionalism explains 
the behavior of states in this situation in Southern Africa is the focus of this section of 
the chapter (O’ Neill, 1996).  
 
For neo-functionalism, co-operation emerges in progressive and incremental ways so that 
its effects result into ‘spillover’ into the emergence of governing institutions. Implicit in 
neo-functionalism, therefore, remains a preoccupation with economism that would 
ultimately achieve supranationality (O’ Neill, 1996). The approach of federalist and 
functionalist regional integration theories is that they are elite driven, requiring the 
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consensus and management of political leadership. Haas (1964), a leading proponent of 
neo-functionalism, moved away from an emphasis on political elite-driven models and 
regarded it as critical that interest groups develop a “stake in promoting further 
integration” (Asante 1984: 180). However, these groups are organised entities, elites in 
themselves and remain responsive to the initial drive of the political elite. Integration 
theorists have also considered the imperative of similar political dispensations and levels 
of development as key to the performance of regional groupings (Krapohl & Muntschick, 
2009).  
 
These regional interests and processes: “… spill over borders, involving contacts between 
groups who are located in different national societies, but who are linked by economic, 
cultural and political needs” (Smith, 1997:74). This implies that decision-making about 
economic, political and security policies, which may lead to deeper political and regional 
integration, goes beyond intergovernmentalism (Haas, 1964). History, however, 
illustrates that in the case of SACU, economic co-operation did not lead to political 
integration, whereas with SADCC it was hoped that political cooperation and limited 
project coordination would lead to economic integration. Because the focus of these 
programmes was national instead of regional in focus, SADCC had no particular 
development programme of its own (Maasdorp, 1992).   
 
Vale & Swatuk (2001) posit that the incremental process to regional integration that is 
posited by neo-functionalist manifests itself through a series of shared projects across 
borders, induces state behaviour towards cooperation resulting in the regional pooling 
efforts. In spite of this, Hurrel (1995:336) argues that, “… regional cooperation may 
involve the creation of formal institutions, but it can often be based on much looser 
structures, involving patterns of regular meetings with some rules attached.” The 
cumulative effect of this process is that it will generate cooperation interdependence 
along sectoral lines, resulting in more expanded scope of regional cooperation.  
 
102 
 
The ontological focus of neo-functionalism is contextual rather than general and 
universal. The central argument of neo-functionalism is captured in the spill-over effect 
that, “…integration within one sector will tend to beget its own impetus and spread to 
other sectors” (Hurrel, 1995: 210). The regional institutions driving this process have an 
important role. Hurrel (1995: 348) asserts that: “supranational institutions [not 
intergovernmental or coordinating bodies] were seen as the most effective means of 
solving common problems, beginning with technical and non-controversial issues, but 
‘spilling over’ into the realm of high politics and leading to a redefinition of group identity 
around the regional unit.”  
 
The experience of SADCC and SADC experimentation with regional integration varies from 
the picture painted by the neo-functionalist theory (O’ Neill, 1996). Intergovernmentalism 
and state driven politico-security and socio-economic development are the character and 
defining feature of the process of regional integration in Southern Africa (Mittelman, 
1999).  Two types of ‘spill over’ will deepen the process of integration. Hurrel (1995: 348) 
notes that: “… first there was functional spill-over whereby partial small initial steps down 
the integration road would create new problems that could only be solved by further 
cooperation. Second, there was political spill-over, whereby the existence of 
supranational institutions would set in motion a self-reinforcing process of institution-
building.”  
 
This self-reinforcing process of institution building will be strengthened by sector-to-
sector integration. Regional integration in Southern Africa, neo-functionalism posits, 
should presuppose a significant level of interstate cooperation at different levels. The 
approach of cooperation along sectoral lines with strong sector coordinating units of the 
SADCC had some useful interventions that would have taken the region quite ahead the 
neo-functionalist route if it was not for the shift that resulted in development regionalism 
of the SADC. Development regionalism is quite laudable but regional cooperation given 
the structure and levels of economic development of the countries in the region would 
have been the most viable, limited approach to regional development. Any progressive 
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development approach in Southern Africa has to start with a neorealist understanding of 
the unit of analysis (the state) that are shaping or driving the process of regional 
integration in the region.  
4.4 Neoliberal Institutionalism  
 
The ontological foundations of neoliberal institutionalism marked a turning point in 
international politics. Keohane’s (1984) groundbreaking work provided an explicit and 
bold explanation of neoliberal theory assumptions including the role of state and power 
in politics. Indeed Keohane (1984), and Martin (2007) provides extensive thinking about 
what it means to be liberal providing an arena for projecting disparate theoretical and 
intellectual dimensions of much liberalism. Neo-liberal institutionalism offers radically 
different solutions to the variety of problems facing the international system (Keohane, 
1984)  
 
Neo-liberal institutionalism’s primary claim is that states’ behavior is determined not so 
much by absolute gains than relative gains in interactions with other actors in the 
international system. Whether regional cooperation results in relative gains or losses is 
not very important to a state as far as neoliberals are concerned (Keohane, 1984). In 
contrast, neo-realism assumes that states are largely concerned with relative rather than 
absolute gains. Keohane (1989: 2-3) provides two conditions that should obtain for 
neoliberal institutionalist assumptions to be relevant: “… actors must have some mutual 
interests … [second] variations in the degree of institutionalisation [must] exert 
substantive effects on state behavior.”  
 
The most important contribution of neoliberal institutionalist theory about state behaviour 
in relation to institutions is that, it has raised the intellectual horizons between neorealism 
and neoliberals. For Keohane (1995: 40), the distributive and allocative difficulties in the 
process of regional cooperation “… may render institutions more important … Far from 
leading to the conclusion that institutions are not significant in world politics, the relative-
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gains debate has led us to understand yet another pathway through which they 
substantially influence the course of international relations.”          
 
Central to neoliberal institutionalist ontology is the analysis of the extent of cooperation 
possible under conditions of anarchy and the conclusions neoliberals reach are radically 
different to those of neorealists (Keohane, 1995). Neo-realists claim that under anarchy 
conflict and the struggle for power are enduring characteristics of international politics 
and that because of this, cooperation between states is at best precarious and at worst 
nonexistent. Neo-liberal institutionalists agree that achieving cooperation is difficult in 
international relations, but that world politics is not a homogenous state of conflict; 
cooperation varies among issues and over-time. Axelrod and Keohane (1996:226), for 
instance, state that:   
 
To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks 
organisation. Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in some 
issue areas, even though they remain loose in others. 
 
Axelrod and Keohane (1996: 4) are incensed by the definition of anarchy as the absence 
of government but argue that this, “… constant feature of world politics permits a variety 
of patterns of interaction among states.” The conception of institutions resembles that of 
regimes. Institutions are defined: “… as the formal or informal procedures, routines, 
norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political 
economy” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938).  
 
For Southern Africa the development regionalism function of institutions is weak, 
circumscribed, and predominantly state-driven with little non-state actor participation in 
the process. Neoliberal institutionalists question why and when institutions matter in the 
political economy of development regionalism in Southern Africa. Indeed whilst 
institution-building is a difficult task, for Southern Africa, the exercise should focus on the 
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“… domains [institutions] of what matter most, under what conditions, and how their 
effects are exerted” (Keohane & Martin, 1995: 50).       
 
4.5 Constructivism 
  
This section of the chapter argues that constructivism provides a useful ontology for 
research inquiry on the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. Constructivism 
goes back to the seminal work of Berger & Luckmann (1996). A variety of conceptual and 
theoretical discourses on constructivism have emerged as a critique of realism and 
neorealism (Velody et. al, 1998; Stam, 2002). On the whole, constructivism’s discursive 
ontology is that human and social phenomena are not innate or immutable but shaped 
and even created through social discourse (Berger & Luckmann, 1996).  
   
The epistemological claim of constructivism is that knowledge is contingent upon social 
relations (Berger & Luckmann, 1996). Whilst constructivism shares with functionalism the 
view that regional integration is triggered by a mismatch between “… efficiency and the 
existing structure of authority,” constructivism however, makes no presumption that the 
outcome of regional integration will “… reflect functional pressures” (Lindberg & 
Scheingold, 1970: 16).  
 
This section of the chapter argues that constructivism provides insights that realism, 
neorealism and neoliberalism do not offer: an ideational and conceptual framework for 
explaining how “… identities, interests and values” are shaped by communities and actors 
within and among states (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970: 43). This section of the chapter 
argues that states’ “… identities, interests and values” are developed through historical 
social interactions and are relative to different people and communities. The 
epistemological claim that this section of the chapter makes is that social interactions 
among states and non-state actors in the process of regional integration in Southern 
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Africa necessitates subjectivity as integral in understanding international relations 
(Connell, 2007). 
 
There are three essential epistemological tenets that the constructivism paradigm is 
based on. One is that, knowledge is not passively accumulated, but rather, is the result 
of active cognising by the individual (Berger & Luckmann, 1996). Second, cognition is an 
adaptive process that functions to make an individual’s behavior more viable given a 
particular environment (Berger & Luckmann, 1996). Third, cognition organises and makes 
sense of one’s experience, and is not a process to render an accurate representation of 
reality (von Glaserfeld, 1996). Constructivism is not a unitary theoretical or conceptual 
paradigm, but it is a continuum (Berger & Luckmann, 1996). The assumptions that 
underlie this continuum vary along several dimensions and have resulted in the definitions 
and support for multiple types of constructivism. 
 
Typically, this continuum is divided into three broad categories: cognitive constructivism, 
social constructivism and radical constructivism. These categories are not simple atomistic 
intellectual blocks of thinking but they change and overlap with one another and in 
relation to other paradigms such as relativism and post-modernism (Berger & Luckmann, 
1996). Cognitive constructivism represents one end, or extreme, of the constructivist 
continuum and is typically associated with information processing and its reliance of the 
component processes of cognition (von Glaserfeld, 1996).  Whilst emerging from the 
three epistemological tenets, cognitive constructivism emphasizes the first two tenets, 
that is, knowledge acquisition is an adaptive process and results from active cognising by 
the individual. Knowledge therefore, from cognitive constructivist position, is the result 
of the accurate internalisation and construction of external reality (Larochelle at. al., 
1998).     
 
Radical constructivism represents the opposite end of the continuum from cognitive 
constructivism.  Radical constructivism fully embraces all the three epistemological tenets, 
that is, knowledge acquisition is adaptive process that results from active cognising by an 
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individual, rendering an experientially based mind, not a mind that reflects some external 
reality (von Glaserfeld, 1990). Radical constructivism is concerned with both the 
construction of mental structures, the position of cognitive constructivist, and the 
construction of personal meaning. In this sense, radical constructivism involves a greater 
degree of construction than does cognitive constructivism, involving two planes of 
construction, structure and meaning, rather than only structure (von Glaserfeld, 1996).     
 
Social constructivism lies somewhere between the transmissions of knowable reality and 
cognitive constructivists, and the construction of a personal and coherent reality of the 
radical constructivist (Prawatt & Falden, 1994). Social constructivism, unlike cognitive and 
radical constructivism, emphasises all the three epistemological tenets of constructivism. 
These particular epistemological emphases lead to defining principles that maintain the 
social nature of knowledge, and the belief that knowledge is the result of social interaction 
and thus is shared rather than an individual experience (Prawatt & Falden, 1994).      
 
In addition, this social interaction occurs within a socio-cultural context, resulting in 
knowledge that is bound to a specific time and place (Gergen, 1995; Vygotsky, 1978). 
This position is exemplified by Prawatt & Falden (1994), “truth is not to be found inside 
the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, 
in the process of their dialogic interaction.”  Truth in this case, is neither objective reality 
of the cognitive constructivist nor the experiential reality of the radical constructivist, but 
rather, is a socially constructed and agreed upon truth resulting from “cooperation in 
cultural practices” (Cobb & Yackel, 1996:37).  
      
In relation to neorealism and realism (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), constructivism 
argues that the process of regional integration is socially constructed, that is, its form is 
derived from an ongoing process of social practice and interaction (Wendt, 1992). 
Neorealist conception of regional integration is that, the structure of the International 
system gives regional integration its form (Waltz, 2000). Specifically, neorealists argue 
that international politics is primarily determined by the fact that the international system 
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is “anarchic” – it lacks overarching authority (Waltz, 1959:34). This anarchic situation, 
neorealist argues, forces the state in its pursuit for regional integration to act in certain 
ways that will secure its self-interest (Waltz, 2000).  
 
Constructivism posits that the causal powers attributed to ‘structure’ by neorealists are in 
fact not ‘given’, but rest on the way in which structure is constructed by social practice 
(Caporaso, 1972). Removed from presumptions about the nature of the identities and 
interests of states in regional integration, and the meaning that social institutions 
(including anarchy) have for such actors, neorealist structure reveals, very little, “… it 
does not predict whether two states will be friends and foes, will recognise each other’s 
sovereignty” (Wendt, 1992: 54). Theorising regional integration in Southern Africa is 
predominantly based on the neorealist assumption that states use regional integration as 
means to pursue their national interests (Caporaso, 1972).  
 
This section of the chapter argues that constructivism offers a different approach to 
regional integration in Southern Africa – where the agency and structure in the process 
of regional integration is seen in mutually relational way (Risse, 2006). Social relations 
determine the institutions because the former are the conditions of existence of the latter 
in the sense that social relations transfer their contradictory social content to institutions 
(Risse, 2006). The process of regional integration in Southern Africa – in all its phases - 
is an institutional arrangement with many forms of appearance of social relations.  
 
This section of the chapter argues that if the behaviour of regional state actors, including 
the non-state actors, is determined by social relations, how any theory of regional 
integration explains the outcome of such cooperation or integration (Marks, 2006. Indeed, 
a conceptual framework or theory of regional integration should tell us about the political 
choices that determine its course. In order to explain the level and scope of regional 
integration, we need to understand the underlying conflicts: who is involved, on what 
issues, and with what consequences (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). The 
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constructivist conceptual and theoretical framework offers stronger explanatory power to 
the substantive character of the debate over regional integration (Marks, 2006).  
 
4.6  New Regionalism    
 
The new regionalism theory is qualitatively a new phenomenon in international relations 
discourse. It refers to a phenomenon that began in the mid-1980s, in contrast to the ‘old 
regionalism’ that began in the 1950s and faded away in the 1970s (Hettne & Söderbaum, 
1998). The old regionalism existed within in a particular historical context, dominated by 
the bipolar Cold War structure in the international system. On the other hand, the current 
wave of new regionalism is linked to the current transformations of the international 
system of politics and relations between states (Hettne, 1995). The new regional 
phenomenon is associated with several and often interrelated set of factors caused by 
the structural transformation of the international political system including: 
 
the change of the bipolar Cold War structure and alliance systems towards the 
multipolar (or perhaps tripolar) structure, with a new international divisions of 
power (NIDP); the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a 
more positive attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism, at least in the 
form of ‘open regionalism’; the restructuring of the global political economy into 
three major blocs: the European Union (EU); the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) and the Asian-Pacific, which are all based on different forms of capitalism; 
the erosion of the Westphalia nation-state system and the growth of economic, 
social, and political interdependence and transformational which has triggered new 
patterns of interaction both among governments and non-state actors; the 
associated ‘globalisation’ of finance, trade production and technology which has 
led to new international division of labour (NIDL); the end of ‘third worldism’ and 
changed attitudes towards (neoliberal) economic development and political system 
in the developing countries (Hurrell & Fawcet,  1995; Gamble & Payne 1996).  
 
The post-Cold War era has also spawned new content and renewed trend towards 
regionalism. New regionalism has become a worldwide phenomenon that has sought to 
provide alternative explanations and theory on the process of regional integration in 
regions outside the European Union (EU) (Hettne, 1995). The ‘old regionalism’ was 
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generally specific about objectives and content, and often had a simple and narrow focus 
on free trade agreements and security alliances. The new regionalism seeks to expand 
the scope and diversity of areas around which the regional integration project is based 
(Hettne, 1995). Hettne (1995:7) posit that the new regionalism is: “comprehensive, 
multifaceted and multidimensional process, implying the change of a particular region 
from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of 
dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political 
regimes.”  
 
New regionalism’s ontological claim is that regional development and cooperation must 
be based on the development needs of the people and countries making the region 
(Hettne, 1995). In this context, new regionalism and its Southern African offshoot of 
developmental regionalism places more responsibility on states, people and the market 
as agency in building balanced development. The political economy of new regionalism 
posits a reversal to uneven economic development but projects development that is 
inclusive and equitable. New regionalism theory is raising an important element around 
agency – by presenting a more expanded definition of agency (Hettne, 1995). The 
process of regional integration in Southern Africa, new regionalism argues, should be 
state-driven but should be based on symbiotic relations between state and non-state 
actors. The theory of new regionalism places more importance on the role of non-state 
actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector and civil society 
(Hettne, 1995).   
 
New regionalism provides insights that reflect the reconfiguration of economic and 
political power in the production centers of the world (Gamble and Payne, 1996). Hurrel 
& Fawcett (1995:309) argue that, “the end of the Cold War has witnessed a further 
expansion of the normative ambitions of international society … to embody some notion 
of a common good … the construction of more elaborate and intrusive interstate security 
orders.” New Regionalism projects an inclusive and broad-based institutional 
arrangement. How this arrangement can obtain in state-drive intergovernmental process 
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of regional integration in Southern African is what this section of the chapter is broaching. 
New regionalism as a phenomenon privileges the linkage and mutual dependence 
between state and non-state actors in the process of regional integration (Gamble and 
Payne, 1996).  
 
4.7. Constructivism Framework to Regional Integration   
 
The global financial crisis that started in 2008 in the United States throws into sharp relief 
the urgency of making sense of the political in development discourse and the study and 
theories of regional integration in Southern Africa. Realist and neorealist theories of 
regional integration in Southern Africa project regional polarisation around South Africa 
given its disproportionate powerful position in the region (Hettne, 1995). The 
maximisation of power thesis at the core of realist, functionalist, neo-functionalist and 
neoliberal institutionalist versions of regional integration in Southern Africa have enabled 
governments to present themselves as managerial bodies that handle the external 
economic pressure they face. The result of this increasingly managerial order has been 
an acute obfuscation of power relations in the reconstruction of contemporary capitalism 
(Marks, 2006).  
 
Mainstream theories of regional integration in Southern Africa offer little in assisting to 
overcome this obfuscation, instead most work on regional integration has arguably 
contributed to the elaboration of discourses that have added to it. This chapter has 
demonstrated how the defining theoretical debate of the study of regional integration – 
that between realists, functionalists, neoliberal institutionalist, constructivists and the new 
regionalism – has constrained its disciplinary horizons (Risse, 2006). Whilst functionalists 
are concerned with spillover, neo-functionalists are concerned with the direction and 
orientation offered by supranational bodies in processes of spillover. The central 
argument has been that a deeper economic integration requires authority to be 
transferred to the regional level: politics follows economics (Risse, 2006).  
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Neo-functionalist technocratic analysis of regional integration in Southern Africa thus 
mirrors the technocratic nature of governance at the regional level. In addition to this, 
neo-functionalism adopts a very problematic pluralistic view of society taken from some 
studies of European integration (Gamble and Payne, 1996). Capital and labour are 
reduced to interest groups that are conceived in broad abstraction from the social 
relations of production. Through abstracting such groups in this way, the state and 
supranational institutions are considered as being more or less impartial to capital and 
labour (Rosamond, 2001).  
 
The intergovernmentalism approach emerged as a critical response to the neo-
functionalist idea of a determining and teleological process running from economics to 
politics (Marks, 2006). In this approach, two distinct layers of government are apparent, 
one characterised by ‘low politics’ (e.g. trade and monetary policy) where states are 
prepared to engage in integrative and cooperative activity, and the other characterised 
by ‘high politics’ (e.g. foreign policy) in which states are not prepared to compromise their 
sovereignty (Moravcsick, 1999).  
 
In defining the process of regional integration in this fashion in Southern Africa, the  
intergovernmentalist approach privileges traditional realist concerns with great power 
politics between states, thus demoting the operations of class-based social forces 
engaged in wider power struggles to peripheral importance (Moravcsick, 1999). The 
political is in this sense considered as the source of potential conflict, while the economic 
is considered as an essentially non-conflictual space wherein the coordination of national 
interests can be achieved. These ontological approaches establishing the core of the 
debate on regional integration studies places the importance of the state in less light as 
opposed to plural interest groups that embody the economic sphere of the process of 
regional integration (Wendt, 1994).   
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The political in this sense has been conceived in very asocial terms. Either it denotes the 
technical measures used to bring bargaining interests groups together in regional 
economic integration or it is seen as the locus of interstate conflict considered in realist 
terms (Wendt, 1994). Against this background, the intervention of new regionalism has 
been vital in two respects. New regionalism has responded to the perennial critique of 
economic determinism as leveled against neo-functionalism by reposing the problem of 
the political in social inquiry on regional integration (Mazzeo, 1984). In this sense, new 
regionalism plays a hugely significant role in contemporary revitalisation of regional 
integration approaches. Secondly new regionalism addresses the social power relations 
that subsist in the Southern African regional integration process. The major shortcoming 
of the new regionalism approach is its insistence on the superficial divide between the 
old and new regionalism (Ikome, 2005). A possible way out of the theoretical impasse 
may be found if one turns to the problematic of social construction.  
 
By exploring how the economy is socially constructed one may be better able to articulate 
the significance of the reconstitution of the political in Southern Africa (Mazzeo, 1984). 
Such an approach retains the new regionalism notion of the political and economic as 
interrelated, without however abandoning it to a totalising conception of class struggle. 
The central thrust of constructivism is the problematisation of regional integration as a 
social factor. Constructivism moves away from the crude foundationalism of both 
neoliberal intuitionalism or Marxist political economy approaches to a tentatively more 
reflexive understanding of economic relations within Southern Africa (Caporaso, Marks, 
Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997). Thus constructivism views the economy as not self-evident – 
a priori entity – but one that is socially constructed. Such constructivist approach to 
regional integration are of value in emphasising how the economy can be used as 
discursive category employed by actors to legitimate their attempts to expand their scope 
of authority (Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997).  
 
The constructivism approach is not without considerable limitations. First, by focusing on 
how the social construction of Southern African economy empowers the Southern African 
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Development Community (SADC) vis-a-vis the member states, the horizons of 
constructivism become narrow to incorporate the role of class struggles in regional 
integration in Southern Africa (Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997). Policymaking 
rather than politics is important to constructivists and thus key questions regarding social 
conflict fall from view. Rather than confining the constructivism approach to regional 
integration to one level, or abandoning it altogether we should extend the notion of 
construction to the entirety of our analysis (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). As such, 
constructivism is not specific to the discursive domain of ideas but extends down to the 
very constitution of the economy. From this view the separation of economic space from 
the political is constituted through the socially contested process of institutional 
formalisation (Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997).  
 
Seeking to understand the nature and limits of regional integration, political scientists 
tended either to remain within the sphere of power politics or to propose an implicitly 
normative template under which the arbitrary exercise of power could be checked by 
rational administration (Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997). At the same time, 
the political economy of regional integration becomes a specialised domain for economics. 
The global financial crisis – with its concomitant destabilising impact on the economy has 
exposed the limitations of these approaches to regional integration (Marks, 2006).  
 
By throwing the spotlight on the political dimensions of international economic affairs, 
the crisis revived critical international political economy (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 
2001). It also invigorates comparative political economy, as it became important to 
understand the nature of Southern African regional integration process better by making 
sense of the political and by bringing the state back-in the process of regional integration 
and in economic development (Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997). 
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4.8 Conclusion  
 
This research utilises the constructivist framework to analyse, understand and explain 
state action and behaviour in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa 
(Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & Pollack, 1997. The choice of the constructivist framework 
is made because constructivism provides a more balanced theoretical approach signaling 
an ongoing cycle of interaction among states – “each state [attempting] to ascribe 
meaning to, or make sense of, the actions and words of the other, thereby producing 
particular values or connotations that are situational and specific to their relationship” 
(Sterling-Folker & Badie: 2012: 105).  
 
The constructivist framework provides the utility and ability to explain norm variation and 
compliance in the policy preferences and actions or behaviour of SADC member states 
(Wendt, 1994). In this way, the constructivist framework places critical importance on 
the interests of states as an important variable in the process of regional integration. How 
these ideational state interests, identities and preferences impact, or inversely, are 
impacted upon by SADC norms and objectives is what this dissertation is exploring 
(Marks, 2006).       
 
The next chapter of the study introduces the first of three case studies that the 
investigation is engaging. Regional security is one of the key priorities that the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) has identified as critical for regional integration. 
The chapter explores the extent of the challenges in bridging the national state and 
regional divide in the construction, implantation and expression of security policy in the 
region. Indeed the study examines whether state policy choices or preferences modify 
and/or evolve sovereignty in the direction of convergence and/or divergence in the region 
(Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Whilst the process of regional integration is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, the intention of drawing insights from the case studies and 
semi-structured interviews is to examine in what areas of policy do state’s policy 
preferences converge and/or diverge.    
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CHAPTER 5 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
SADC’s COMMON OR COLLECTIVE SECURITY   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
5.1 Introduction    
 
 
This chapter presents one of the three case studies that have been identified to illuminate 
and ascertain the extent to which state policy preferences or choices move in the direction 
of common regional policy or towards national consolidation of policy space in Southern 
Africa. The primary aim of this chapter is to develop a case and evidence for establishing 
the relationship between security policy preferences of states in Southern Africa and 
regional security programmes. The intention is to establish the correlation between a 
state’s sovereign policy space and the SADC regional policy dimension. The three case 
studies of SADC’s collective security; the trade relations between SADC and the European 
Union (EU); and SADC’s foreign policy or diplomacy have been chosen because they 
provide complex terrains in which policy contestation and persuasion among states in the 
region is rife. The regional security terrain is even more complex given the historical 
backdrop of apartheid and Cold War destabilisation and conflict in the region.  
 
The ongoing trade arrangement and negotiations or what is referred in most literature as 
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between SADC states and the European 
Union (EU) presents an overwhelming discourse on how the interplay between national 
interests and regional interests outside of a binding regional framework for engaging third 
parties continue to frustrate the regional integration objectives and goals (Tralac, 2014). 
Foreign policy or diplomacy provides another important terrain in which the rationale for 
regional integration in Southern Africa is explained. The demise of apartheid and the Cold 
War has ushered into significant and new forms of multilateral and bilateral engagements 
by states in the region with the rest of the world. This widening external scope poses an 
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internal challenge for Southern Africa thus: to what extent is the direction of external 
diplomacy in the region projecting differentiated policy approach or collective approach 
to access world affairs?        
 
5.2      Regional Collective Security   
 
The genesis of the Southern African regional security framework is characterised by deep-
seated interstate conflict with a number of both internal and external sources (Khadiagala 
1994; Klotz 1995). The region was engulfed by protracted interstate and intrastate 
conflicts that were primarily rooted in Cold War geopolitics and apartheid destabilisation 
(Ohlson et. al, 1994). In their path-breaking study Ohlson et al (1994: 189) argue that 
the intensity of conflict in Southern Africa was increased by the symbiotic “spillover” factor 
that spawned the violence across state boarders in the region. The violent struggles 
against colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe and against 
apartheid in South Africa left deep seated interstate security problems for the region 
(Khadiagala 1994; Klotz 1995).      
 
In the 1960s, South Africa accelerated its policy of “assertive incorporation” by providing 
military and technical support to the Rhodesian government through the promotion of 
the notion of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) to counter the 
influence of the Frontline States in the region (Hull, 1996: 33). In response to this, the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a policy of political isolation towards South 
Africa (OAU, 1985). The dimensions of the politico-security challenges in the region were 
steeped and linked to the political question of the liberation of South Africa (Khadiagala 
1994; Klotz 1995). Given the Cold War situation that was underway, this situation was 
further complicated with intense interaction between internal regional actors as well as 
external actors such the United States and the United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) 
strategically placing them on either side of the politico-security dilemma (Hull, 1996: 33).   
 
118 
 
The period of the 1970s and the 1980s saw the emergence of a “coercive incorporation” 
posture from the South African government culminating in intense regional 
“destabilisation” (Hull, 1996:34).  This was evidenced in deliberate support by the South 
African government of “counter-revolutionary movements in Angola, Mozambique, a so-
called liberation army in Lesotho and settler forces in Namibia” (Hull, 1996: 34). The 
South African government’s resolve to destabilise the region did not cease even after its 
signing of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique which precluded covert and overt 
hostilities between the two parties (Patel, 1992). The regional destabilisation efforts of 
the South African government had a variety of impact on the countries of the region. It 
is estimated that the cost of South Africa’s destabilsation in Mozambique between 1980 
and 1988 was approximately US$60 billion with 1.5 million lives lost (Patel, 1996: 45-61).       
     
The rationale for the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) in 1980 was partly a response “to counter apartheid destabilisation 
and to reduce its members’ economic dependence on South Africa” (Matlosa, 2001: 393-
405). The demise of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 coincided with the transformation 
of SADCC into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 - resulting 
in the inclusion of the regional military power – South Africa (Windhoek Treaty, 1992). In 
1996, the development of the SADC security architecture – the Organ on Politics, Defense 
and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) – took shape to “[allow] more flexibility and timely 
response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations” (SADC 
Communiqué, 1996: 2).       
 
Most discussion on the evolution of the common security regime in Southern Africa has 
centered on the interstate disputes over the shape and orientation of the OPDSC (Malan, 
1998; Green, 1999). This chapter is less concerned with the shape and orientation of the 
OPDSC, but how SADC states’ security preferences and choices impact on state 
sovereignty and how the state itself is impacted upon by the process of regional 
integration. Put differently, in what ways is the design of the regional security architecture 
informed by state interests or regional interests and vice versa. Nathan (2006) argues 
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that there are external and internal logics that act as distinguishing features of states’ 
security policy preferences in Southern Africa.  
 
     The external logic which is strong in southern Africa, refers to the interests gains 
     and material conditions that make the organisation a beneficial venture in the 
     assessment of member states. The internal logic, which is weak in the case of SADC 
     refers to the normative congruence in the policies of member states that enable     
     these states to engage in close political and security cooperation (Nathan, 2006: 
     606).     
 
Cilliers (1999) is concerned with SADC viewing its insecurity and threats as external to 
the system and organisation of region. Cilliers (1999:9) puts his general analysis of the 
security challenges in the region this way: “… state security … is not threatened by 
conventional threats of armed attack by other countries but more insidious measures 
many which flow from the weakness of the state …” It is this aspect of the position of 
states in relation to how they make decisions on security matters that concerns this 
chapter. Thus the meaning of conflict and security is important so that domestic state 
policy understanding is clarified in the analysis from the regional perspectives in the 
OPDSC.   
 
Vale (1996: 387) on the other hand, is more concerned with the citizen’s voice with a 
conceited lament for more of what he calls “… common regional purpose that links  
Southern Africa’s  people to each other, instead of, on the states that have entrapped 
rather than liberated the regional spirit.” Relegating the state to a trap that has continued 
to stifle some “regional spirit” is persuasive but limiting; as it misplaces the ideational and 
constructivist understanding of a state-led and intergovernmental process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa. Given this, the chapter argues that the security 
architecture in Southern Africa and the discursive interactions of state actors has to be 
infused and developed with new ideas emerging from the citizens within the national 
spirit to shape and bring about Vale’s regional spirit (Vale, 1996).          
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The chapter is concerned with what explains the security preferences of states in 
Southern Africa. The chapter will utilise the constructivist framework to understand, 
explain and evaluate three constructivist research assumptions below that states derive 
their power from making decisions that drive their interests and sustain their identities 
thus:   
 
1. the more congruent states security preferences are, the less likely they are to 
prefer military actions in the security choices they make; 
2. states will make security preferences in relation to self-interest, preferences will 
be made in relation to utility derived; 
3. the less clear the external threat to regional security, the less likely that countries 
would achieve mutual security (Hull, 1996: 38). 
 
The SADC Treaty (1992) provides that the heads of state and government of the SADC 
are the primary intergovernmental policymaking body, supported by the Council of 
Ministers. The Protocol on the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation 
(OPDSC) is the third operational leg of the troika driving the security architecture in the 
SADC region. The SADC leadership also established in 2003 a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) 
providing for a framework for security cooperation among member states in the face of 
external aggression (SADC Communique, 2003). The MDP reflected a much broader 
regional intention to build a security community. In 2004, the heads of state and 
government adopted the strategic indicative plan of the organ (SIPO I) to provide for 
policy direction and guidelines in the daily operations of the Organ (SADC, 2004). SIPO I 
was also established to ensure that there is significant alignment between SADC’s and 
the African Union’s peace and security objectives (SADC Report, 2004).     
 
The instruments that are mentioned above are important in that a much deeper analysis 
of how they are established and what structure of decision making among states is 
envisaged, with what strategic instruments of enforcing alignment and compliance is 
critical. It is this latter aspect that the chapter and the research is examining – how do 
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state preferences converge or diverge towards the common and mutual regional security 
objectives envisaged in the Organ (OPDSC), or MDP or in the SIPO I and II. The 
discussion below will look at the three instruments of the SADC architecture in detail to 
explain, understand and evaluate state behaviour in respect to the three constructivist 
hypotheses indicated above. It also draws illuminating evidence on the data captured 
from the field research and interviews undertaken at the SADC Secretariat and with other 
stakeholders who have been involved and have written and researched on the subject 
matter (SADC Report, 2010).   
 
The Organ is guided by the following objectives: protecting the people; promoting 
political, security and defence cooperation; developing common foreign policy approaches 
and collective security capacity to respond to external threats; peacekeeping and 
resolving intrastate and interstate conflicts (Cornwell, 1996). Furthermore, the Organ 
intends to promote the development of democratic institutions in member states; 
implementing the United Nations (UN), AU and other international conventions; upholding 
international law; developing cooperation between police and security services in 
combating domestic and cross-border crime; and disaster management (Cilliers, 1995).  
 
The Organ is composed of two major components: the directorate or secretariat and the 
troika. The Organ’s directorate is located at the SADC Secretariat headquarters in 
Gaborone, Botswana (SADC Report, 1996). There are six intergovernmental levels at 
which the Organ operates, namely: i) the chairperson of the troika or chairperson of the 
Organ; ii) the Ministerial Committee of the Organ – the committee reports to the 
chairperson of the Organ; iii) the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); 
iv) the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); v) ad hoc committees 
established by the Ministerial Committee; vi) and the Organ directorate (SADC, 2001). 
The objectives of the Organ emphasise “the relationship between development and 
security and the need to balance state behaviour and human security” (SADC 
Communique, 2012).  
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       Figure1: SADC Defence and Security Architecture  
 
 
The difference between the ISDSC and ISPDC committees is basically that of focus and 
orientation in the arena of security issues. ISDSC is mainly concerned with defence, public 
security and state security including military and intelligence systems whilst ISPDC is 
focused on good governance, human rights and diplomacy (Cawthra & du Pisani, 2007). 
In this arena of policy and organisation coordination the state and not regional spirit is 
looming large. However, the arena of state action wherein this ambitious policy 
framework is implemented is the most critical aspect of this investigation. The five year 
strategic plan (SIPO I) provides a framework for the implementation of the OPSDC. Given 
the importance and sensitivity of the matters pertaining to SIPO’s mandate, the SADC 
Ministerial Committee “undertook an evaluation of the SIPO I in 2007, 2009 and in 2012 
which led to the development of SIPO II” (SADC Report, 2011).  
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The reason and objective of the evaluation of SIPO I was that “it lacked coherent 
benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation of progress and contained too many priorities 
thus precluding proper sequencing and implementation” (SADC Report, 2012). SIPO II 
was ratified by the Summit of Heads State and Government in Windhoek Namibia on 
August 2012 (SADC Report, 2013). The secrecy surrounding the publicity or non-publicity 
of SIPO II has raised much speculation. The major concern has been that the document 
(SIPO II) is too internally focused with limited input from civil society. The document also 
is charged for lacking to come-up with solution to the problem that the Organ has with 
International Cooperating Partners (ICP). More closely, SIPO II is criticised for its rigid 
approach to what it considers as “strategic” areas that must be exclusively funded and 
controlled by its member states and leaving “non-strategic” designations to the ICP (SADC 
Communique, 2012).  
 
The 2003 Mutual Defence Pact is rooted in the 1998 joint military intervention by 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
“Operation Restore Sovereign Legitimacy” in the DRC was carried with the SADC or AU 
sanction in support of the then president Laurent Kabila (Johnson, 2009). The three 
countries invoked provisions of article 51 of the UN Charter on collective self-defense, as 
well as principles of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The three countries were 
“not only deceitfully operating along the second research assumption … of self-interest 
in relation to [material] utility derived” (Hwang, 2006: 134); they also “… dragooned and 
distorted international conventions to satisfy the narrow interests of the leadership of the 
three countries” (Hwang, 2006: 137).                    
 
Since the DRC joined SADC in 1997, the coalition of the three countries argued that their 
military intervention was in line with article 2 (a) of the SADC Protocol on Politics Defence 
and Security Cooperation (Johnson, 2009). In this way, the three countries claimed that 
their mandate was the protection of the people of the region from external aggression. 
Worried about the lack of legitimacy of the claim and the pretext under which the military 
intervention was carried, coupled with the lack of authorisation of the military intervention 
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by the UN and/or the AU; the Zimbabwe led coalition pushed for a protocol to create a 
SADC pact compelling all states to support a collective response in the face of external 
aggression against a member state (Hull & Derblom, 2009).      
 
The South African government was concerned of the stance that the Zimbabwe led 
coalition pushed and proffered a flexible approach that would allow for much broader 
conflict resolution and diplomatic engagement (Cilliers, 2006). The balanced approach 
that South Africa proposed was catapulted and used as a weapon to criticise Zimbabwe, 
Namibia and Angola’s irresponsible unilateralism. The constructivist research assumption 
of “… self interest in relation to [material] utility derived” is depicted in this protracted 
conflict: interests, preferences and economic investments for Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Angola in the DRC conflict were “… explained as reasons for the intervention” (Ngoma, 
2004: 23). Angola’s security was threatened by potential alliances between the rebels 
which had used DRC as a rear base for many years (Ngoma, 2004).  
 
Namibia was also concerned about the Angolan rebels’ destabilising role in the Caprivi 
Strip, where Namibia had economic and geopolitical interests, especially with respect to 
securing vital water supplies and mining options from the DRC (Ngoma, 2004). 
Zimbabwe’s motivations and preferences for military intervention were given as a 
complex set of economic, military and strategic interests that benefited the country’s 
political and military elite, but also sought to bolster its depleted and fragile power supply 
(Ngoma, 2004).    
 
The constructivist research assumption of fragile and differentiated if narrow 
interpellations of the preferences, interest and motivations of SADC member states can 
also be found in the 1998 Lesotho SADC mandated intervention. In September 1998, the 
government of Lesotho requested assistance form the SADC following a virtual coup 
d’état in the wake of an army mutiny and the rejection of the May 1998 election results 
by opposition groups (Fisher & Ngoma, 2005). South Africa and Botswana deployed 
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troops under the guise of “Operation Boleas” sparking a debate “… on the procedure for 
collective [security] decision making in SADC (Southall et. al., 1995: 12).  
 
The constructivist research assumption that SADC states’ security interests and 
preferences are privileged over regional security norms and objectives is depicted in this 
example (Cornwell, 1996). Related to this, Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty and Article 7 
(1) of the MDP raises the complex interplay between “state sovereignty” and the 
“balancing of [the] region’s desire for [security] collaboration” (Fisher & Ngoma, 2005: 
2). During the deliberation for the signatures of the MDP, this balancing of the region’s 
desire with states’ interests and preferences prompted concerns that outside such 
balancing securing arrangement:  “… this would render member states hostage to those 
who behaved belligerently and would eventually draw the region into protracted military 
actions” (SADC Report, 2012).  
 
In response to Article 6 (1) of the MDP, an option placing the region towards the third 
constructivist assumption was “… that military involvement should be voluntary where 
each State party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems 
appropriate” (MDP, 1998: 23).  Indeed this option of placing regional security decision on 
voluntary state action is grounded in a longstanding intergovernmental approach to 
regional integration in Africa. It is viewed in many circles as one of the main obstacles 
towards SADC’s collective “security community” (Vale, 1996). It provides for member 
states to renege and to justify their inability or the bending of their policy preferences 
away from commitments to collective security action in the region (Baker & Maeresera, 
2009). The SADC has not experienced new military interventions since the DRC and 
Lesotho conflicts in 1998, except for recent conflicts in the Eastern DRC (SADC 
Communique, 2012).   
 
The security arena in the SADC region like any other arena is conceptualised and 
theorised within an intergovernmental approach to regional integration. State preferences 
and decision making at the Summit level is projected within this paradigm. There are 
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however, challenging and complex institutional frameworks in the formulation of SADC’s 
intergovernmental regional integration process. The example of the SADC Tribunal is the 
case in point. The Tribunal was established in 1992 under Article 16 of the SADC Treaty: 
providing for the legal interpretation of the treaty and how to settle jurisdictional disputes 
over intra-state litigation (SADC Communique, 1992). This appears to confer 
supranational powers to the Tribunal, which has prompted arguments that this was not 
what was intended (SADC Report, 2012). It is baffling that supranational powers could – 
as many commentators interpret Article 16 of the SADC Treaty - be given to the Tribunal 
whilst the Summit is regarded as the pinnacle of intergovernmental consensus decision 
making in the region. Given this, how did the Tribunal come into being?    
 
According to the SADC Treaty (1992: 34), the Tribunal would be “… constituted to ensure 
adherence to, and proper interpretation of, the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary 
instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it.” The SADC 
Treaty (1992: 25) makes reference to the Tribunal Protocol that will provide for its “… 
composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related matters.” The SADC 
Tribunal was assented by the Summit of Heads of State and Government in 2000 and it 
was envisaged at that time, that it would come into force by a process of state ratification 
(SADC Report, 2000). However in 2001, amendments were made to the original Treaty 
and the Tribunal Protocol was made an integral part of the Treaty (SADC Communique, 
2001).      
 
It took four years until 2005 that the judges of the Tribunal were sworn in and the 
Tribunal was officially inaugurated (SADC Communique, 2005). The Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
covers “… disputes between states and between natural and legal persons and states 
over the interpretation, applicability and validity of SADC protocols and the validity of acts 
undertaken by SADC institutions” (SADC 2001: 4). In a case that tested the supposed 
supranational jurisdiction of the Tribunal in 2007, Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and Others vs. the 
Republic of Zimbabwe held that the Zimbabwean law ousting the domestic courts’ 
jurisdiction to the rule on the lawfulness of land seizures violated the rule of law in that 
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it denied the claimants the right of access to the courts and the right to fair trial 
(Matyszak, 2011). The government of Zimbabwe objected to the ruling of the Tribunal 
arguing that “… it was not bound by its rulings as the Tribunal’s constituting treaty had 
not been ratified by two thirds of member states as required” (Matyszak, 2011: 23).  
 
Furthermore, the Zimbabwean government “… submitted proposals that would exclude 
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over disputes between natural or legal persons and member 
states” (SADC Report, 2012). In August 2010, the SADC Summit held in Windhoek, 
Namibia, suspended the Tribunal and commissioned a review of its mandate and 
jurisdiction (SADC Communique, 2010). When the report and recommendations of the 
Tribunal review were presented in an extraordinary SADC Summit in May 2011, the 
regional leadership: “…. held that appropriate legal instruments to change the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal and legal framework within which the Tribunal operates were to be 
prepared for presentation to Summit in August 2012” (SADC Report, 2011: 3).                     
     
The SADC Ministers of Justice and Attorney Generals were requested by the Summit to 
make amendments to the Tribunal Protocol to dissolve the antagonism in the structure 
and content. In their final recommendation to the SADC Council of Ministers, the SADC 
Ministers of Justice and Attorney Generals proposed that the current structure of the 
Tribunal be upheld. The SADC Council of Minsters objected to the report and the 
recommendations of the Ministers of Justice and Attorney General prompting the SADC 
Summit of 17-18 August 2012, in Maputo, to call for a new Tribunal Protocol that would 
preclude the right of individuals to the court (SADC Report, 2012). This has placed and 
raised the matter of the binding nature of the decisions taken by bodies created by the 
Summit which makes its decisions in an intergovernmental and consensus basis (Ikome, 
2005; Nathan, 2013).  
 
The debacle and discourse on the Tribunal and in respect to successive Summit decisions 
placed significant spotlight on the importance and difficulty of how state sovereignty is 
conceptualised in the process of regional integration in Africa (Erasmus, 2014). What has 
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complicated the matter even further is that another member state’s court – the South 
African Supreme Court of Appeal – has pronounced on the matter giving judgment against 
the Zimbabwean government (Business Day, 2012: 4). The matter went to the South 
African Constitutional Court for further review; but it is less the matter of where the 
matter goes that this research is concerned with. The research is concerned with the 
disparate and loose conceptual tools to explain and understand constructivist interactions 
between states in Southern Africa.     
 
SADC’s operational framework has been underpinned and consolidated within an 
intergovernmental approach to regional integration (SADC Treaty, 1992). The power and 
status of decision making in these arrangements is centralised around the Summit and 
the Council of Ministers (SADC Treaty, 1992). Whist Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty is 
clear, state sovereignty invariably supersedes the collective assembly of regional norms 
and objectives, weakening potential for accountability. In an interesting Tralac working 
paper, Erasmus had this say: “… it is equally important to point out that the Summit (a 
political body) does not have the power to decide the future of the Tribunal” (Erasmus, 
2012: 1). Article 10 subsections 2 and 3 of the SADC Declaration on the Tribunal Protocol 
(SADC Treaty, 1992) say the following:   
 
1. The Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and 
       control of the functions of SADC.  
 
2. The Summit shall adopt legal instruments for the implementation of 
      the provisions of this Treaty; provided that the Summit may delegate 
   this authority to the Council or any other institution of SADC as the 
                Summit may deem appropriate. 
   
Moreover, the August 2012 SADC Summit’s communique in Maputo, Mozambique did 
exactly what Erasmus says it “… does not have power to decide” (2012: 2). The challenge 
with the analyses on the SADC Tribunal is that it conceives the Tribunal Protocol and its 
provisions as an instrument of coercion. On the other hand, the process of 
intergovernmental regional integration in Southern Africa projects an invitation to 
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voluntary adaptation and not so much wholesale and binding supranational coercion 
(Fisher & Ngoma, 2005).   
 
Criticism of the Summit decisions on the Tribunal suffers from the same politicist angle 
that it places on the Summit (Business, 2012: 4). This research undertakes a much 
broader spectrum of areas in the structure of the regional economy and in the process of 
regional integration – and asks the question: how will SADC manage the interests of 
states in the process of creating a common and collective regional integration scheme in 
trade; investment; security; foreign affairs or diplomacy and in many other areas. The 
overwhelming focus on the SADC Tribunal process misses an important focus in respect 
to how decision making in the SADC is undertaken – including in the establishment of 
SADC institutions that should oversee the implementation of the regional integration 
programme (Erasmus, 2014).    
 
The establishment of a security community in the SADC requires centralised institutions 
at the regional level that are integrated within member states. Erasmus (2014: 5) puts 
the matter this way: “the distinction between the roles of a regional tribunal and domestic 
courts in member states in enforcing the law of regional/international organisations is a 
crucial one. It is unheard of for national courts in the absence of a special arrangement 
to exercise jurisdiction over international organisations …” Similarly, the South African 
Appeals Court cannot “exercise its jurisdiction” over the sovereign state of Zimbabwe as 
it derives its authority and jurisdiction from the South African Constitution and not from 
SADC (Wendt, 1992). The development of common regional security policy involves the 
aggregation of constructivist interests, identities and values of member states (Nathan, 
2013). In this way, the crafting of the regional security architecture must draw national 
states’ preferences and interests towards common values and offer a collective 
framework for implementation. SADC’s focus in the security arena is still predominantly 
state-driven with less strength on the regional security norms and values (Hurd, 1994). 
The interpretation and analysis of the constructivist assumptions in the interactions 
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between member states has to be seen within an intergovernmental framework or 
approach of the SADC to regional integration process (Moravcsik, 1997).          
   
The chapter examines the security challenges in SADC with a focus on how the issue of 
security policy aggregation occurs. The difficulty that most analyses on regional 
integration find is that it places the “end state” in front of the process of how to get to 
that end (Erasmus, 2014). In this way, the analyses takes a much easier cut on complex 
issues of how member states’ interests are aggregated into the Tribunal Protocol 
structure, for instance, so as to provide for the collective if internally binding institutional 
framework from which authority and jurisdiction is derived (Erasmus, 2014).  
 
The research is broaching the process of regional integration and how state sovereignty 
is mediated, negotiated or evolved in the process. The lack of attention paid to the 
structure and the bureaucratic politics in explaining the SADC’s objectives to regional 
security was the starting point in this chapter. By concentrating on the character of the 
process of regional security, the research argues in general, that we should avoid the risk 
of inadequately conceptualising or misunderstanding the basis or causes of the SADC 
Summit’s decision making process on security.   
 
5.3     Conclusion  
 
The chapter concludes with the observation that the notion that the “region lacks an 
appropriate regional institution to handle security issues” (Vale, 1996: 380) is right but 
even more critical is the understanding of how the process of regional security 
development in Southern Africa is conceived. Put differently, the case of the SADC 
Tribunal depicts an appropriate institutional mechanism for many commentators 
(Erasmus, 20102; Gauntlet, 2012). However, it is the understanding of the logic and 
process of decision making that had driven and informed the Heads and State and 
Government to assent to the formation of the SADC Tribunal Protocol that is critical. In 
this way, having “… [an] appropriate institution to handle security issues” is one thing, 
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understanding and being sensitive to the logic and behaviour of state actors in the process 
of decision making decision about regional security is quite another.          
 
The chapter has utilised three constructivist assumptions to explain state behaviour and 
action in relation to regional security (Wendt, 1994). The chapter concludes that indeed 
all the examples utilised in this chapter confirm the three constructivist research 
assumptions and prove that the dominant driver of state behaviour and action is state 
interests, values and the protection and the safeguarding of national identity (Wendt, 
1992). The more congruent SADC states’ security interests, preferences and interactions 
are, the less likely they are to prefer military actions in the security choices they make. 
Two, SADC states will make security preferences in relation to their own self-interest, 
protecting their identity or sovereignty and values. Thirdly, SADC’s states’ preferences, 
interests, and values evolve in relation to the utility that a state derives in the process of 
regional integration (Wendt, 1992).  
 
The research places premium on state interests, identity and values as important 
variables in security cooperation in Southern Africa. The constructivist research examples 
utilised in this chapter show that creation of a SADC security institutional architecture is 
a mutually constitutive process where state action and behaviour determine the outcome 
of integration in the same way that integration process is re-shaping the state in Southern 
Africa (Wendt, 2002). The discursive understanding of SADC’s security architecture 
cannot be explained or understood outside what Wendt (1987:359) calls social structures 
that “… are inseparable from the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to 
their actions.” This chapter concludes that the constructivist analysis of the agent-
structure problem in regional integration studies is useful in explaining the preferences, 
choices and interests of SADC states. In his extremely innovative and constructivist 
analysis Wendt (1987:365) put the matter this way, invoking Giddens’ structuration 
theory (1979):      
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A key implication of the argument … about the agent-structure relationship           
was that theories of international relations must have foundations in theories of 
both their principal units of analysis (state agents and system structure). Such 
theories are more than simply convenient or desirable: they are necessary to 
explain state action. This requirement follows directly from the scientific realist’s 
conception of explanation as identifying causal mechanisms, and from the 
ontological claims of structuration theory about the relationship of agents and 
structure. If the properties of states and systems structures are both thought to 
be causally relevant to events in the international system, and if those properties 
are somehow interrelated, then theoretical understanding of both those units are 
necessary to explain state action.            
  
With regard to SIPO II and its contribution to the creation of the SADC security 
architecture; the chapter draws two important points. One, SIPO II, like SIPO I, is crafted 
within an intergovernmental paradigm to regional integration and this creates difficulties 
in the aggregation of disparate security interests and identities of state actors. Van 
Nieuwkerk (2012: 18) makes the point this way: “SIPO II is not meant to be a binding 
policy document or legal framework for decision-makers, but a guide to collective 
bahaviour.” The second point that the chapter concludes drawing on the three 
constructivist research assumptions utilised in the research is that “the role of state 
actors, policymakers and security advisers is not given adequate space in the SIPO II” 
(SADC Communique, 2012).  
 
The constructivist assumptions utilised in the chapter provides for an important site or 
context for explaining and understanding the crafting of the regional security policy in 
SADC. Less attention is given in SIPO II to individual and group decision makers. 
Constructivism places premium on the importance of socially constructed interactions 
including the psychological norms of actors in regional security policy making (Schafer, 
2012). Whilst this area is relatively underdeveloped in regional integration studies 
(Schafer, 2012), it is an important variable for explaining the logic behind collective 
decision making or “groupthink” in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. 
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Another important point that the chapter draws from the constructivist assumption and 
which the SIPO II is quiet on is the false equivalence between collective regional security 
objectives and norms and SADC institutional structures (Schafer, 2012). If the SADC 
institutional structures were having supranational authority over security issues any state 
could use its power in a way that a civil state would (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). But the 
SADC institutional structure does not provide for supranational authority over regional 
security matters.  
 
Van Nieuwkerk makes this point quite succinctly: “SIPO II does not provide any guidance 
on this score, so the impetus will have to emerge elsewhere: in our view, this is part of 
the leadership challenge facing SADC and its member states” (2012: 18). Indeed, the 
explanation and evidence provided in the explanation of the constructivist hypotheses 
prove that SADC member states themselves are not comfortable with the idea of 
delegating sovereign interests of states on security policy to the SADC structures (Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2012).      
 
This research utilises the three constructivist research assumptions to explain how state 
sovereignty evolves in the process of regional integration. The security case study is one 
of three cases with the two below on trade and foreign affairs or diplomacy used to 
investigate how state interests are mediated, negotiated or evolved in the process of 
regional integration (Booth, 1991). The chapter therefore was less concerned with an 
explanation of the concept of “security community” or “regional security” but rather what 
informs the internal logic of these concepts in their application in real life situations in the 
SADC region (Vale, 1991).  
 
The strategy in using examples to explore the constructivist research assumptions as well 
as broach the research questions as to why SADC states’ preferences, interests and 
motivations diverge/converge away from SADC objectives towards protection of national 
interest and vice versa is important. The contestation of the regional security trajectory 
in SADC is the function of the regional approach to regional integration. To assume and 
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project any notion of regional security that can be juxtaposed over the “heads” of the 
SADC Summit is like expecting the SADC Secretariat to tell the member states what to do 
or the AU Commission to dictate the terms of engagement over the Heads of State and 
Government.      
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CHAPTER 6 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
SADC’S TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
6.1  Introduction  
 
Using the three constructivist assumptions, this chapter assesses the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); and whether their results uphold or 
indeed undermine the collective character of regional policy making towards an external 
party. As explained more extensively in chapter 2, the theory underpinning regional 
integration revolves around the work by Viner (1950). Viner argued that regional 
integration will not always result in gains in economic efficiency. Viner also posited that 
regional integration, in addition to trade creation effects can potentially have trade 
diversion effects on either the participating economies or even on third party economies 
outside of the agreement.  
 
Trade creation is when trade liberalisation creates trade that would not have existed 
otherwise. This consequently results in a country being supplied goods and/or services 
by the most efficient producer of the product. Trade creation has been proven often to 
result in improved welfare gains. This however depends on how well distributional issues 
are taken into account. At least in the short run, freer trade will have losers (normally the 
import competing sectors) as well as gainers (normally exporters) and the latter may not 
always compensate the losers (Viner, 1953). 
 
In contrast, trade diversion is when discriminatory trade liberalisation diverts trade away 
from a more efficient supplier outside of the regional trade agreement (RTA) in favour of 
a less efficient supplier within the RTA (Viner, 1950). Trade diversion will, at times, be 
sufficiently strong as to outweigh trade creating effects and so reduce a country's national 
welfare whereas in certain instances national welfare could still improve despite the trade 
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diversion (Viner, 1950). Are regional integration agreements to be regarded as a step 
toward global free trade? Viner (1950) attempted to answer this, albeit inconclusively. 
This is largely because the relative importance of trade creation versus trade diversion is 
an empirical matter depending on conditions of supply and demand and on the size of 
factors such as the initial level of tariffs. A rule of thumb is that this will depend on the 
extent that the RTA results in trade creation and trade diversion (Viner, 1950).  
 
Ohmae (1996), and Kemp & Wan (1976), build their work on the foundation laid by Viner. 
A major difference of their work to Viner’s was their view that: “It is always possible for 
a regional integration agreement, formed among an arbitrary group of countries, to 
structure itself in such a way as to make the member countries better off without making 
any of the non-member countries worse off” (Kemp & Wan, 1976:34). More recently, 
Krugman (1991) came up with economic geography factor to explain the determinants 
of regional concentration of economic activity. Based on the assumption that increasing 
returns to scale are desired, Krugman hypothesises that the eventual determinants of the 
location of economic activity will be economies of scale and trade cost considerations 
(Krugman, 1991). Economies of scale can be enhanced in regional trading areas by 
locating production activity in one location rather than each activity in each country.  
 
On the other hand, Hass (1976) noted that an important determinant of the success of 
any RTA is that the distribution of gains and/or losses should be carefully evaluated. After 
this carefully thought out compensation mechanisms should be established. A critical 
factor for this to dissertation is whether or the extent to which an RTA member is ready 
to surrender a degree of national sovereignty to supranational organisation. Such an 
approach recognises that any regional integration process will always result in certain 
states’ interest emerging higher in one area and lower in another area. Haas (1976) and 
several other regional integration scholars also underscore the fact that the successful 
attainment of harmonised and coordinated policies between member states is a lengthy 
process of interaction among states.   
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Reflecting on the gradual nature of this process, the orthodox regional integration model 
has six stages. Starting from a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in which member 
states apply lower tariffs to imports produced by other members as opposed to imports 
from non-member states; whilst maintaining the prerogative to individually determine 
tariffs on imports from non-member states; figure 1.4 below illustrates these stages and 
their main characteristics.   
 
     Figure 2. Characteristics of the Six Stages of Regional Integration  
Integration 
Arrangement 
Free trade 
among 
members 
Common 
commercial 
policy 
Free 
factor 
mobility  
Common 
monetary and 
fiscal policies 
Central Government 
Preferential 
trade area 
No No No No No 
Free trade 
area 
Yes No No No No 
Customs union Yes Yes No No No 
Common 
market 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Economic 
union 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Political union Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Source: Author’s compilation updated in August 2014 
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     Figure 3. Schematic Trade Analytical Framework – Author Compilation (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obligations to the Multilateral Trading System 
Instrument of Analysis: WTO Legal Provisions on 
RTAs - GATT Article 24  
Basic Analysis Principle: RTAs should not lead to 
rise in barriers to trade 
Obligations to EU-ACP Mandate 
Instrument of Analysis: CPA – Art.s 35.2 and 37.5  
Basic Analysis Principle: State Interests; Promotion of 
regional integration 
 
 
EPA Negotiations 
Analysis: 
SADC Feb. 2006 
Framework and its 
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Objectives and Norms  
Regional Integration 
in Southern Africa  
Analysis: 
Overlapping 
Membership: State 
Interests, Preferences   
ECONOMIC THEORY: REGIONAL INTEGRATION & TRADE 
LIBERALISATION 
Analysis: Constructivist Framework and Analysis of Trade Theory as 
championed by Viner et.al. 
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6.2 Trade Relations between the EU and Southern Africa 
 
Since 1975, economic and trade relations between the EU and her former ACP colonies, 
including all SADC and SACU states has been governed by a series of framework 
agreements known as the Lomé Conventions, up to 1999 and the Cotonou Agreement 
since 2000 (See Figure 3.1 below).  
 
     Figure 4. Conventions between the EEC/EU and the ACP 
Year Treaty, Declaration or 
Decision 
Comment 
1975 Lomé I Included the STABEX system, a facility for stabilising 
agricultural export earnings. 
1979 Lomé II Inclusion of SYSMIN facility to assist ACP countries 
preserve mining production capacity and protects 
them against fall in global mineral prices. 
1984 Lomé III Shift of emphasis to food security. 
1990 Lomé IV Emphasis on mitigating SAPs. 
2000 Cotonou Shift of emphasis to ‘nationally owned’ development. 
2001 Everything But Arms  Zero tariff access granted to all imports from LDCs 
except arms. 
2002 EU-South Africa- Trade, 
Development & Cooperation 
Agreement  
An FTA between the EU and South Africa 
2002 3rd Generalised System of 
Preferences regulation  
Implemented the scheme until 2005. A new scheme 
covering 2006-2015 now in implementation. 
Source: Author compilation and updated in August 2014 
 
The four Lomé conventions were characterised by the EU granting aid and unilateral trade 
preferences to ACP states. The incompatibility of these preferences with WTO rules 
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resulted in the new Cotonou Agreement. The WTO rules governing the provision of 
unilateral trade preferences are contained in the ‘Enabling Clause’ concluded during the 
Tokyo Round and only permits the differentiation of unilateral trade preferences based 
on countries’ level of development (Bertelsmann & Draper, 2006). Hence in granting trade 
preferences to developing ACP states, the EU would also have to extend this preference 
all developing WTO member states in order to be compliant with the clause. From Figure 
3 above, it can be seen that there exist four main frameworks that can be applied to EU 
trade relations with Southern African states: 
 
1. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA): forms the principal framework 
governing trade and economic relationship. Signed on 23 July 2000 the 
Agreement’s main objective is “… reducing and eventually eradicating poverty 
consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (CPA, 2000). 
 
Maintaining loyalty to the spirit of the Lomé conventions, the CPA granted its signatories 
extensive unilateral trade preferences until 31 December 2007. Needless to say, this 
required a WTO waiver. Hence, until the end of 2007, Southern African states signatory 
to the CPA (all Southern African states except South Africa) enjoyed non-reciprocal, duty 
and quota-free access to the EU with some qualifications. These relate to (a) exceptions 
arising from the application of the EU Common Agricultural Policy, (b) the application by 
the EU of strict Rules of Origin, (c) the Safeguard clause at the EU’s disposal and (d) the 
application by the EU of stringent Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Standards (CPA, 2000). 
 
The CPA covers the period 2000-2020. Under article 95 of the Agreement, it is to be 
adapted every five years, with the exception of the economic and trade provisions which 
have a special review procedure. The review process which started in 2004 and was 
concluded in early 2005, did not result in any substantial trade-related revisions.  
 
2. The Everything But Arms (EBA) Initiative: the EBA is a special non-reciprocal trade 
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framework providing duty and quota-free access to the EU market of all products 
from LDCs except arms and ammunition. This access is however also qualified as 
bananas, rice and sugar, and products containing them still face duties and/or 
quotas until 2009 (CPA, 2000). 
  
Unlike the Cotonou Agreement, the EBA initiative is fully WTO compliant as the 
preferences, in line with the Enabling Clause, are extended to all LDC states that 
are WTO members. Consequently, eight LDC states within the SADC and SACU 
region are eligible to benefit from the EBA initiative. These are Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia (CPA, 2000). 
 
3. The Generalised System of Preferences: The GSPs arose from a recommendation, 
in 1968, by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
that industrialised countries grant trade preferences to all developing countries. 
The EU first implemented a GSP scheme in 1971. According to the EU external 
trade website; “The EU's GSP grants products imported from GSP beneficiary 
countries either duty-free access or a tariff reduction, depending on which of the 
GSP arrangements a country enjoys” (EU, 2013). There are five GSPs available 
under the EU GSPs, of which the EBA initiative is one. All Southern African countries 
have access to the general GSP, however since the framework entails much lesser 
preferences than the CPA or EBA initiative, it is hardly ever used (CPA, 2000). 
 
4. The South Africa-EU Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement: the TDCA 
is a free trade agreement between the EU and South Africa. Because the EU treats 
South Africa as being at a different development level than other ACP states, South 
Africa was not given access to the CPA. Instead, a reciprocal WTO compliant 
agreement was negotiated and concluded (TDCA, 1999).  
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Although essentially an agreement between the EU and South Africa, the TDCA 
has significant implications on the other SACU member states. Since South Africa 
is in a customs union, the BLNS states are and have been de facto tied to the tariff 
reduction obligations entered into by South Africa in the TDCA. This has resulted 
in great resentment of the TDCA by the BLNS states as they were not party to its 
negotiations and so the agreement does not build-in their sensitivities (Sandrey, 
2012). 
 
6.3 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are a free trade agreements being 
negotiated between the European Commission (EC) (on behalf of EU member states) and 
75 African Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) member states that make up former 
colonies of Europe. EPA is largely principled on the notion of reciprocity hence reversing 
decades of unilateral trade preferences from the EU to ACP states. The reversal of this 
longstanding relationship has primarily been necessitated by the fact that the non-
reciprocal nature of the relationship was not compliant with the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) rules governing the provision of such preferences as contained in the enabling 
clause. Consequently and to avert continued challenges by other WTO member states, a 
WTO compliant framework had to be agreed (Bertelsmann & Draper, 2006). 
 
At the launch of the EPA negotiations in 2002, ACP states were divided into six regional 
groups each negotiating a separate EPA agreement with the EU. These groups were: 
West Africa, East and Southern Africa, SADC (also referred to at times as ‘SADC minus’), 
Central Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Negotiations were to be completed by 31 
December 2007 and EPA was hence expected to be operational from 1st January 2008. 
However, by the end of 2007, the EU and the ACP, with the exception of the Caribbean 
region, had inevitably failed to conclude full regional and comprehensive trade agreement 
as originally foreseen by the CPA. The South Centre notes that: “… a large number of 
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technical and political divergences stood on the way of that objective” (South Centre, 
2008). As of 01 January 2008: 
 
Only the Caribbean managed to conclude a comprehensive EPA agreement; 20 
other ACP countries initialed an agreement of partial scope, requiring Continued 
negotiations with the EC to reach a full agreement by the end of 2008 or mid-
2009; the remaining forty ACP countries which were engaged in the EPA 
negotiations preferred, albeit arguably at a risk, not to initial interim texts; most 
of these are LDCs, eligible for EBA preferences, whilst some are non-LDCs who are 
now trading with the EU under the other available GSP regimes or as in the case 
of South Africa, already have a WTO compliant free trade agreement with the EU 
(South Centre, 2008).  
 
With the expiry of the last Lomé Convention (Lomé IV) came the imperative to negotiate 
and conclude a WTO-compliant framework to govern trade relations between the EU and 
ACP states. The CPA heralded this move. Although the agreement itself identifies five 
pillars, three main pillars of cooperation can be identified as the bedrock of the CPA 
namely; (1) political, (2) development and (3) economic and trade cooperation. It is under 
the economic and trade cooperation that the EU and ACP states agreed to conclude EPA. 
Articles 34 to 38 of the Cotonou Agreement are the relevant texts as regards EPA. Articles 
36 to 38 provide a number of principles against which outcomes of the negotiations are 
to be evaluated (EPAs, 2011). These principles include: 
 
WTO compatibility of the final agreements; gradual introduction of the 
arrangements; maintenance of non-reciprocity during the transition to the new 
arrangements; use of the preparatory period to build capacity in both the 
private and public sectors “…where appropriate with assistance to budgetary 
adjustment and fiscal reform, as well as for infrastructure upgrading and 
development, and for investment promotion;” maintenance of the CPA acquis; 
sensitivity to the differing development levels and socio-economic impact of 
trade measures on ACP countries and their capacity to adapt and adjust their 
economies to the liberalisation process (CPA, 2000).    
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The benefits, especially for ACP countries, of being part of a larger, integrated and rules-
based economic area with predictable, stable and transparent policies has been a major 
selling point of the EPA. These benefits generally relate to the orthodox dynamic gains of 
moving from restricted to free trade and include economies of scale, specialisation, 
increased competitiveness, attraction of foreign investment and increased intra-regional 
trade flows. Crucial to point out in this regard is the fact that these purported gains have 
not been accepted without critical analysis. In fact, a considerable number of analysts 
and international NGOs have disputed any such claims. The reasoning of such disputes 
is however beyond the scope of this dissertation. Some of the aspects relevant to the 
dissertation are however looked at in the next sections.  
 
Whilst the centrality and candor of the need to re-formulate the EU-ACP trade relationship 
in a WTO-compliant manner is hardly contested, Goodison & Stoneman (2005: 20) 
contend that the EC has not been entirely forthcoming on their motivation to conclude 
EPA negotiations. Citing a 1995 paper by the EC, they suggest that the EU is rather 
motivated by the hunger to bolster its presence in the faster growing economies of the 
world including: 
  
… strategic considerations regarding the need to reinforce our 
presence in particular markets and to attenuate the potential threat of 
others establishing privileged relations with countries which are 
economically important to the EU… (Goodison & Stoneman, 2005:20). 
 
As regards the benefits to the EU of an FTA with South Africa, Goodison and Stoneman 
(2005: 20) also cite the same paper as contending that: 
 
The further opening up of the South African market … will create  
competitive advantages for EU exporters compared to exporters from 
the USA, Japan and other suppliers of South Africa. The price the EU 
would have to pay for such an improved position in terms of loss of 
customs revenues is relatively low … (Goodison & Stoneman, 2005:20). 
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They then note that once the framework of achieving this had been mapped out the 
rhetoric and justifications for EU FTAs mutated and EU offensive interests are no longer 
mentioned in EPA discussions. This constructivist interest-driven analysis helps to explain 
the insistence of the EU for a ‘beyond WTO- compliance’ nature of the current EPA 
negotiations, reflecting partly EU’s insistence on the inclusion of new generational issues 
in negotiations.  
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are intended to change the trade 
relationship between the European Union (EU) and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
states into a WTO-compatible trade relationship. Their negotiations derive their mandate 
from the CPA between the EU and the ACP. Whilst WTO-compliance is the primary legal 
objective of EPAs and their negotiations, the CPA places other equally important legal 
obligations on them. Of interest in this dissertation, are Articles 35.2 and 37.5 of the CPA 
which place a legal obligation to not only be cognisant of the regional integration 
initiatives in Southern Africa but to also foster, deepen and strengthen regional 
integration. Articles 35.2 and 37.2 of the Cotonou Agreement read as follows (CPA, 
2000:23): 
   
a) Economic and trade cooperation shall build on regional integration 
initiatives of ACP States, bearing in mind that regional integration is a 
key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the world 
economy;  
 
b) Negotiations of the economic partnership agreements will be 
undertaken with ACP countries which consider themselves in a position 
to do so, at the level they consider appropriate and in accordance with 
the procedures agreed by the ACP Group, taking into account regional 
integration process within the ACP. 
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6.4 RECs in Southern Africa 
 
Three major RECs and one big FTA arrangement (under construction) co-exist amidst an 
interesting and complex web of programme duplication and similarities in objectives in 
Southern Africa. These are:  
 
1. the Southern African Development Community (SADC),  
2. the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and  
3. the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); and   
4. the Tripartite Free Trade Area (COMESA, EAC and SADC) (Hartzenberg, 2012)  
 
The similarity in the RECs’ regional integration objectives is illustrated in the table below.  
 
     Figure 5. The Regional Integration Timetable in Southern Africa  
 Free Trade 
Area 
Customs 
Union 
Common Market Economic Union 
SADC 2008 2010 2015 2016 
SACU 1910 1910 Exists partially Not elaborated 
upon 
COMESA 2001 2001 Not elaborated 
upon 
Not elaborated 
upon 
     Source: *Adapted from Gibb R. 2006.  
 
Nonetheless, the three RECs have, as alluded to earlier, undergone some important 
strategic transformation post 1991. In accordance with multilateral obligations, all of the 
three RECs have been notified at the WTO (See figure 3.3). Two of these, SADC and 
SACU have been notified under article XXIV of the GATT whilst COMESA has been notified 
under the more flexible ‘Enabling Clause’. SACU is the only customs union whilst the 
others are either FTAs or PTAs. 
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     Figure 6. Southern African RECs Notified to the WTO 
Agreement 
Date of 
entry 
into 
force 
Date 
notified 
by 
Parties* 
Related 
provision 
Type of 
agreemen
t ** 
Document series 
SACU 
15-Jul-
04 
25-Jun-07 
GATT Art. 
XXIV 
CU WT/REG231 
SADC 
1-Sep-
00 
2-Aug-04 
GATT Art. 
XXIV 
FTA WT/REG176 
EC-South 
Africa 
1-Jan-
00 
2-Nov-00 
GATT Art. 
XXIV 
FTA WT/REG113 
COMESA 
8-Dec-
94 
4-May-95 
Enabling 
Clause 
FTA WT/COMTD/N/3 
     Source: WTO Africa Trade Statistics 2006 
 
However although three RECs exist in the region, this dissertation only takes a look at 
SADC and SACU. COMESA is not examined because its membership goes beyond the 
region of interest of the dissertation – the Southern African region. Accordingly, the 
proceeding sections briefly describe SADC and SACU. SADC is made of 15 member states, 
eight of which are LDCs. In addition to being members of SADC, 13 of the members are 
also members of at least one other regional organisation. Only Mozambique and 
Seychelles are members of SADC alone (See figure 3.4).  
 
     Figure 7. Membership of Other Regional Organisations  
SADC 
COMESA IOC EAC SACU ECCAS 
Member  
State 
Angola X       X 
Botswana       X  
DRC X        
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Lesotho       X  
Madagascar X  X      
      
Malawi X         
Mauritius X  X      
Mozambique          
Namibia       X  
Seychelles      
South Africa       X  
Swaziland X     X  
Tanzania     X    
Zambia X         
Zimbabwe X         
     Source: Author compilation data from SADC website (2012) 
 
SADC has a remarkably broad agenda covering more than just trade. Its areas of 
cooperation are spelt out in its various protocols as well as other instruments. The 1996 
Trade Protocol is essentially the primary regional integration driving tool. SADC, like SACU 
is characterised by South African economic hegemony. South Africa contributes 65% of 
the region’s GDP whilst the second and third largest economies (Angola and Tanzania) 
contribute 11% and 6% respectively (See Figure 3.5 below).  
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Figure 8.  2010 SADC GDP PPP (millions US$) 
 
     Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators database (2010) 
 
 
In terms of trade and regional integration, SADC is still confronted by a number of 
challenges including lacklustre political commitment, stringent rules of origin (ROOs) and 
a lack of diversity of trading products (Hartzenberg et. al., 2012). Currently, SADC 
member states have been battling to conclude a harmonised regional integration agenda. 
This means that integration and harmonisation within the region has not yet been 
achieved.  
 
As seen in Figure 3.2 above, a SADC FTA is to be functional by the end of 2008 with a 
CU foreseen by 2010. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate, in part, these challenges. From these 
it can be seen that seven SADC states have an applied simple average rates in the range 
of 3.5% to 8% (this figure, it must be noted is mainly due to the five SACU states that 
GDP, PPP (constant 2010 international $) 
11% 
3% 
3% 0% 3% 
1% 2% 
2% 
1% 
65% 
1% 6% 
2% 
Angola Botswana Congo, Dem. Rep. Lesotho 
Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mozambique 
Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania 
Zambia 
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have a uniform simple average MFN applied rate); whilst six have applied simple MFN 
rates of between 12% and 13.9%. The main implication of this is that it will not be easy 
to achieve convergence in the applied MFN tariff rates of the region, a requisite of regional 
integration. 
 
In terms of trade with the EU, it can be seen that all eight LDCs have duty free access on 
over 90.2% of tariff lines of their exports to the EU, largely due to the EBA initiative. 
Additionally, all the other member states also have considerable duty free access on a 
high percentage of tariff lines. All-in-all, of the thirteen SADC states for whom data is 
available, only three South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland have less than 90.2% access 
to duty free tariff lines on exports to the EU. Regardless, very little diversity in trade is 
exhibited in the region’s exports to the EU. 
 
     Figure 9. Some Features of SADC Trade with the EU  
Country 
Diversification 
Duty 
Free  Export market  Applied MFN Rate  
95% of HS-6 
trade (no. of 
subheadings)  
Tariff 
Line (%) 
importance 
ranking (Simple Average %) 
Angola 2 96.6 3 7.2 
Botswana 1 83.4 1 8.0 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 14 95.9 1 12.0 
Lesotho 18 90.2 3 7.9 
Madagascar 116 95.2 1 13.3 
Malawi 8 98.1 1 13.5 
Mauritius 90 94.7 1 3.5 
Mozambique 5 95.2 1 12.1 
Namibia 26 93.1 1 8.0 
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South Africa 68 67.8 1 8.0 
Swaziland 27 40.2 2 8.0 
Tanzania 51 97.5 1 12.7 
Zambia 21 97.4 4 13.9 
Zimbabwe … … … ... 
     Source: WTO Trade Statistics Database (2013) 
 
 
Figure 10.  Histogram of SADC MFN Rates 
Tariff Range Frequency 
0 0 
0 - 3.5% 1 
3.6 - 9% 6 
9.1 - 12% 1 
12 - 15% 5 
More than 15% 0 
     Source: WTO Trade Statistics Database (2013) 
 
6.5 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
 
SACU was founded in 1910. It is the oldest customs union in the world and is the only 
functional customs union in Africa. Its members are South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland. All members of SACU are also members of the SADC. Additionally, 
Swaziland is also a member of COMESA. All SACU members with the exception of 
Botswana are also members of the Common Monetary Area (CMA) otherwise referred to 
as the ‘Rand Zone’. Of the five SACU economies, only Lesotho is an LDC whilst the others 
are non-LDC. Additionally, SACU is characterised by the economic dominance of South 
Africa which accounts for approximately 91% of SACU’s GDP, with Botswana the second 
biggest economy only accounting for about 5%. When measured in terms of per capita 
GDP however, South Africa is second to Botswana which has experience relatively higher 
growth in recent years (See figures 11 and 12).    
152 
 
 
     Figure 11. 2006 SACU GDP PPP (millions US$) 
 
     Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators database (2006) 
 
         Figure 12. 2006 SACU Per Capita GDP millions of constant (2000) 
 
           Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators Database (2010) 
According to the WTO, the applied simple average MFN rate in the SACU region is 8% 
(See Figure 3.6), comparatively higher to the applied rates of the region’s more developed 
trading partners. For example, the EU and Japan with rates of 5.4% and 5.6%, 
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respectively. When compared to other developing trading partners, the applied SACU 
MFN simple average is relatively lower than those of Brazil, China, India and Russia which 
have simple applied MFN rates of 12.3%, 9.9%, 19.2% and 11.4% respectively. Figure 
3.6 above, illustrates some features of SACU trade with the EU. From the figure below, 
the EU market is first in terms of importance as an export market for South Africa, 
Botswana and Namibia; second for Swaziland and is comparatively less important for 
Lesotho, for which it ranks third after the USA and Canada. 
 
Data from the WTO reveals that, despite considerable access to duty-free tariff lines 
(ranging from 40.2% for Swaziland to 93.1% for Namibia), SACU exports to the EU exhibit 
little diversity (Sandrey, 2012). The South African trade picture with the EU is 
unsurprisingly the most diverse in the region with 68 HS-6 subheadings with trade flows. 
This restraint is particularly observable when contrasted against EU trade with the 
economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and Egypt which register 560, 132, 1,269, 1,521 
and 281 HS-6 subheadings with trade flows. Since its founding, the SACU agreement was 
replaced in 1969 and later by the current 2002 Agreement (Walker, 2009).  
 
The current SACU agreement of 2002 transformed SACU into a democratic, rules based 
institution. Amongst other things, the SACU agreement envisions the establishment of an 
organisation with “… common policies and common institutions” (SACU Agreement, 2002: 
Article 27). Besides, already submitting to two Trade Policy Reviews with the last one 
having been in 2003, the extent of loyalty to the new agreement can be noted by, 
amongst other things: 
 
The establishment of a tribunal to settle disputes related to the implementation 
and interpretation of the agreement. The provision of the adoption, by all member 
states, of common policies in a number of areas (Part 8 of the agreement). The 
establishment of a common negotiating mechanism and policy mandates for future 
negotiations between SACU and third parties. 
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Hartzenberg et. al., (2012) & Gibb (2006) and indeed several other economic 
commentators and analysts that have been interviewed for this dissertation have 
lamented the multiple and overlapping membership of RECs that has characterised the 
Southern African region (Interview, 2000). Overlapping membership to regional 
organisations, by creating institutional and trade regulatory overlap, raises a number of 
technical and procedural complications. Procedurally, multiple memberships of RECs 
strain the already limited financial and institutional capacity and resources of member 
states (Hartzenberg et. al., 2012). The financial and institutional resources deployed by 
states that are members of different RECs that ultimately have the same eventual end 
goal could be better used if they were channeled more rationally.  
 
This is because administrative costs of maintaining such arrangements rise since trade 
policy operates within multiple trade regimes with different tariffs and rules of origin. 
Whilst multiple memberships of RECs present no major problems in the first two stages 
of regional integration (PTA and FTA), confusion and conflict increases as integration 
deepens in the RECs; especially in the Customs Union stage. Box 4.0 below illustrates 
some of these complications by using an example of two SADC member states. In any 
case a country cannot be a member of more than one customs union (CU) unless the 
CUs are similar. This is because an important feature of CUs is that they have a common 
external tariff (CET) and hence have a common trade policy.  
 
For example, when COMESA becomes a CU, the COMESA states that are members of the 
SADC FTA would be in violation of WTO regulations on RTAs if they were to maintain 
trade preferences to non-COMESA SADC states. The critical factor to point out is the 
problem of multiple REC membership within the regional integration agenda is not only 
unique to the Southern African region. In a statement opening the African Union private 
sector forum in Banjul Gambia in June 2006, the African Union Commissioner (AUC) for 
Economic Affairs, Mkwezalamba remarked that:  
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Indeed the RECS are recognised as the building blocks of the African 
Economic Community in the Abuja Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community. However, more could have been achieved in this 
process had there not been any problems associated with the overlapping 
and multiple memberships to regional economic communities (RECs) of 
member states… 
 
This school of thought is supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for  
 
Africa (UNECA). Explaining the problems that this results in, the UNECA (2002) in its   
 
Extent of the Problem of Overlapping REC membership in Southern Africa* 
Gibb (2006) uses three case studies to illustrate the current unworkable regional integration 
situation in Southern Africa and Eastern Africa due to overlapping membership to RECs. Two of 
these examples are adopted below: 
 
Zambia is a member of SADC and COMESA. Under the SADC Protocol on Trade it is obliged to 
remove tariff barriers to South Africa, a fellow SADC member by 2012. Similarly, as a result of its 
COMESA membership, it is obliged to be part of the COMESA CET in 2008. However, the COMESA 
CET excludes and hence discriminates against South Africa which is not a member of COMESA. 
Hence, Zambia has agreed to simultaneously promote free trade with South Africa and to maintain 
tariff barriers against it.   
 
Swaziland being a member of SADC and the only SACU member also a member of COMESA has 
agreed to simultaneously implement three FTAs and three customs unions. It has hence agreed 
via the SACU CET to maintain tariff barriers against non-SADC COMESA states despite being a 
member of COMESA itself, while simultaneously agreeing to erect a COMESA CET against other 
SACU states. At present the country relies on COMESA derogations, allowing it to access the 
COMESA FTA while simultaneously, applying the SACU tariff regime against COMESA imports.  
 
*Adapted from Gibb R. (2006). Rationalisation or Redundancy? Making Eastern & Southern 
Africa’s Regional Trade Units Relevant. Brenthurst Discussion Paper 3/2006. 
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The many regional economic communities with overlapping memberships 
are perceived as wasting effort and resources. Having multiple groups 
adds to the work of harmonisation and coordination and complicates the 
eventual fusion of regional economic communities into the African Union. 
This has prompted calls to rationalise integration. 
 
Accordingly, during the first conference for African Ministers in charge of regional 
integration that took place in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in March 2006, a resolution 
on the rationalisation and harmonisation of RECs noted: 
 
 … with concern the constraints posed by a proliferation of RECs and the 
challenges these constraints pose to taking the process of continental 
integration forward towards the African Economic Community.  
 
This was closely followed by the Decision on the Moratorium on the Recognition of RECs 
in July 2006 which effectively suspended the recognition, by the AUC, of new RECs with 
the exception of the seven RECs identified in 1997 plus the East Africa Community as the 
eighth. This decision puts into context the disruptive nature of overlapping REC 
membership in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole, partly explaining the infancy of 
regional integration in Southern Africa. Of relevance to the dissertation is the fact that 
regional integration in Southern Africa remains problematic and underdeveloped. This 
notwithstanding the region is simultaneously involved in EPA negotiations with the EC. 
The effect of this is two-fold: 
 
1. The region has engaged the EU without a harmonised regional position on which 
to build up on and make concessions with the EC, and; 
 
2. The region has further strained its already limited resources by engaging in these 
parallel initiatives. 
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6.6 EPA Negotiations in the SADC Region 
 
The immediate effect of EPA negotiations on the process of regional integration in 
Southern African and in relation to states’ constructivist interests and identity is that it 
has split the SADC member states amongst four EPA negotiating configurations namely; 
the central African, East and Southern African, SADC-EPA (variably referred to as SADC-
minus) and the East African group (See figure 4.1 and 4.2). Originally of the fifteen SADC 
member states, seven (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola and 
Tanzania) opted to negotiate under the SADC-EPA configuration, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo joined the Central Africa grouping, five (Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe) joined the ESA grouping whilst South Africa was 
initially merely an observer in the SADC-EPA grouping (Walker, 2009).  
 
As the negotiations progressed, Tanzania later joined the EAC. Initially South Africa only 
had ‘observer’ status since it already has a WTO-compliant FTA with the EU. However, 
South Africa joined the SADC-EPA configuration in February 2006. The SADC-EPA 
configuration currently consists of South Africa, the BLNS states, Angola and 
Mozambique. Of these seven states, three (Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique) are LDCs 
whilst the remaining four are not. Additionally, South Africa and Angola make up the 
major economies of this configuration.  
 
The SADC-EPA negotiations were launched in July 2004 in Windhoek, Namibia. A 
negotiations structure at both national and regional level was accordingly formulated by 
the configuration member states and Botswana, through its Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, was designated coordinator of the overall process of negotiations. Each SADC 
EPA Member State was also assigned a negotiation issue or issues to coordinate. 
 
158 
 
     Figure 13. EPA Configurations in Southern Africa
 
 
      Figure 14. Membership of Other RECs of SADC Member States (with EPAs) 
 
SADC 
COMESA IOC EAC[2] SACU 
EPA 
Member  Configuration 
State SADC ESA 
Central 
Africa 
Angola X       X     
Botswana       X X   X 
DRC X         X   
Lesotho       X X     
Madagascar X  X       X   
Malawi X          X   
Mauritius X  X       X   
Mozambique         X     
Namibia       X X     
South Africa       X X     
Swaziland X     X X     
Tanzania     X     X   
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Zambia X          X   
Zimbabwe X          X   
     Source: Author compilation SADC data (2012) 
 
6.7 Analysis of the Current EPAs Developments  
 
Whilst this section looks at the progress and the state of the SADC-EPA negotiations, it 
does so with special interest on how these relate to state interests on the one hand and 
the process of regional integration on the other. In that regard, the section is not at all 
exhaustive in that several other issues not directly related to regional integration, at least 
in the opinion of this dissertation, are not analysed. Grappling with the complications and 
challenges of overlapping membership in regional integration arrangements has not been 
easy for SADC group and this was the occupation of the first part of the negotiation 
period. In fact, towards the end of 2005, SADC suspended EPA negotiations “… in order 
to deal more concretely with key regional integration challenges and the inter-linkages 
created by different trade regimes between the Southern Africa region and the EU such 
as the EU-SA TDCA and the situation of the BLNS in SACU and the EPA. The result was 
the adoption of a SADC framework proposal which was submitted to the EC on 7 March 
2006” (SADC, 2006: 6).  
 
Consequently in March 2006, a proposal was presented to the European Commission (EC) 
by the SADC-EPA group. This has come to be known as the ‘Framework Proposal for the 
EPA Negotiations between SADC and the EU’. The importance of this framework lay in its 
attempt to support a regional integration agenda in Southern Africa. In this particular 
regard, it called for the inclusion of South Africa as a full participant in the SADC-EPA 
configuration and to the alignment of the TDCA and the EPA process (Sandrey, 2012). In 
addition to this, the framework contained four major suggestions stated below. 
 
In line with the call to align the TDCA and EPA process, it was suggested that the TDCA 
be used as benchmark for negotiations particularly since four of the remaining six SADC-
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EPA configuration members, the BLNS states, are de facto participants of the TDCA. A 
qualification to this however was that the sensitivities of the BLNS states be addressed. 
The need to address the sensitivities of the BLNS has to be seen against the context that 
the TDCA was negotiated between South Africa and the EU. South Africa hence 
unilaterally locked-in the BLNS states, without consultation, to obligations some of which 
were costly to BLNS states (Sandrey, 2012).  
 
For example, the SACU CET meant that SACU’s fiscal revenue pool shrunk due to the 
TDCA. Goodison and Stoneman (2005:.23) quote studies as estimating that the TDCA 
shrunk the fiscal revenue pools of the BLNS states as follows: 
 
Botswana – 53% 
Lesotho – 12.9% 
Namibia – 8.6% 
Swaziland – 13.9% 
 
Additionally, the TDCA has resulted in the reduction of trade protection of the BLNS states 
without factoring in their defensive interests (Goodson & Stoneman, 2005). Secondly, it 
was submitted that the EBA qualifying SADC-EPA LDC states should continue enjoying 
their non-reciprocal, duty-free EBA status. Essentially this entailed a binding in the EBA 
benefits of LDCs in the EPAs. The third submission was that all SADC-EPA states including 
South Africa be granted duty free market access to the EU (Goodson & Stoneman, 2005). 
More likely than not, realising the potential divisive nature of this suggestion, the South 
African Department of Trade and Industry was quick to point out that: “… South Africa 
conceded that this should not be achieved at the expense of any other SADC EPA 
member, and recognising the EU’s sensitivities in agriculture, this could be obtained over 
a transitional period” (DTI, 2008).  
 
The last suggestion which has proved to be a major sticking point was in regard to new 
generation trade issues - services, investment, procurement, intellectual property, 
competition, labour, and environment. These it was suggested “… should be subject to 
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non-binding cooperative arrangements to allow time for building policy, human and 
institutional capacity at national level” (SADC-EPA Framework, 2006:12). The 
development of national positions should then “… be followed by processes for regional 
convergence to build regional markets and common regional policies” (DTI, 2008). The 
South African government was indeed making its constructivist interests very clear. More 
significantly, new generation trade issues are not necessary in order to make the 
agreement WTO compliant. The argument is that these issues, some of which are already 
under negotiation in the WTO, can be negotiated at a later time without the time pressure 
accompanying current negotiations.  
 
Once submitted to the EC, a long period of non-response followed prompting the SADC 
secretariat to, at one point observe that the silence gave the “… impression that these 
developments in the SADC-EPA almost require a de facto re-launching of the negotiating 
process” (SADC, 2007). When the response came exactly a year later in March 2007, 
Xavier Carim, South Africa’s chief trade negotiator; summarised the response as 
consisting of the EU welcoming South Africa’s inclusion in the SADC-EPA configuration 
whilst challenging everything else (Carim, 2007). In summary, the EC in its official 
response generally adopted a hazy view and refused the suggestions. 
   
On 01 January 2008, five of the seven SADC-EPA configuration countries (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland) initialed an interim EPA. Namibia 
nonetheless initialed with reservations. South Africa, which already has a free trade 
agreement with the EU and is under no obligation to conclude an agreement, did not 
initial, whilst Angola an LDC simply registered its intent to come on board in the future. 
A special brief by BIDPA (2009) on the signing of the iEPA by these five states,  
summarised state constructivist state interests in two ways: “… economic, where national 
commercial and financial interests are pursued, while the second are equally valid and 
legitimate geopolitical and strategic interests” (BIDPA, 2009: 1).   
 
162 
 
Most analyses on South Africa’s reaction to the initial signing of the iEPA by Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland have tended to link the country’s position to the SACU revenue 
sharing formula (Draper & Khumalo, 2009). In this way, the analyses have projected that 
the “… South African Treasury is uncomfortable with subsidy’s extent … particularly [on] 
Lesotho and Swaziland” (Draper & Khumalo, 2009: 4). This is indeed an important and a 
delicate historical point in SACU. However, the constructivist framework that is utilised in 
the research requires one to look at state reaction and interaction alongside the normative 
objectives and norms of the institutions driving regional integration in Southern Africa. It 
is this symbiotic or co-constitutive relationship that the research is concerned with.  
 
In the revised SACU agreement of 2002, the state parties in the Customs Union completed 
a revised version of the agreement with new provisions. One of the provisions that were 
raised by Botswana, Lesotho Namibia, and Swaziland – in response to the unilateral 
signing of the TDCA in 1999 by South Africa – was the inclusion of article 31.3 which 
stated that: 
 
 No Member State shall negotiate and enter new preferential trade agreements 
 without the consent of other Member States.  
 
The collective provision of article 31.3 of the SACU agreement therefore, provides for the 
convergence of all SACU states’ interests in a manner that provides each state a veto 
over others on trade policy. Given this, an important factor is whether South Africa, or 
Namibia for that matter, consented to Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho’s initial signing of 
the iEPA, as provided in Article 31.3 of the SACU agreement. There is no evidence that 
the South African government “… view[ed] the signing as a fundamental violation of 
Article 31.3” (BIDPA, 2009: 3). What is evident however in the initial signing of the iEPA 
is that, articles, clauses, and protocols are important but not sufficient instruments to 
induce states to surrender their constructivist and cherished possession “… of the right 
and ability to act on international stage according to their own judgments and preferences 
… ” (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004:137).        
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6.8 EPAs and Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
 
This chapter assesses the effects of the EPA negotiations on SADC states’ capacity to 
engage collectively with third parties. Indeed the chapter demonstrates the extent of the 
gap between state interests and regional interests in the policy making arenas in Southern 
Africa. As noted earlier, the immediate effect of EPA negotiations on the SADC region was 
to split the SADC member states into four EPA negotiating configurations. Needless to say, 
this splintering of the bloc came with costs, not least of which are the resultant adjustment 
costs associated with realigning the resultant blocs. The realignment of the blocs 
themselves is a process that requires time to build internal coherence and strong, well-
coordinated institutions. More importantly, EPA has led to an increase in regional groupings 
in the region. This has further complicated the rationalisation of regional integration in the 
region. 
 
The behaviour and response of the EC to the SADC framework betrayed the Commissions’ 
commitment to its legal obligation to the EPA process in order to strengthen and support 
regional integration in the region. The Trade Law Centre of Southern Africa (TRALAC) 
provides an interesting account of the period in between the submission by the SADC-EPA 
group and the official response from the EC (2008). According to the TRALAC (2008), an 
unofficial response was received on 1 December 2006, almost nine months after 
submitting the proposal. Six points are cited as the EC unofficial response. Five of these 
are particularly relevant due to their implications on the regional integration process in 
Southern Africa. 
 
The EC response was clear in its doubts of whether the negotiations will be completed on 
time. The EC’s concerns centered on the configuration issues and the involvement of South 
Africa. The EC accepted the proposal to include South Africa in the configuration and that 
SACU is the axis driving regional integration in Southern Africa. Reference is made to an 
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“… institutionally coherent and economically integrated core group, which could be 
gradually expanded to integrate more countries in the region” (Tralac, 2008:17).  
 
The inclusion is however qualified by a differentiation between the market access 
conditions of South Africa and the BLNS. The EC seeks to maintain a separate trade regime 
for South Africa while trying to preserve the coherence of the configuration. The EC’s view 
is that this should be undertaken through a “… rigorous system of control for rules of 
origin and the establishment of an autonomous safeguard mechanism which will 
automatically apply in case of a trade surge linked to circumvention” (Tralac, 2008: 18). 
 
The TDCA is considered as a useful starting point for negotiations relating to imports from 
the EU. Any increase in tariffs to accommodate BLNS sensitivities is opposed by the EC 
since these adjustments would also apply to South Africa” (Tralac, 2008: 13). Each of 
these responses has implications on regional integration in the region. The possibility of 
sticking to the deadline is in doubt, placing the credibility of the legally binding obligations 
on new generational trade issues in question. As already noted, there exists no imperative 
to conclude new generational trade issues (NGIs) in EPAs as their conclusion is not a 
requirement for WTO compliance. Additionally, some of these issues are currently being 
negotiated at the WTO.  
 
Given that most developing WTO member states have resisted new generation trade 
issues negotiations, the EC can be “accused” of using EPA to “sneak in” NGIs into the 
multilateral trading system. Given that ACP states make up over half of WTO members, 
the conclusion of NGI negotiations with them would effectively mark the inclusion of the 
Singapore issues in the multilateral trading system. The proposition that the inclusion of 
South Africa in the negotiations implies that SACU is now the ”axis driving regional 
integration” is misplaced as it undermines the SADC-EPA negotiation structure. 
Furthermore, this has cast serious doubts on EC’s support to the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa. SACU does not have the requisite mandate from the other 
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SADC-EPA member states to assume such a role and no such implication is made in the 
SADC-EPA framework submission to the commission. 
 
The differentiation of obligations and benefits, regarding both goods and services, for 
different SADC-EPA member states poses three complications on SADC’s regional 
integration agenda in respect to the constructivist notion of state interests and collective 
identity (Tralac, 2014: 3) 
 
a. Whilst the situation is technically possible in SADC’s current FTA, serious 
complexities confront the situation should SADC move on to a customs 
union, 
 
b. Differential new generational trade issues obligations to the EU hamper the 
possibility of SADC agreeing on a common position on the issues, and; 
 
c. Importantly, in order to effectively implement the differential obligations to 
the EC and stem the problem of transhipment and/or trade deflection, 
countries will have to set up rigorous, time-consuming customs procedures 
and costly ROO checks. This essentially implies a rise in trade barriers.     
 
The refusal to incorporate BLNS sensitivities in the TDCA presents major regional 
integration challenges for SACU. For example, whereas the BLNS EPA schedules are based 
on the HS 2007, the TDCA schedules are based on the earlier HS 1996. Secondly, whereas 
the TDCA is based on a ‘negative list’, EPAs are based on a ‘positive list.’ The difference 
between the two being that whilst any product not specifically listed in the schedules is 
liberalised under a ‘negative listing’ protocol, in a ‘positive listing’, what is to happen to 
each and every item is that listed and any item not listed is considered to maintain an ‘as 
is’ status (Qualmann, 2006). An implication of this, as in the example above, is that an 
effective implementation of these two statuses will entail the building up trade barriers 
and restrictions in the region hence again debilitating regional integration. 
 
Using the constructivist framework the following analysis is provided, figure 5.1 
summarises the study’s findings. As stated earlier in the chapter, the constructivist analysis 
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of the interacting and procedural level is undertaken to interrogate adherence to the 
theoretical and legal framework of the WTO Article XXIV as well as CPA Articles 37.5 and 
35.2. At the SADC states interests’ level, an examination is undertaken on the principle of 
how RTAs should not lead to a rise in trade barriers and the undermining of the regional 
integration agenda of Southern Africa. This is because as illustrated earlier in the chapter 
trade barriers lead to efficiency losses which can have negative welfare effects. Any rise 
in trade barriers is more likely to increase the potential of trade diversion and negative 
welfare effects.   
 
At the CPA level, adherence to the two principles of consideration of existing regional 
integration processes and the promotion of regional integration; is assessed. Of the five 
points from the EC unofficial response, the dissertation pairs each response with its 
relevant level of analysis based on the implications of the response.  
  
     Figure 15. Measure of EPAs Effects on Regional Integration 
   
Analysis 
Level 
Principle Relevant Points 
in EC Unofficial 
Response 
Pass/Fail 
SADC-EPA RTA should not lead to a 
rise in trade barriers 
1, 3 and 5 Fail 
CPA 1. Consideration of 
existing regional 
integration initiatives  
2. Promotion of regional 
integration 
2 and 5 Fail 
     Source: Author Compilation from EPAs 2012 data   
 
Starting with the SADC-EPA level; the dissertation notes that the implications of points 3 
and 5 of the EC response inadvertently imply a rise in non-tariff trade barriers in the form 
of complicated rules of origin. By breeding and promoting a rise in trade barriers, EPA 
essentially fail to adhere to their trade obligation. Additionally, the spirit behind the ‘beyond 
WTO’ nature of the EPAs exhibited by the insistence on the inclusion of NGIs in the 
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negotiations by EC is questionable given the limited negotiation time and the fact that 
completion of NGIs is not a pre-requisite of WTO-compliance.  
 
At the CPA level; points 2 and 5 in the EC response also brings to question its commitment 
to the CPA mandate. Additionally, by leading to a proliferation of regional groupings, EPA 
has exacerbated the problem of multiple regional organisation membership and its 
negative effects. Ultimately, this implies that EPAs, by failing to adhere to the SADC-EPA 
Proposal Framework on regional integration and the CPA mandate on EPA negotiations 
and regional integration, will not promote regional integration. On the contrary, by raising 
non-tariff trade barriers EPAs will hinder regional integration. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
EPA have a legal obligation to not only take into consideration current regional integration 
initiatives in Southern Africa but more importantly, to re-enforce and strengthen regional 
integration in ACP states. Due to the complexities of multiple and overlapping 
memberships of SADC member states to various RECs, there exists, not only in the 
Southern African region but the entire ACP region, an imperative to rationalise REC 
membership essentially streamlining the regional integration process. EPAs potential in 
this regard, almost go without saying since countries can only be members of one EPA 
configuration.  
 
EPA hence has the potential to streamline the regional integration process in Southern 
Africa. Additionally, EPAs have the potential to ‘lock-in’ SADC-EPA member states into 
regional integration process and policy reforms. The South Centre suggests that “the 
presence of the EU within each EPA grouping will enhance the credibility of integration 
initiatives, and that the incentives of financial aid and technical assistance will encourage 
political support for regional integration. (South Center, 2008: 36).  
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However, a great deal of pessimism on the EPAs’ ability to foster regional integration, not 
only in Southern Africa but indeed continentally exists. The Africa Union Commission is of 
the opinion that “… unless the time frames of the EPAs are streamlined with the RECs 
integration roadmaps, EPAs could well undermine the RECs, since the EU is an important 
and influential partner in the areas of trade, development and finance, and peace and 
security” (Mkwezalamba, 2006: 5). This pessimism with EPAs is shared by the SADC trade 
adviser, Kalenga. Kalenga (2008) wonders whether “… a SADC-EC EPA (can) assist the 
integration process in the region, and if so, how?” Whilst the feasibility of the EU adopting 
the integration roadmaps of the various RECs on the continent is arguable, the point that 
the process of regional integration might derive fewer benefits from the EPAs process is 
persuasive. 
 
What now remains is for both parties to map out a mutually acceptable way forward that 
will see the strengthening and fostering of regional integration in Southern Africa taking 
center-stage as an objective. Although negotiating with a stronger partner, this 
imperative lies primarily on the SADC-EPA states. Should such a way forward prove 
elusive, not only will the current gains of regional integration in Southern Africa be lost 
but a reality exists that the ‘partnership’ in the EPAs between the EU and the Southern 
African region will most likely be akin to the partnership between a rider and his horse.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
SADC’S COMMON OR COLLECTIVE DIPLOMACY   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter assesses the extent to which state policy preferences diverge (away) or 
converge (towards) SADC’s normative objectives and goals. The chapter uses the 
constructivist framework to evaluate state behaviour as well as the bahaviour of state 
actors in the process of regional foreign policy making. Despite the real-world importance 
of SADC decision making in internal diplomacy and external relations, it has rarely been 
subjected to theoretically rigorous and methodologically guided inquiry that has become 
the norm in regional integration studies. Instead, most work on SADC collective diplomacy 
has focused on describing the evolution of the SADC institutional processes and the 
competence of the SADC Secretariat. The chapter utilises the constructivist framework to 
look at social and political construction of SADC diplomacy, the formation of actor identity 
and interests. Therefore, the chapter evaluates the implications of the process of regional 
integration on the SADC nation state’s foreign policy and vice versa.  
 
The bulk of instructive literature on the process of common or regional foreign policy 
making in Southern Africa correctly focuses on the SADC’s normative and collective 
diplomatic objectives and goals (Khadiagala, 2010; Van Nieuwkerk, 2010). This chapter 
builds on this work by looking at the behaviour of states and state actors in the process 
of what Khadiagala calls “… the forging of regional foreign policies …” in Southern Africa. 
The chapter assesses the making of SADC’s foreign policy or what Van Nieuwkerk 
describes as “… the name for a subset, namely, how states inter-relate” (Van Nieuwkerk, 
2010: 98). The chapter is utilising the constructivist framework to analyse the hypotheses 
from the general member states’ inter-relations and interactions in bargaining, 
negotiation and social adaptation in the diplomatic arena. 
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The chapter looks at the body of diplomatic or foreign policy protocols or agreements 
that define regional foreign policy objective and norms. The intention is to ascertain the 
level of convergence that is envisaged in the protocols or agreements and how member 
states’ foreign policy positions are harmonised or diverge in the process. The chapter 
makes an examination of SADC and its member states using the constructivist framework 
and theory to explain and evaluate SADC’s foreign policy-making posture. The chapter 
then links the constructivist framework or theory with other alternative hypotheses 
highlighting the effects of threats to states going alone, policy examination and normative 
persuasion.  
7.2 SADC’s Diplomacy  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that the chapter defines SADC diplomacy   as 
the set of protocols, declarations, charters and memoranda of understanding that have 
been adopted by the SADC member states to address issues and manage relationships 
beyond their collective external border. This includes policy areas dominated by the 
member states, namely the common foreign policy areas where policy-making 
competence is shared by member states and driven by regional institutions. SADC 
diplomacy is also conceived to include state behaviour, and more importantly, the 
bahaviour of state actors in their interactions in Southern Africa. There is no intention in 
the chapter to investigate the supranational nature of the diplomacy or foreign affairs 
decision making process. The dissertation is concerned with whether member states and 
the region’s decision making on foreign policy is converging or diverging.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
Accordingly, the dependent variable for the empirical analysis of SADC foreign policy could 
be any of the following policy outputs, which we define as ‘common policies’: Council of 
Ministers’ conclusions or decisions related to world affairs; the principal instruments of 
Common Foreign Policy positions, common positions and joint actions; and the wide 
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variety of positions adopted in other areas of external relations, such as mandates for 
international negotiations on trade, environment or SADC accession, decisions on 
development or humanitarian assistance, or the imposition of sanctions, to name just a 
few. The chapter seeks to explain the motivations behind the policy preferences that 
member states bring to this policy arena of SADC external diplomacy.  
 
SADC member states, it is argued, have been extremely reluctant to transfer decision-
making authority for regional diplomacy and foreign policy to regional institutions 
(Ndlovu, 2011). In contrast to other policy areas, where the member states accept some 
degree of coordination by the SADC Secretariat, they have insisted on a heavily 
intergovernmental process for decision-making on diplomacy and foreign policy (SADC 
2003). As a result, the provisions of the Protocol on the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security Cooperation (OPDSC) grant considerable bargaining power to individual member 
states with respect to the adoption of particular policies (Ndlovu, 2011). Furthermore, all 
policies on external diplomacy adopted under the SADC Treaty (1992) require ratification 
by consensus and are thus subject to slow ratification process by national parliaments of 
each member state.  
 
The SADC Treaty similar to the African Union’s (AU) Constitutive Act allows for decision 
making that is undertaken through consensus, “or failing which by the two thirds 
majority” among member states. Simple majority is however allowed at the AU level on 
“procedural matters, including the question of whether a matter is one of procedure or 
not” (AU Constitutive Act, 2002: Article 7). Because of the intergovernmental nature of 
the process of regional integration, the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government 
have greater authority on ‘external relations’ but member states retain considerable 
powers to block the adoption of policies they do not like. As such, the Zimbabwean 
government’s blunt assertion – “when we don’t agree, there is no common policy” – could 
thus have been voiced by any member state in any area of SADC foreign policy (Ndlovu, 
2011: 15).  
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It is thus noteworthy that the SADC member states have reached agreement on more 
than 36 ‘binding’ protocols, common positions, declarations, memoranda of 
understanding and charters under the SADC Treaty since 2002, involving high-profile 
diplomatic disputes, economic and trade development and even the use of military force 
(SADC Website, 2013). Adoption of such common policies has increased considerably 
over time but the slow pace of member states’ ratification of protocols is, as posited by 
Ndlovu (2011), another indication that state sovereignty is the treasured terrain by 
governments in the region. In addition, the SADC has a number of statements, treatise 
and declarations on SADC’s external diplomacy reflecting member states’ consensus on 
particular developments in world affairs (Oosthuizen, 2006: 139).  
 
However, the chapter is concerned with how the process of common or regional foreign 
policy making in Southern Africa is co-determined by SADC member states and other 
state actors. It is instructive at this point to quote Van Nieuwkerk at length “… searching 
for effectiveness in transforming the world …” (2010:82):   
 
Crucially, because of its close history and integrated future, South Africa must 
manage this – human security – agenda in collaboration with the Southern African 
region, and beyond. It asks then for decisive determination of the country’s 
national interests and the firm pursuance of these via its international relations. It 
also seeks for a careful calibration of its Africa role. We have previously argued 
that the South African government, under former President Mbeki, adopted an 
‘emerging middle power’ role, whereby foreign policy approaches were marked by 
the exercise of ‘soft power’, understood as the ability to set political agendas in a 
way that shapes the preferences of others.   
       
In an introduction of another sterling contribution to African foreign policy - looking at an 
earlier period in African development: Adar & Schraeder (2007: 1) put the challenge 
facing Africa this way:  
  
The principal theme of early studies of African foreign policy is that foreign policy 
begins and ends with the desires of African leaders. What became known as the 
“big man” syndrome of African foreign policy became very popular due to the 
tendency of the first generation African leaders to create highly centralised 
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authoritarian regimes that suppressed other centers of power capable of 
challenging the foreign policy supremacy of the presidential mansion. It therefore 
was common to identify the African state and its foreign policy with the beliefs, 
psychology or personal whims of the African president in power, as best captured 
by an amusing play on words of a famous French phrase to describe the nature of 
Kenya [African] politics under President Daniel arap Moi: “L’Etat, c’est Moi” (The 
state, it’s Moi!).   
  
The process of diplomacy or foreign policy convergence in the Southern African region 
has been a daunting task. The constructivist assessment undertaken in this chapter shows 
how state actors and SADC’s bureaucrats have undertaken to either bridge or expand the 
consistent refrain among the scholars that (Ndlovu, 2011; Akokpari, 2008; Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2012) the SADC Treaty as a policy-arena is plagued by non-cooperation. 
When we consider other foreign policy areas that the SADC classifies as ‘external 
relations,’ such as the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolution 1973 on Libya, 
development cooperation, global environmental policy and trade, the record of policy 
agreement points to divergent preferences (SADC, 2010).  
 
The research question that this chapter intends to probe is how SADC achieves common 
policies when the member states’ preferences are identical and fails to achieve common 
policies when preferences diverge. When the harmony of preferences is rare, this 
research question intends to probe how this failure of collective agreement is negotiated 
in the SADC. The flip-side of this research question is what in the nature of state 
preferences drives the failure of SADC collective agreements and vice versa. In this 
situation, a member state’s foreign policy preference or that of a regional organisation, 
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), may sometimes conflate or be in 
violation of the regional norms and provision or international obligations (Campbell, 
2013). This situation was more pronounced in Libya because “the United States (US), 
Britain and France took the lead to rush through a resolution in the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council, invoking the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’ … worded, with 
the formulation [that] ‘all necessary measures’” be undertaken by NATO in its intervention 
in Libya (Campbell, 2013: 2). 
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In this regard, South Africa’s foreign policy representatives to the United Nations were 
challenged to explain what the region’s position was, on the one hand, and South Africa’s 
position on the other, on the United Nations Security Council’s Resolution (UNSC) 1973 
(SA Embassy, 2011). The question that concerns this examination is how was the UNSC 
sanctioned intervention in Libya “… compatible with the objectives of the [SADC] Treaty” 
(SADC Treaty, 2002: 10)? Given the complexity of how the UNSC resolution was 
implemented, it is safe to say that, the social construction of foreign policy is indeed 
driven by interests, preferences and considerations of states and these may, at times, be 
out of line with the provisions of international obligations and institutions.  
 
However, the reason that such decisions are complex, intense and difficult, it is 
reasonable to assume that, even where some preference convergence has occurred, the 
quest for agreement in international fora by a SADC member state in violation of Article 
24 subsection (1)1 of the SADC Treaty involves the compromise of policy preference and 
adjustment of policy behaviour by a SADC member state that otherwise would prefer to 
avoid such concessions. This focus on the challenge of overcoming the divergent policy 
preferences of the member states is not to say that the SADC’s protocols or policy 
instruments are weak or irrelevant to the making of SADC foreign policy and external 
relations. Nor is it to say that SADC member states always have radically different 
preferences.  
 
The frequent and intensive consultation and interaction among SADC member states 
weakens the egoistic interests and identities and induces national policy-makers and state 
actors to seek the views of their SADC counterparts (SADC Report, 2012). In the absence 
of this, there is hardened attitudes towards countries that were seen to be breaking the 
                                                 
1 (1) Subject to the provisions of the Article 6 (1), Member States and SADC shall maintain good working 
       relations and other forms of cooperation, and may enter into agreements with other states, regional  
      and international organisations, whose objectives are compatible with the objectives of SADC and 
      to the provisions of the Treaty.     
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line. Addressing the 5th National Congress of the Tanzanian Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 
President Mugabe had this to say about South African foreign policy posture: “those states 
seeking political superiority of greater sovereignty – [are] undermining regional defence 
and security” (Ndlovu, 2011: 16) The tone in the interaction among state leaders in the 
region has always demonstrated that the ‘Southern Africanisation’ of the foreign policy-
formation process is far from convergence or completion.  
 
Thus we return to the research question introduced above: how and under what 
conditions do SADC member states overcome their divergent preferences to reach 
agreement on common policies regarding issues and interests and preferences beyond 
their collective external border? This question draws attention to the behavioral choices 
of member states and state actors in extra-SADC negotiations that are critical for the 
SADC to achieve consensus (SADC Report, 2013). Although all member states are 
formally capable of obstructing agreement, the ‘binding’ nature of the Protocol on the 
Organ on Defence, Politics and Security and Cooperation is vague and can be abused by 
member states (RISDP, 2003).  
 
The following section of the chapter presents a number of examples practical of states’ 
constructivist interactions depicting states’ action and bahaviour towards external 
diplomatic challenges. These practical examples of constructivist interactions among 
SADC states’ differ not only in their general claims regarding the factors determining 
SADC policy choice, but also with regard to the role member states play in advancing and 
undermining such policies. This discussion presents the dissertation’s core question 
regarding how SADC member states overcome divergent preferences to reach agreement 
on common policies and what type of policy outcome is likely to result. This reflects the 
constructivist framework that international relations and SADC governance is driven by 
member states to maximise their self-interest and maintain their identity.  
 
SADC’s substantive and procedural norms and objectives serve as important driver and 
shaper of state behavior and actor behaviour in the process of regional integration.  The 
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explanatory power of the constructivist framework can is assessed, however, when 
compared to alternatives whose assumptions, observable expectations and scope 
conditions have also been clearly and fairly presented. The analysis of the regional 
diplomatic or foreign policy making process in Southern Africa through the constructivist 
framework is thus focused on member states’ preferences (state sovereignty). This 
constructivist theoretical exposition provides a platform for an evaluation of the various 
questions and their explanatory power through an examination of their correspondence 
with evidence from intra-SADC engagements and policy outcomes across a range of 
political events.  
7.3 Constructivism Framework and SADC Diplomacy  
 
The constructivist framework conceives regional diplomacy or foreign policy making as a 
process that is “defined by shared understandings, expectations and knowledge” (Wendt, 
1994:73). In this way, constructivism views the process of building common diplomatic 
or foreign policy in the SADC as driven by interests, identities and ideational factors in 
the continuous interaction and inter-relations among member states and state actors. 
Although constructivism recognises that member states dominate the creation of SADC 
institutions, it also asserts that these institutions come to exert an independent effect on 
member states’ subsequent negotiating behavior and policy choices.  
 
In short, there is a co-constitutive or co-determining effect in interactions among SADC 
member states and in the process in institutionalising regional integration in Southern 
Africa (Sterling-Folker & Badie, 2012). The constructivist framework to regional 
integration emphasises the behavioral impact of state actors and the SADC institutional 
norms and objectives and how these in turn influence the process of regional integration. 
Constructivism presents SADC member states as ‘agents’ because they are committed to 
ensuring SADC‘s political viability (although probably to varying degrees) and value being 
seen as acting in accordance with its normative policy objectives, regardless of their 
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divergent preferences with regard to particular policy issues (Sterling-Folker & Badie, 
2012).  
 
Constructivism asserts that SADC decision-making on any given issue is shaped by the 
normative and policy commitments already made by member states in the course of 
creating the SADC’s institutions, enlarging its borders and adopting policies to govern its 
internal dynamics and external relationships. Through a combination of commitment and 
treaty-making and protocol development, SADC member states have developed two 
meta-norms as a general guide to their deliberations on foreign policy and external 
relations: joint action as an intrinsic value, including support for the functionality and 
credibility of the SADC; and consistency and coherence in SADC policy-making across 
time and issue-areas (SADC Treaty, Article 24 (1)).  
 
In addition to these meta-norms, SADC member states have established a number of 
substantive (that is, ends-oriented) and procedural (that is, means-oriented) norms. In 
treaties and Council of Ministers and Summit decisions, member states have formally and 
repeatedly identified support for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, conflict 
prevention, the strengthening of multilateral institutions, free trade and the promotion of 
development as the principal goals of SADC foreign policy and external relations (SADC 
Treaty, 2002).  
 
As a result, SADC member states are supposed to pursue their foreign policy and external 
relations preferences within an institutionalised setting that encourages certain 
negotiating practices and legitimates certain substantive outcomes while discouraging 
and delegitimating others. The constructivist framework that is utilised in the dissertation 
explains these norms and policy commitments and how they impact on member states 
preferences and interests and on the type of policies they adopt at the SADC level. The 
likelihood that the SADC will adopt a common policy on a given issue, as well as the 
content of that policy, thus depends upon both the distribution of preferences among the 
member states (which varies from issue to issue) and how SADC norms (which are ideally 
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supposed to be the aggregate of member states’ norms) affect their choices in pursuit of 
those preferences.  
7.4 SADC’s Constructivist Multilateralism  
 
The concept of multilateralism in international relations denotes an activity “an 
institutional form that coordinates relations among two or more states on the basis of 
generalised principle of conduct” (Ruggie, 1993: 11). The Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) is “an institutional form” that aims to coordinate among its fifteen 
member states in the process of multilateral regional integration. It has in line with 
Ruggie’s “generalised principle of conduct” codified in its SADC Treaty a body of 
objectives and aspirations in respect to each member state’s conduct. Senior bureaucrats 
at the SADC Secretariat - the coordinating center of the “generalised principle of conduct” 
– are quite outright in their assessment that “without peace and stability, investment and 
development” regional integration will remain a pipedream (Interview, 2012).  
 
Indeed, the SADC Treaty (1992) takes the matter of the generalised principles of conduct 
very seriously in that its declaration pronounces “… that the region must develop a 
framework of cooperation which provides for … strengthening regional solidarity, peace 
and security in order for the people of the region to live and work together in peace and 
harmony … the region needs therefore, to establish a framework and mechanism to 
strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security.” At the time 
these noble words were pronounced in Windhoek in 1992, winds of change were blowing 
through the last bastion of apartheid colonialism in South Africa. South Africa’s 
ascendance into SADC presented the organisation with pomp and excitement. South 
Africa itself also displayed a barrage of over-exaggerated liberal notions of regional 
solidarity, human rights and democracy.  
The first event that practically tested and challenged the SADC‘s multilateral diplomacy 
and “generalised principle of conduct” was the Nigerian Crisis in 1995. This Nigerian crisis 
also tested South Africa’s resolve to steer the region in pursuance of its normative 
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objectives. In 1990, Ken Saro-Wiwa, a Nigerian Ogoni environmental activist, began 
devoting most of his time to human rights and environmental causes, particularly in 
Ogoniland. He was one of the earliest members of the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP), which advocated for the rights of the Ogoni people. The Ogoni 
Bill of Rights, written by MOSOP, set out the movement's demands, including increased 
autonomy for the Ogoni people, a fair share of the proceeds of oil extraction, and 
remediation of environmental damage to Ogoni lands in Nigeria. In particular, MOSOP 
struggled against the degradation of Ogoni lands by Shell Oil Company (Wiwa, 1995). 
In 1992, Saro-Wiwa was imprisoned for several months, without trial, by the Nigerian 
military government. Saro-Wiwa was Vice Chair of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO) General Assembly from 1993 to 1995 (UNPO, 1995). UNPO is an 
international, nonviolent, and democratic organization (of which MOSOP is a member). 
Its members are indigenous peoples, minorities, and unrecognised or occupied territories 
who have joined together to protect and promote their human and cultural rights, to 
preserve their environments and to find nonviolent solutions to conflicts which affect 
them. 
In January 1993, MOSOP organised peaceful marches of around 300,000 Ogoni people – 
more than half of the Ogoni population – through four Ogoni centers, drawing 
international attention to Ogoni people's plight. The same year the Nigerian government 
occupied the region militarily. Saro-Wiwa was arrested again and detained by Nigerian 
authorities in June 1993, but was released after a month. On 21 May 1994 four Ogoni 
chiefs (all on the conservative side of a schism within MOSOP over strategy) were brutally 
murdered. Saro-Wiwa had been denied entry to Ogoniland on the day of the murders, 
but he was arrested and accused of incitement to them. He denied the charges, but was 
imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death by a specially 
convened tribunal.  
Nearly all of the defendants' lawyers resigned in protest against the trial's cynical rigging 
by President Abacha’s regime. The resignations left the defendants to their own means 
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against the tribunal, which continued to bring witnesses to testify against Saro-Wiwa and 
his peers. Many of these supposed witnesses later admitted that they had been bribed 
by the Nigerian government to support the criminal allegations. At least two witnesses 
who testified that Saro-Wiwa was involved in the murders of the Ogoni elders later 
recanted, stating that they had been bribed with money and offers of jobs with Shell to 
give false testimony – in the presence of Shell’s lawyer (Pilkington, 2009). 
The trial was widely criticised by human rights organizations and, half a year later, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa received the Right Livelihood Award for his courage as well as the Goldman 
Environmental Prize. Very few observers were surprised when the tribunal declared a 
"guilty" verdict, but most were shocked that the penalty would be death by hanging for 
all nine defendants (Pilkington, 2009). Many were sceptical that the punishments would 
actually occur, as the Nigerian government would face international outrage and possible 
sanctions and other legal action should the penalties be carried out. But on 10 November 
1995, Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP leaders (the "Ogoni Nine") were killed by 
hanging at the hands of military personnel. According to most accounts, Saro-Wiwa was 
the last to be hanged and so was forced to watch the death of his colleagues. Information 
on the circumstances of Saro-Wiwa's own death are unclear, but it is generally agreed 
that multiple attempts were required before he died (Pilkington, 2009). 
The incident of the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa drew the attention President Mandela of 
South Africa. After serious attempts to diplomatically scupper the execution of Saro-Wiwa 
coupled with decision by President Abacha to execute Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists 
eight at the same time that, the Commonwealth leaders were meeting in Auckland, New 
Zealand. SADC and the African Union (AU) were conspicuously quiet in their 
condemnation of the crisis and President Abacha in Nigeria. Contrary to most depiction 
of South Africa’s foreign policy as “quiet diplomacy” – President Mandela’s administration 
was quite aggressive, it is argued, if loud in its attempts to prevent Saro-Wiwa and other 
activists from execution as well as to secure the release from prison of Chief Moshood 
Abiola (Pilkington, 2009).  
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In terms of the example, constructive multilateralism based on “generalised principles of 
conduct” the matter above was raised by South Africa consistently at the United Nations 
followed by the recall of the Nigerian, culminating in President Mandela insisting that the 
SADC Summit in December 1995 should discuss the matter (SADC Communique, 2005). 
President Mandela had at this juncture discarded any pretense to “quiet diplomacy” and 
accused President Abacha of Nigeria of “judicial murder” (Sampson, 1999: 557). The 
SADC Summit in December 1995, in spite of all the body of evidence in its declarations 
in the SADC Treaty or segments of the Protocol on the Organ for Defence, Politics and 
Security that relate to the African Union and its Constitutive Act (AU, 2002), reneged and 
declined to take action against Nigeria and handed over the matter to the Commonwealth 
(RISDP, 2003; SADC Treaty, 1992; SADC Organ, 2001). President Mandela was very 
incensed: “if Africa refrains from taking firm action against Nigeria, then talk about 
renaissance in Africa is hollow” (Sampson, 1999: 557).  
 
The Commonwealth created a Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) to address the Nigerian 
matter. Whilst most analyses saw South Africa’s action as failure of its African solidarity 
stance, South Africa’s stand and upholding of SADC’s and AU’s constitutive principles 
reinforced its foreign policy and diplomatic posture towards Africa (Mills, 2000). The 
hypothesis above on twisted regional multilateralism demonstrates the complex arena of 
how a member state’s constructivist policy preferences and interests in pursuance of 
SADC’s normative objectives and goals may be frustrated on particular issues. Whilst 
some member states like South Africa, in the example of the Nigerian crisis, may value 
coherence and consistency in SADC’s foreign policy and value being seen as acting in 
accordance with the community’s normative and policy commitments, others might not. 
As a result, this hypothesis asserts, that the policy-making behavior of member states is 
not necessarily shaped significantly by shared perceptions regarding which policy options 
are consistent or inconsistent with pre-existing SADC norms and commitments. The 
preferences of many member states may be shaped by the narrow African solidarity 
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agenda, among other things, at the expense of the “generalised principle of conduct” of 
the organisation.  
 
In this situation, member states whose policy preferences are seen as consistent with the 
substantive norms or policy commitments of the SADC are pressured and influenced to 
bend their preferences and to acquiescent to those with norm-inconsistent preferences. 
The South African state action in the Nigerian crisis thus demonstrated an example of 
how not to compromise its preferences and how not to ‘play along’ with the norm-
inconsistent policy. As a result, South Africa objected to a situation of agreeing to a 
twisted regional multilateralism that is inconsistent with SADC’s “generalised principle of 
conduct.”  
 
Nel (1998:3) puts the challenge that SADC is facing as that of balancing: “… generalised 
principles of conduct … in an non-discriminatory way to all states that want to cooperate, 
without negating the individuality and autonomy of each actor; distributing the costs and 
benefits of interaction across the system (indivisibility); and developing incentives for 
actors to suspend the urge for instant gratification on every single issue, and to recognize 
and pursue joint satisfaction on many issues (diffuse reciprocity).”   
 
This dynamic affects all member states, including the small ones. If this is incorrect, one 
would expect SADC member state’s preferences on foreign policy to be consistent with 
pre-existing SADC norms and policy commitments. Of course, the perception of normative 
(in)consistency is subject to deliberate acts of ‘framing’ that link issues and choices to 
pre-existing ideas and prior experiences. Successfully framing a possible common or 
community policy of a SADC member state as consistent with the SADC’s formal norms 
and prior policy commitments disempowers its opponents, as demonstrated in the South 
African example on the Nigerian crisis. Whereas framing a possible policy as inconsistent 
with existing norms and commitments disempowers its supporters. SADC’s major 
challenge, this hypothesis posits is how it frames regional normative policy choices in 
terms of their consistency with pre-existing SADC norms and commitments in foreign 
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policy and external diplomacy in the SADC Treaty and in the Protocol on the Organ for 
Defence, Politics and Security (Pilkington, 2009).  
 
Similarly, the examples utilised in this case study, as was the case with the previous two 
on regional security and the SADC-EU EPA negotiations show the same situation that 
indeed, state behaviour and interests drive the process of regional integration. These 
interests of states are sometimes consistent and at times inconsistent with SADC’s 
regional norms and objectives. This confirms the constructivist framework utilised is the 
research that, “… state interests are an in important part constructed by systemic 
structures, not exogenous to them …” (Wendt, 1994: 72-73). The social and political 
interaction among SADC states, as depicted in these case studies, depicts the 
constructivist element that the state agency is as critical as the institutional structure of 
the SADC process of regional integration. These two forces - agents and structure - 
reinforce each other “co-constituting and co-determining” both the outcome of regional 
integration as well as the character of the state (Sterling-Folker & Badie, 2012: 172).    
 
7.5 Zimbabwe – SA’s Reluctant Multilateralism?             
 
The second example as an illustration of the constructivist research assumption in the 
behaviour of states and other actors in the SADC region is the political crisis in Zimbabwe. 
The intention is to focus on the political crisis that culminated after the March 2008 
presidential elections. The intention is not undermine other parts of the Zimbabwean 
crisis nor is it to privilege the 2008 election crisis as the most prominent of all these areas. 
The research strategy is to utilise the 2008 political election crisis as presenting a powerful 
explanatory example of an event or incident of SADC’s experience in finding the right 
balance in application of the “generalised principles of conduct” in its internal diplomacy. 
The event of the 2008 election is also important, like the Nigerian example, as it provides 
an interaction by a number of actors in the crisis - the SADC Secretariat, the AU and the 
South African government as the SADC mediator. It is however, SADC’s normative norms 
and objectives that are seriously tested in this example.       
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Subsequent to the disputed Zimbabwean election run-off results of March 2008, the SADC 
mediation process under the auspices of South Africa culminated in the signing of the 
Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 (GPA, 2008). The Zimbabwean 
government of national unity was then formed in February 2009 (Crisis Group, 2012). 
Since the signing of the GPA the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) 
and the Movement for Democratic Change–Mutambara (MDC-M) complained about the 
continued flouting and breaking of GPA milestones by President Mugabe’s Zimbabwean 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Crisis Group, 2012).  
 
The GPA mandate is not what we could consider here as the SADC normative objective 
because it was an agreement between parties of a SADC member state. What is important 
for the purpose of this chapter is how SADC and the AU, for that matter, as the 
“guarantors” of the GPA agreement process in Zimbabwe allowed and/or disallowed the 
flouting of SADC’s electoral conditions and norms that are codified in its electoral code of 
conduct (Crisis Group, 2012).    
 
Article 22 of the GPA agreement in Zimbabwe calls for the establishment of the Joint 
Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) mandated to oversee the process of 
“compliance and monitoring” thereof (GPA, 2008: 12). Given the internal political intensity 
in Zimbabwe combined with the lack of proper coordination and interaction from the 
SADC side, JOMIC was ineffective in ensuring comprehensive monitoring and 
implementation of the GPA (Crisis Group, 2012). Furthermore, the declarations and 
communiqués that SADC gave in November 2009 and August 2012 were of not effect as 
compliance and implementation was still shortcoming (SADC, 2009). The Zimbabwean 
crisis has provided a significant and important test to the viability of SADC’s normative 
objectives to regional integration. If anything, the process reflected limitations and 
challenges in SADC’s capacity to enforce its “generalised principle of conduct.” Others 
blamed South Africa for what they call: “reluctant multilateralist, preferring instead to 
engage in quiet, bilateral diplomacy with Mugabe’s regime” (Taylor & William, 2008).  
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On the contrary, Jordan (2012: 6) posited that South Africa “… devised a style of 
diplomacy that compelled adversaries to abandon zero-sum attitudes and search for 
solutions in which there are no apparent victors or vanquished.” This South African 
foreign policy posture towards Zimbabwe, Jordan argues, has frequently been criticised 
“as permissive if not treacherous. Yet who can dispute that the tenuous peace it has 
produced in Zimbabwe is preferable to the civil unrest that a dogmatic insistence on 
principle would have precipitated” (2012: 6).  ZANU-PF on the other hand, exclaimed that 
the GPA does not provide for the delegation of Zimbabwe’s sovereign interests and 
identity to outside parties (Moyo, 2012).  
 
The invocation of the Zimbabwean sovereignty by ZANU-PF is tantamount or similar to 
the logic or illogic exercised on the SADC Tribunal issue in the previous chapter. Only that 
the difference in this instance is not as complex as to cover the fact that SADC is 
increasingly irritated by Zimbabwe’s protracted resistance. After failing to allow three 
SADC officers to strengthen the GPA implementation process, the SADC mediator, 
President Zuma of South Africa, presented a scathing report to a SADC meeting in 
Livingstone, Zambia on June 2011 that, the ZANU-PF was responsible for delaying 
progress in the implementation of the GPA (SADC Communique, 2011). In response, 
President Mugabe threatened SADC that Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and it has the 
same right to preclude President Zuma from mediating in what he called “interference” – 
cunningly invoking again a SADC norm and objective (SADC, 2011: 2).       
 
The GPA process in Zimbabwe is testimony to the fragility and difficulty of negotiating 
the internal diplomatic space within SADC. Confirming this difficulty, the SADC mediator 
President Zuma went to Zimbabwe only twice in two years, November 2010 and in August 
2012 (SADC Communique, 2012). With this kind of interaction with SADC mediator 
coupled with ZANU-PF’s explicit flouting of the process, it is inconceivable how the key 
GPA milestones such as the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and the 
finalisation of the drafting of the Zimbabwean constitution will proceed. Whilst the notion 
186 
 
of “actorness” (Van Nieuwkerk: 2012: 18) is recognised as important in constructivist 
analysis of state interactions: the constructivist analysis offered in this section of the 
chapter has sought to lessen focus on South Africa’s diplomatic posture or interaction 
with Zimbabwe to the respective leaders – Mbeki or Zuma and Mugabe. The importance 
of actorness notwithstanding, the intention is deliberately meant to circumvent the 
reduction of a country’s foreign policy to letters and ideas of the country’s president.        
 
The growth and institutional stability of the SADC have created the conditions that, 
according to constructivist framework, foster a cooperative approach to negotiations 
identification with common goals and values and trust in the dynamics of diffuse 
reciprocity (Wendt, 1994; Ruggie, 1998). These conditions encourage SADC mediators to 
remember some identities and common ties, and to forget identities that tend to create 
cleavages and conflicts. Over time, these conditions have been reinforced by procedural 
norms that encourage policy-makers to consult each other before publicising their 
preferences, to seek consensus. It is therefore, reasonable to observe that as SADC 
member States deliberate over foreign policy issues at the SADC level, the constructivist 
analysis shows that the movement toward common policies is dominated by cooperative 
tactics as well as the competitive tactics that are reinforcing sovereign state interests and 
identity.  
 
The Zimbabwe GPA experience presents an even more complex situation in that to reach 
an agreement that comes as close as possible to satisfying the preferences of all the 
parties (internal and external to Zimbabwe) there is a need to expand the pie’ through 
the redrafting of the Constitution rather than to divide it – a different type 0f policy 
outcome is sure to result. If this example in the case study is correct, we would expect 
intra-SADC disputes to be much easier, less complex and more importantly not a zero-
sum game. Furthermore, if this example in the case study is also true it would not be 
difficult to produce common policies that would reflect “generalised principles of conduct” 
by all SADC member states. The two events that have been utilised in this chapter point 
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to alternative explanations in understanding state behaviour and interactions in the SADC 
process of regional integration (Crisis Group, 2012).  
 
The events and cases that have been used to explain the foreign policy dilemma facing 
SADC raises more substantive issues than realist, neorealist or liberal institutionalist 
frameworks can explain. It raises issues in respect to different relationships between 
interests, member states, institutions, interactions and policy outcomes. In this terrain, 
realist, neorealist and liberal institutionalist frameworks’ inclination to explain and verify 
or test state preferences relative to SADC normative norms and objectives might be 
limiting. The constructivist framework underpinning this dissertation however shows that 
the interests, preferences and identities of member states in SADC are co-constituted 
within the process of regional integration.  
 
Furthermore, the intergovernmentalism approach to regional integration provides a 
lubricant for the protection of state interests and preferences. Intergovernmentalism 
treats the SADC as an international forum in which member states acts strategically in 
pursuit of their interests and policy preferences on particular issues. Intergovernmentalist 
approach attributes these preferences to the interaction of international pressures and 
state domestic political considerations. The discussion on the SADC Tribunal was precisely 
about this logic. It is the constructivist logic of appropriateness rather than consequences 
that is projected here: “variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affects the 
national security and [foreign] policies of states” (Jepperson et. al., 1996: 35).   
 
Furthermore, the constructivist logic of appropriateness in intergovernmentalism assumes 
that divergences in the member states’ policy preferences are not significantly 
compensated by a shared commitment to common goals or values, and it emphasises 
the fact that each member state wields a potential degree of freedom or sovereignty over 
policy proposals (Hoffmann, 1995; Moravcsik, 1997). SADC member states give 
concessions on off-setting issues and thus shift their preferences in bargaining over policy 
choices in specific reciprocity (Keohane, 1995) implying no shift in their underlying 
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preferences. These assumptions regarding the preferences and calculations of member 
states lead to the expectation of competitive bargaining (also known as ‘hard bargaining’) 
over policy alternatives (Schmidt, 2006).  
 
The dilemma created here, is that whichever member state is least receptive to change, 
say Zimbabwe on the Tribunal issue, will dominate SADC internal diplomacy invoking 
national interest and weighing in heavily on the consensual decision-making process in 
the SADC Summit. The terrain of SADC’s internal and external diplomacy, as the two case 
or incidents above demonstrate, with common or collective decision making requiring 
unanimous and consensual support, the SADC “will be hampered by the constant threat 
of having one of its numerous member states break from its ranks” (Meunier, 2000: 132).  
 
Where member states’ policy preferences are mutually exclusive - such as the choice 
between cutting and expanding ties with a particular country, say Zimbabwe in the case 
above - competitive bargaining will prevent the adoption of any common policy – an 
outcome known as deadlock. Where the disagreement of the member states is a matter 
of degree, competitive bargaining will likely result in agreement on whatever policy is 
acceptable to all member states and closest to the ideal outcome of the one least 
receptive to change. The social construction of regional integration in South Africa is 
complex. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
The constructivist analysis of the two SADC incidents and events covered in this chapter 
demonstrate how state and state actors learn new policy preferences from each other as 
they grapple with the complexity and interconnectedness of international issues 
(Goldstein et.al, 2001). In this situation, the constructivist notion of the ideational and 
practical aspects of the process of regional integration is critical. SADC member states 
face considerable uncertainty regarding the implications of various foreign policy and 
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external relations options for their interests and values. This uncertainty is most common, 
and policy learning is thus most likely to occur, when highly technical scientific or 
economic issues are under discussion. However, the frequent opportunities for 
consultation offered by SADC institutions enable them to reduce uncertainty by 
exchanging policy-relevant ideas and information (Goldstein et.al, 2001).  
 
Seen in this light, the principal value of intra-SADC foreign policy and diplomacy 
consultation is its contribution to a learning process whereby member states whose policy 
preferences were originally divergent eventually converge around policy preferences 
indicated by particular bodies of information or causal ideas. Once preference 
convergence has occurred, agreement on common and community policies is not difficult 
(Goldstein et.al, 2001). It is here that Jordan’s diagnosis of the previous South African 
foreign policy towards Zimbabwe should be seen, as a learning process at negotiating, 
persuasion, and “diplomatic skills” in a very difficult environment.  
 
Constructivist theories of international relations and regional integration posit an 
interactive relationship between the interactions of states and the understandings of self 
and self-interest that drive their behavior (Risse, 2006). Jordan puts the matter this way 
in relation to Africa: “for decades since independence, a low intensity war ravaged 
between the northern and southern Sudan. Africa and the world took notice only when it 
escalated during the 1980s and 1990s” (2012: 6). Jordan’s article is arguing for consistent 
and persuasive diplomacy “that is not fixated with quick wins and zero-sum outcomes” 
(2012: 6). Jordan explains what is needed this way: “Africa chose Mbeki to negotiate 
peace and deliver Africa’s youngest state, South Sudan … like a conscientious pediatrician 
… renowned for a capacity to see an adversary’s point of view” (2012:6). Indeed, Mbeki’s 
diplomatic engagement and skills assisted in making it possible for the South Sudan to 
achieve its sovereignty and peace.  
 
But the Zimbabwean situation aptly demonstrates that SADC member states may engage 
in normative diplomatic persuasion and negotiation under a variety of difficult 
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circumstances. In certain instances, policy preferences may be polarised within Summit 
and Council decisions, representatives of both SADC and member states concerned may 
exchange arguments in an effort to persuade the other side. The value that should be 
derived in all this complex and difficult diplomatic interaction is an attempt to bend and 
socialise both positions towards meeting the SADC norms and objectives. But, the 
constructivist analysis provided on these cases show that the decision by the SADC Heads 
of State and Government to choose intergovernmentalism as opposed to 
supranationalism as an approach to regional integration in Southern Africa was based on 
safeguarding their national interests and identities.  
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CHAPTER 8 
______________________________________________________________________ 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
8.1 Analysis of the Findings  
 
This research study is utilising interviews and case studies with examples of practical 
state action and behaviour to examine the causal direction of state preferences and 
interests in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. To generate data, the 
research interviewed about thirty professionals who work and research in the field of 
regional integration in Southern Africa. SADC Secretariat staff and officials of 
governments of the SADC member states were also interviewed. Academics and other 
professional researching and writing on regional integration were also interviewed. The 
broad scope of the sample of interviewees is intended not only to provide for balanced 
and empirical view on regional integration but also to examine different, alternative and 
discursive perspectives to the regional integration in Southern Africa.      
 
Semi-structured interviews are the instrument for data collection in the research. 
Respondent interviews are important because “… they elicit open-ended responses to 
series of directive questions” (Lindlof, 1995: 171). The average duration of each interview 
ranged from 40 to 50 minutes. For data collection, the researcher utilised a tape recorder 
and took notes during the interviews (Babbie, 1998). Taking notes during interviews 
helped in capturing how the interviewees felt about the research questions (Cresswell, 
1994). The interviewees’ statements were systematically transcribed before being 
analysed. Interpretative reading of the data was conducted several times. The transcribed 
interviews were classified into themes. Identical views and statement were aggregated 
on paper (Lindlof, 1995). Data analysis was conducted thoroughly to ensure validity and 
trustworthiness of the research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998).     
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The notion of the “indivisibility of state sovereignty” emerged as an overarching theme 
permeating most of the interviewees’ statements. Most of the interviewees criticised state 
actors in Southern Africa for their “unwillingness to bend sovereignty towards regional 
objectives and goals.” Some of the interviewees argued that ordinary citizens in the region 
“are keen to move to higher levels of integration.” For many interviewees, the “absence 
of bold leadership” both at the state and regional level “is responsible for the dichotomy 
in state versus regional interests.” One interviewee went further arguing that citizens in 
the region are “discriminating against each other, and look down upon themselves.”  
 
Many interviewees viewed the framing of state sovereignty and regional integration 
interaction in the discourse on regional integration in Southern Africa “… as the cause of 
the negative and slow process towards meaningful integration in the region.” Many 
interviewees correlated the slow integration impetus in the SADC region “… to the lack of 
deeper analysis of the state and its relation with the process of regional integration.” Most 
of the SADC Secretariat interviewees depicted the cause of “… the weak coordinating 
mechanisms in Gaborone …” as emanating from the “the failure of the member states to 
cede some power to the institution to enable it to enforce agreed decisions and 
programmes for common good.” 
  
Indeed, the theme of SADC member states’ “reluctance to share sovereignty with fellow 
member states is conceived as major source of the delay in the regional integration 
process in the region.” Similarly, most of the interviewees who are doing work in the 
academic and professional areas depicted member states’ inclination to protect 
sovereignty in this way: “they represent national interests of their own governments, so 
regional organisations require own political champions to provide political leadership for 
the implementation of regional policies and programmes.”   
 
Most interviewees projected the construcvist notion that “… more richer and substantive 
understanding of the state agency” in the process of regional integration is required. 
Some interviewees decried the unwillingness among state actors to push SADC’s 
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“common vision of building SADC into a strong economic integration scheme with 
maximum benefit for citizens of these countries as part of the so-called regional shared 
future paradigm.” 
 
8.2 Discussion of the Findings 
  
The research is systematically examining the sources of SADC member state’s policy 
preferences in the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. The research is 
utilising three case studies of regional security, SADC-EU EPAs trade and SADC’s internal 
and external diplomacy. The findings of the research corroborate many different aspects 
of the theories emphasising that the delegation of sovereignty by states - on security 
matters, diplomacy and trade - is not an objective shared by many SADC member states. 
The preference for invoking the maintenance of state sovereignty in an intergovernmental 
process of regional integration in Southern Africa is not so much an objection to regional 
integration as it is about negotiating the nature of the state that will become at the end 
of the process of regional integration (Checkel, 1998).  
 
Most of the interviewees’ statements confirm the notion that the state in Southern Africa 
– in the process of regional integration – is not a constant but an important variable.  
Another key finding in the interviews that corroborates the literature review was that 
insufficient attention has been paid to the phenomena of voluntarily agreed limitations 
on a state’s recognised authority to make and to enforce policies (Kratochwil, 1993). For 
instance, the SADC Tribunal and the SADC-EU cases have focused on the problem of 
excessive extra-territorial assertions of state sovereignty, and of overlapping and 
conflicting jurisdictions, rather than on the degree of intrusion on jurisdiction voluntarily 
agreed to between states in terms SADC norms and objectives (Kratochwil, 1993). 
 
The interviews also confirm key aspects of the claims in the some of the theories in 
chapter 4. The interviews correlated the realist theory’s claim that states have interests 
and the case studies and examples that the research has utilised demonstrate same 
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(Walt, 2004). For constructivists, however, it is how these interests are placed in the 
social construction of regional integration; in negotiations, persuasion in external 
diplomacy that realist and neorealist notions of state preferences get challenged (Checkel, 
1998).  The interviewees’ statements confirm most of the realist, neorealist and liberal 
institutionalist, constructivist theories claims about the importance of understanding: “the 
structure of the system,” better theorising of the “state agency,” and more nuanced 
analysis of “the role of institutions” (Hoffman, 1991: 170; George, 1994: 157; Biersteker, 
1989: 263-7).  
 
In relation to these case studies and the interviews give a positive confirmation of what 
is covered in the literature that; state preferences, interests and identities are the driving 
forces behind state action. Responding to calls for “research on the transformation of 
fundamental structures in international relations” (Ruggie, 1993: 5), and an “…almost 
urgent need for much better analytical and disaggregated explorations of …international 
economic law concepts” (Jackson, 2006: 23), the research has found  that state 
preferences, interests and identities [state sovereignty] are more conceptually coherent 
tools to measure the process of regional integration than the measurement of protocols 
that members states sign.  
 
The research findings confirm that neither the state nor the process of regional 
integration can singularly define the other. What the research findings also show is the 
intersection between the interviewee’s frustration and the constructivist framework claim 
that the “… false demarcation between the unit [state] and the aggregate [regional 
integration]” is not useful in understanding regional integration in Africa (O’Brennan, 
2001: 181).  The process of regional integration in Southern Africa is one in which states 
interact where the enmeshment in social interactions produces the blurring of the divide 
(Figure 1, below). Most of the interviewees’ statements converge with the constructivist 
framework in the research that, states’ delegation of sovereignty in the process of 
regional integration is explained as the process of mutual constitution (Wendt, 1994).   
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     Figure 16. Constructivist Schematic Cycle of SADC Integration Process   
        
 
     Source: Author Schematic Compilation, August 2014    
 
The distinct dimensions of state interests, preferences and identity and how these are 
delegated in the process of regional integration explains the constitutive relationship 
rather than simply a causal theoretical relationship among states in the region (Wendt, 
1994). In this way, the constructivist framework provided useful tools to establish the 
causal mechanism and context of the process of regional integration in this research 
(Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). The research findings also demonstrate that identity is the 
context within which states’ interests, preferences and sovereignty are divined and 
interpreted.   
 
The research has also found that the discursive identities of SADC states do not determine 
trade, foreign and security policies “… but [it] provide contextual template for the 
determination and pursuit of national interests. It thus defines the framework from which 
policy choices ensues. Identity sets the agenda for policy makers – and delimits or defines 
the policy choices that are then initially available to them” (O’Brennan, 2001: 181). The 
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interviewees’ statements and the case studies demonstrate what Wendt observed: “… 
states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent 
interactions” (Wendt, 1994: 385).         
 
The research findings demonstrate that the constructivist framework is not only 
conceptually coherent as a characterisation of regional policy integration; it is also more 
tractable (Booth & Vale, 1995). The research findings confirm the validity of the choice 
of foreign policy, SADC-EU EPAs trade and the security architecture as case studies (Price 
& Reus-Smit, 1998). The increasing scope of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the 
region requires the need for increased binding regulatory arrangement to avoid the 
tension between national and regional jurisdictions issues (Wendt, 1994).  
 
With regard to state sovereignty, the interviewees’ statements and case studies 
corroborate what the literature review conveys that “sovereignty is progressively tested, 
negotiated, and evolved,” trade, foreign diplomacy and security relations are increasingly 
characterised by global interdependences (Tralac, 2014: 3). Fundamental shifts are taking 
place as states are beginning to realise that their best chance of ‘realist’ survival lies in 
cooperation with their neighbours (Cornwell, 1995). Clearly, there has been a critical 
connection between what happens in South Africa and in the Southern African region in 
respect to trade, foreign and security policies. Even more, the area of trade relations in 
the region raises this connection between South Africa and the region of Southern Africa 
more glaringly (Tralac, 2014).  
 
The more the usual refrain is conveyed that ‘as South Africa prospers, the region of 
Southern Africa prospers,’ the more the divisions and gap in economic development 
between South Africa and the region (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). Whilst much of the earlier 
functionalist emphasis on regional foreign policy has continued, its emphasis on technical 
and economic cooperation had lost its raison d’etre in the post-Cold War era. According 
to Cornwell (1995: 12), a crude realist if “quixotic diplomacy” and security policy was 
replaced by a neorealist perspective. The neorealist approach to regional foreign and 
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security policy posited the idea of South Africa as the regional power. South Africa 
however, quickly acknowledged the limits of its power and relied more on non-coercive 
instruments of diplomatic, security and trade engagement (du Pisani, 2011).  
 
There have been a number of positive developments in South Africa’s Africa Agenda in 
the past years. The decisive intervention to prevent another military takeover in Lesotho, 
along with some partners, in August-September 1994; the scrapping of Namibia’s external 
debt to South Africa and the earlier transfer of Walvis Bay to Namibian sovereignty; the 
gesture of atonement for the excesses of destabilisation by the then Speaker of the South 
African Parliament – Frene Ginwala – to the people of Mozambique “… were all signs of 
sensitive and matured external diplomacy” (Daniel 1995:34).  
 
Furthermore, South Africa’s earlier signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 
destruction of its nuclear weapons programme placed the country and the region at the 
diplomatic and security centre on the international debate around the review and 
extension of the Treaty at the United Nations in New York (Evans: 1995). Moreover South 
Africa has returned to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Geneva as 
permanent member of its Governing Council and is participating in the African Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone and in African Nuclear Energy Research Groups (Evans 1995:106-
107).       
 
Perhaps the 1994 crisis in Lesotho serves as the best example of South Africa’s newfound 
role in preventive diplomacy in Southern Africa, albeit in concert with its regional partners 
within the SADC. For the observers the Lesotho political crisis, the dissolution of the 
Mokhehle government by King Letsie III in August 1994 was directly connected to the 
bigger debate on the position of the monarchy in general and the reinstatement of 
Moshoeshoe II in particular (Sejanamane, 1994). It seems that King Letsie III staged the 
so called “King’s Coup” not on his own behalf but on behalf of his father (Matlosa, 1996). 
After the Pretoria meeting between President Masire of Botswana, President Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, and President Mandela of South Africa – it was clear that King Letsie III could 
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not sustain the takeover of the government (Sejanamane, 1994). The King therefore, 
stalled and started to bargain for an honourable exit (Sejanamane, 1994). However, the 
Frontline States regarded the King’s attitude of not acceding to their seven day deadline 
for the reinstatement of the democratically elected government as defiance.     
    
For South Africa and the Southern African region, the impact of the breakdown of law 
and order in Lesotho, or the total collapse of the economy as a result of civil strife, was 
a primary concern. In view of the porousness of the border between Lesotho and South 
Africa, and the shared historical origin of the peoples in both countries, civil strife could 
have led to the exodus of large numbers of people, legally and illegally, into South Africa. 
Such a large population movement would have destabilised the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) of the South African government. Even more, civil strife 
or military intervention of any form would have resulted in massive destruction of the 
Lesotho infrastructure. South Africa’s diplomatic intervention in the Lesotho crisis, albeit 
under constrained multilateral mandate was a manifestation of “leadership as hegemony” 
(Khadiagala, 1996: 9).           
 
Unfortunately, South Africa’s foreign policy relations have also shown some negative 
trends. The apparent softening of support for human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe, 
the challenging diplomatic engagements and role that South Africa played at the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), are in sharp contrast to what South Africa espoused at 
the dawn of its democracy (Habib, 2010). However, the Nigerian crisis must rank as one 
of the first serious African diplomatic challenge that confronted the South African 
government (van der Westhuizen, 2010). The Nigerian crisis tested the African National 
Congress’ (ANC) foreign policy ideals, goals and objectives in a very tangible way. Indeed 
the crisis pitted two schools of thinking in the ANC and in the country, head-on.  
 
On the one hand, are idealists who projected a view that for South Africa’s miracle of a 
democratic transition to mean anything in Africa, and if its meaning were to be kept alive 
domestically, there must be an intimate connection between South Africa’s moral 
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commitment to democracy and human rights and its conduct in foreign policy (van der 
Westhuizen, 2010). The neo-realists on the other hand, argued strongly that because 
South Africa did not understand nor have a proper assessment of the Abacha regime in 
Nigeria – and the tragedy that unfolded on the Ogoni Nine, during a Commonwealth 
Summit in Auckland – “made South Africa’s reaction and diplomatic engagement on the 
matter look very naïve” (Cornwell, 1995: 18). Moreover, President Mandela had raised 
his concerns over several cases where the rights of minorities came into play, the 
worrying thing was that he has was not sufficiently forceful in promoting the requisite 
human rights narrative (Vale: 1997).  
 
Questions were asked about the quality of diplomatic and assessment reports that 
President Mandela received from the South Africa mission in Nigeria at the time (Cornwell, 
1995; van der Westhuizen, 2010). Nonetheless, President Mandela’s condemnation of the 
tragedy and human rights violations by the Abacha regime at the Commonwealth meeting 
heralded a turning point in South Africa’s foreign policy. Significant lessons were derived 
in that experience that strong and decisive leadership is needed in external diplomacy in 
Southern Africa and in Africa in general but alongside an equally rigorous assessment of 
national - and not so much party interests – in diplomatic review of the situation. Even 
more importantly, the major lesson from both the Lesotho and more especially, the 
Nigerian crisis is the significance of consulting the regional SADC leadership (Mills, 1994).       
 
Measuring the depth of regional convergence or integration in foreign policy, trade and 
security policy requires the construction of new measurement instruments. To that end, 
the cases used in the dissertation combined with the literature and interviews across the 
three different domains of state policy jurisdiction in the case studies are important. 
Compared to the binary distinction that is typical of many pre-existing approaches, the 
cases provide a more detailed ordering of distinct levels of the depth of integration. It is 
difficult to use existing methods to directly compare the depth of policy integration across 
the region, across instrument types, or across different chapters in an RTA for instance, 
because they mainly rely on proxies for depth of policy integration rather than direct 
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measures. The method developed here facilitates comparisons between different regional 
agreements, including incorporation of the SADC in such comparisons, and it is capable 
of comparing integration arrangements of varying types.  
 
The SADC EPA negotiations with the European Union (EU) have raised serious challenges 
about the need to develop common values to deal with external parties. The experience 
of the SADC-EU EPA negotiations has also tested the weak institutional base upon which 
SACU and SADC are created. More importantly, the SADC-EU EPA negotiations have 
shown that state interests, preferences and identity are important in the choices, 
considerations and policy decisions that states and state actors make. Confirming this 
point and in spite of EU’s intransigent behaviour, the EU remains SA’s largest trading 
partner – with “the share of trade declining from 44% in mid-1990 to 26.5% in 2011” 
(Carim, 2013: 9).      
 
There is a great deal of concern in the SADC about the unilateral announcement by the 
EU that the EPA must be in force by 2014 or preferences will lapse. This places pressure 
on ACP countries to conclude the trade deal – with South Africa, Namibia, Botswana 
threatened by the possibility of removal from the new Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) schemes in 2014 and with Swaziland’s benefits to be reduced (Carim, 2013). The 
fundamental finding that this dissertation is making in all of this, is that, EU’s intransigent 
behaviour, combined with the disparate nature of SADC responses to it, impacts 
negatively on regional integration in Southern Africa.       
 
Furthermore, the literature surveyed in the dissertation demonstrates that the 
implementation of protocols is low when the signatories’ substantive national policy 
competencies are dissimilar. Similarity of substance in formulation in trade, diplomacy 
and security policies appears to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
deepening regional integration. This result casts doubt on a rival hypothesis, that the 
enforcement of integration by expanding the powers of the SADC Secretariat or the SADC 
Tribunal is a substitute for the convergence of national policies.  
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SADC Secretariat or the SADC Tribunal cannot do what SADC member states are unable 
to do in an intergovernmental arrangement. Common SADC policy instruments are very 
good but not sufficient predictor of the depth of policy convergence among member 
states. Disaggregating by policy instrument type reveals that all the differences in 
member states’ policy preferences is a good predictor of the depth of regional 
convergence. There are three important factors or trends that the findings of the 
dissertation are showing in respect to state sovereignty and regional integration: i) the 
policy instruments and protocols that are created by the SADC are not self-executing; ii) 
nations states drive the implementation of the SADC programmes and protocols; iii) the 
absence of a final, institutionally binding and, more importantly, an enforcing “normative 
congruence” in the policy architecture of the SADC continues to frustrate regional 
objectives (Nathan, 2013).   
 
In all this, the dissertation shows that state sovereignty in Southern Africa is a seriously 
guarded and contested arena. Indeed, state sovereignty in Southern Africa and all of 
Africa is a very serious area of policy and decision making. Moreover, the unanimous 
decision by the Maputo SADC 2012 Summit to dissolve the SADC Tribunal is a strong 
indication of this point. This dissertation argues that most analyses on the fate of the 
SADC Tribunal places too much weight on the law or the legal basis on the fate and in 
the assessment of the SADC Tribunal situation. The political motivations of state actors 
in respect to how decisions are made by the SADC Summit do not feature in this analysis.  
 
In this analyses, the Heads of State and Government of the SADC have set-up the SADC 
Tribunal and accorded it in terms of Article 16 (5) powers that make its “… decisions … 
final and binding” (SADC Treaty, 2002: 9). This legal analysis would make us believe that 
no political considerations are held by state actors when they create regional institutions. 
In this fashion, a strictly legal and apolitical process to regional integration is proffered 
as “… one which wakes to disillusion and dysfunction …” (Gauntlett, 2012: 1).    
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Another basis of this legalistic analysis on the SADC Tribunal’s fate has been the notion 
that state sovereignty in Southern Africa “is resurgent” (Gauntlett, 2012: 1). In this view, 
Gauntlett identifies the “… adherents [of sovereignty to] include those who stand to lose 
most from its demise, or at least attenuation. Their scholarship is necessarily nostalgic” 
(Gauntlett, 2012: 1). Ironically, Gauntlett makes an important point - its implications in 
respect to where the SADC Tribunal derives its authority - is not raised by Gauntlett: “the 
Tribunal is overwhelmingly supported by donor aid, particularly from the member states 
of the EU. There is no reason why this should continue, for it expensively to adjudicate 
title to sandbanks in rivers, or tiffs over uninhabited atolls, on for its (now more carefully 
chosen) members to decorate international law gatherings” (Gauntlett: 2012: 3).     
 
Furthermore, in a dialogue discussion dubbed: SADC Tribunal: Removing the Scales of 
Justice, at the University of Pretoria, the former Judge President of the SADC Tribunal, 
Judge Pillay, had this to say: “the decisions of the [SADC] Summit [are] clearly illegal and 
ultra vires. Summit has no power to restrict the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, not least 
because it is subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction” (UP Dialogue Notes: 2013). The Judge 
did not exclude the South African state actors in his enchantment: “South Africa did not 
fight to protect the SADC Tribunal instead SA state actors selfishly stood by and allowed 
the Tribunal to be bulldozed by SADC …” (UP Dialogue Notes, 2013).       
 
The former Judge President of the SADC Tribunal, Pillay, made further pronouncements 
on the Tribunal’s fate in a speech delivered at Freedom under Law and Constitution Court 
Clerks Alumni Association in Johannesburg in 2012: “… the Independent Consultants and 
the Workshop had recommended in respect of enforcement of Tribunal decisions: All 
SADC countries should confer to those decisions the force of law and empower their 
judicial organs to implement them as domestic law and not as foreign law and the 
Tribunal should be empowered to impose remedies for non-compliance with its 
judgments and other decisions” (2012: 16).  
 
203 
 
The analyses provided above are important in respect to state sovereignty and regional 
integration in Southern Africa. It is also important for a very serious conclusion that the 
dissertation is making that: most analyses on state sovereignty and regional integration 
in Southern Africa “… fails to historicise the emergence of the sovereign state, taking for 
granted that its origins can be located exclusively within Europe” (Hobson, 2009: 672). 
The findings of this dissertation have cast doubt if suspicion on the extant accounts that 
state sovereignty is resurgent in Southern Africa. This dissertation has shown that state 
sovereignty is not ushered in by “… adherents … who stand to lose …” (Gauntlett, 2012:1) 
but that state sovereignty is a recently acquired and treasured achievement of most 
African states.  
 
Ironically, the ‘nostalgic hacking’ of the Westphalian sovereign state blunts the analyses 
to the contemporary phenomenon of state sovereignty in Southern Africa. Even more, 
Gauntlett’s analysis of the SADC Tribunal is not only bounded up tightly in its legalistic 
straight jacket but it is constrained by its inability to reflect the discursive interactions of 
historical and social construction of state sovereignty in Southern Africa. This ahistorical 
narrative is often replicated by many critical theorists who argue that globalisation is now 
transcending the modern sovereign state. The findings of this dissertation show that state 
sovereignty matters in the process of regional integration. The constructivist framework 
that the dissertation utilises shows that state sovereignty matters for different reasons 
and explanations than those given by realist, neorealist, and neo-liberal institutionalists.   
 
With regard to the former SADC Tribunal Judge President’s prouncements on the SADC 
Tribunal’s demise; it is perhaps safe to say that, Judge Pillay did concede in his 
presentation in Johannesburg that: “Summit does have, of course, the power to amend 
the SADC Treaty …” (2012: 6). Indeed, Article 35 (1) of the SADC Treaty states: “The 
Summit may decide by a resolution supported by three-quarters of all members to 
dissolve SADC or any of its institutions, and determine the terms and concessions of 
dealing with its liabilities and disposal of its assets” (2002: 13). It is important to place 
Article 35 (1) on record when the matter of the SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction and its work 
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is raised. Simply put, the SADC Tribunal is an organisation of the SADC created by the 
Heads of State and Government.  
 
The distinction is carefully raised between what Article 35 (1) of the SADC Treaty calls 
“… SADC or any of its institutions …” and Gauntlett’s reference to the SADC Tribunal as 
“… the region’s international law court …” (Gauntlett, 2012: 1). Some scholars have 
argued that, it is this padoxical if not an awkward position that the SADC Tribunal 
occupied that led to its demise (Nathan, 2013). Whilst many within the ranks of the SADC 
Tribunal viewed it as a regional court, it derived its authority in respect to the enforcement 
of its decisions from national member states’ courts. Even more, the SADC Tribunal 
exercised its jurisdiction and mandate in a problematic way in that: in the absence of a 
regional harmonised jurisprudence or normative congruence, the SADC Tribunal 
depended and sometimes used and invoked one SADC member state’s jurisprudence to 
hammer at another. 
   
The importance of the SADC Tribunal jurisdiction and work notwithstanding, the question 
that can be raised in this regard is why would the SADC leadership create an institution 
in order to destroy it? Bastasin (2012) argues that the theoretical explanations of causality 
in the European crisis are wrong. Similarly, the SADC Tribunal discourse in Southern Africa 
is placed as if there are SADC wide legal discourses, and yet the enforcements of the 
SADC Tribunal rulings are left in the hands of national governments (SADC Treaty, 2002). 
Hence, the story of the SADC Tribunal has been an experience of SADC national 
governments’ recriminations with “an unelected body” (Bastasin, 2012: 3).    
 
Nathan (2013) argued that the SADC Tribunal was conceived out of what he calls 
“institutional mimicry” that has placed European institutional models over modesty and 
local context in the design of SADC institutions. In this way, the international donors that 
‘sponsored’ the SADC Tribunal and are often key to the establishment of SADC institutions 
have no clue about the regional political context. Nathan (2013) defines the weaknesses 
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in the work of the SADC Tribunal as reflected in its lack of understanding of three 
important factors:  
 
1. State sovereignty in SADC is new and a valued property;  
2. States in SADC are still grappling with de jure as opposed with de facto 
sovereignty; 
3. SADC does not have common policy values or normative congruence (UP Dialogue 
Notes, 2013). 
 
Indeed, this dissertation has utilised the constructivist framework to analyse the 
relationship of state sovereignty and regional integration in Southern Africa. Similarly, the 
findings of the dissertation – utilising the constructivist framework – reflect similar 
conclusions to those raised by Nathan (2013) above: 
 
1. States are the principal units of analysis for regional integration in Southern Africa;  
2. The key structures are inter-subjective and material in the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa; 
3. State preferences, interests and identities are an important part; constructed 
through social discursive interactions among states and not given exogenously to 
the process of regional integration (Wendt, 1994).      
 
The SADC Tribunal experience is not unique to SADC’s regional integration experiment. 
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe which culminated in October 2008 (Bastasin, 2012: 
3), “was influenced by an irresponsible tug-of-war between ECB [European Central Bank] 
and the national governments.” This conflict resulted in a protracted tug-of-war that was 
“more about politics and human behaviour” than law, economics and money (Bastasin, 
2012: 3). Bastasin (2012: 3) makes an important observation about this situation which 
is very relevant for the SADC Tribunal experience: “the consequences of the conflict 
between an unelected body entrusted with the general welfare and the democratically 
elected governments representing national interests were so grave that they represent a 
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first disquieting test of the contradiction between jealous national powers and weakly 
legitimated supranational governance.”    
 
Therefore, the fact that most current SADC regional integration agreements fall well short 
of a legally binding obligation does not, however, render them homogenous, in terms of 
their impact on states’ authority to enforce them. The glass of SADC’s regional policy 
convergence may not be half full, but neither is it empty. SADC states go to considerable 
lengths to negotiate the wording of regional protocols and international standards. This 
is true also of trade, diplomatic and security policy convergence. State behaviour suggests 
that the inclusion or exclusion of different provisions is regarded as salient. The 
dissertation is confined to measuring the effects of the depth of cooperation in respect to 
member states’ preferences and what informs the behaviour of member states in making 
their policy choices.  
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CHAPTER 9 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
RESEARCH CONLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
9.1 Conclusion 
  
The interviews and the three case studies combined with examples of practical incidents 
of state action and behaviour in SADC reveal how the interviewees’ made meaning of 
state sovereignty and regional integration process in Southern Africa. The interviewees 
argued that most of what is written of the state in Southern Africa distorts the reality of 
this constitutive interaction. Some of the interviews took the initiative of being self-critical, 
looking at their work and how it provides much deeper understanding of regional 
integration in Southern Africa. These findings provide important insights affirming the 
difficulty and complexity of the regional integration process in Southern Africa.  
 
The findings of this research are instructive and insightful as they provide indications for 
understanding how the interviewees felt about the process of regional integration in 
Southern Africa. The findings of this research acquire more significance as the process of 
regional integration in Southern Africa deepens. The findings of this research underscore 
the need for bold leadership to take the region into greater heights in its regional 
integration agenda. Coordination of roles both for state, the bureaucrats at the SADC 
Secretariat, the region’s civil society and private sector is critical for this exercise. 
However, the perennial problem of having institutions whose role is merely to coordinate 
intergovernmental interactions among states exerts a break on the achievement of 
collective regional outcomes.     
 
The three case studies and the examples of incidents of state action discussed in some 
of the cases demonstrate that a comprehensive process of constructive interactions 
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among states in making their respective policy preferences in the process of regional 
integration in line or against SADC’s normative objectives and norms is critical. The 
findings of the research and the analysis that is provided is important in generating more 
insight into the workings of state leaders and state actors. The findings of this research 
show that the SADC experimentation with regional integration is not unique. The biggest 
experiment in the history of regional integration, the EU is in crisis, precisely for the same 
reasons that continue to hound Southern Africa.  
  
Increasing literature on regional integration focuses on economic aspects of integration, 
and pays relatively little attention to state sovereignty as a distinct phenomenon. The 
result is that there is no recognised direct measure of the depth of regional policy 
integration, in terms of measuring the extent to which states voluntarily agree to pool 
their authority towards the regional integration agenda. Existing indicators use proxies 
that are less and less accurate as measurements of the depth of policy integration – such 
as the number of protocols that a country has signed or whether an RTA is an FTA or a 
Customs Union. Merely counting the number of protocols signed by member states fails 
to account for the very wide variation across and within different range of policy areas in 
respect to the implementation of such protocols.  
 
The data surveyed in the literature review combined with the information and data 
collected in the interviews and in the three case studies do confirm that, the regional 
integration process in Southern Africa, is a discursive process among state actors that are 
more concerned about their sovereignty as they are about regional integration outcomes. 
The study concludes drawing on the construcvist and realist literature on regional 
integration that states have interests; and that state actors will do whatever is possible 
in their power to influence decision-making in pursuit of their national interests. In a few 
number of cases, states will bend their national interests if the regional integration 
outcome serves the political, economic and diplomatic interests of such states.    
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The three case studies demonstrate the constructivist framework’s assumptions that state 
interests, identities and preferences matter a great deal in the process of decision making 
among state actors. Indeed the three case studies; namely, external diplomacy, collective 
security and trade relations with the EU show that state interest drive motivations and 
choices of member states in the process of regional integration.  The research findings 
and recommendations highlight significant parallels and lesson in the history of regional 
integration in Europe. In this regard, this makes an significant contribution to knowledge 
in respect to new ways of theorising regional integration in Africa, in the deployment of 
practical interpretative analysis of the relationships between the depth of policy 
integration process, on the one hand, and state behaviour – with a particular reference 
to state policy preferences as a key determinant factors in the process regional 
integration.  
 
The findings of this dissertation have addressed the research questions that the research 
investigates regarding whether the SADC’s normative objectives and goals of regional 
integration are paradoxical. The dissertation’s findings convey the following in respect to 
both the research questions in the study as well the construcvist assumptions 
underpinning the case studies: the more SADC wants to become a powerful international 
actor, the more it has to define the role of its constituent parts, its fifteen member states. 
At the core of the findings in this research is that without the SADC thoroughly basing its 
normative aspirations on firm, binding, and internally consistent strategy – its regional 
integration project will continue to stumble. Even more, the RISDP, SIPO I and II even 
in their revised forms, cannot assist in resolving the SADC’s paradox.  
 
The dissertation looks at the whole array of International Relations literature and theories 
on regional integration. The dissertation’s key finding in this regard, which is also 
extensively corroborated by the data on the case studies and the interviews is that, ideas 
and discursive interactions among states matter significantly in the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa. The theories and literature surveyed in this dissertation: 
realism, neorealism, liberal institutionalism, institutionalism, new regionalism and 
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constructivism, albeit with differing degrees, emphasise the role of ideas in analysing, 
theorising, and conceptualising any political and economic phenomenon. However, the 
constructivist and realist literature surveyed, provide a more powerful account of 
explaining state behaviour and the behaviour of state actors in the process of regional 
integration in Southern Africa.  
 
The literature of state sovereignty and regional integration also reflects what the 
interviews and the case studies findings project thus: the idea of a sovereign state has 
traditionally based its origins on the notion that it is has indivisible right to defend its 
existence and survival (defensive realism), but also it has a singular right to the 
determination of its fate within its territory. The process of regional integration on the 
other hand, does project notions or aspirations towards the extension of sovereignty to 
allow for the sharing resources and territory of one country for the benefit of the collective 
regional community. It is the intersection of state sovereignty and regional integration 
that the constructivist notion of co-determination and co-constitution is projected in the 
research.  
 
The demise of the SADC Tribunal in 2012 in Maputo, Mozambique, this research 
concludes, is the example of how state actors in Southern Africa continue to find the 
difficulties in negotiating the intersection between state sovereignty and regional 
integration. This research concludes (schematic representation below), whilst regional 
leadership is important in the resolution of the contradictions in the intersection between 
state sovereignty and regional integration, the existence of binding institutional 
frameworks as well as a vibrant civil society is also critical. Secondly, this dissertation 
concludes that closing the gap between national interests and regional normative 
objectives is also essential to the process of regional and continental integration. Thirdly, 
the dissertation concludes that state preferences and interests will be aggregated towards 
intergovernmental regional integration outcomes once states find congruence in regional 
outcomes and national interests.    
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The model of state action and behaviour that is projected in the findings of this research 
is that states in Southern Africa privilege the realist institutional factors such as the 
distribution of capabilities and information alongside the protection of their sovereignty. 
The discursive constructivist and intergovernmental interactions among states in the 
process of regional integration in Southern Africa is in the main, a continuous, complex 
and delicate process of negotiation the balance between state sovereignty (national 
interest) and regional integration. Clearly, the state-society relationship is important in 
ensuring that the process of regional integration agenda is grounded and driven from 
within national states. In this way, SADC’s regional normative objectives will continually 
through a process of legitimation take root and the gap between national interests and 
regional interests will gradually dissipate, resulting in the aggregation of interest, 
preferences and identities in collective security, trade relations, and collective diplomacy.     
 
      Figure 17. SADC Constructivist Schema of Regional Integration 
 
      Source: Author Compilation Based on Findings of this Research (2014) 
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9.2 Recommendations  
 
There is a range of qualitative measures that the SADC integration project will have to 
undertake to resolve the paradox of legitimating the process of regional integration within 
the borders of its member states. The following policy interventions and strategic areas 
emerge from the findings of this dissertation as important recommendations in  the 
management of the state sovereignty - regional integration complex in the SADC. These 
policy interventions and strategic areas are not exhaustive nor do they cover all the areas 
in the state sovereignty - regional integration complex in Southern Africa. These 
recommendations draw on the literature surveyed and from the case studies utilised in 
the dissertation.    
 
Leadership Deficit – the SADC was formed during the time when the leadership axis was 
underpinned by the agenda of the Frontline States. This process managed to breed and 
endure the leadership qualities that were necessary for the SADC’s formation in Southern 
Africa. The leadership differences were concealed by the common concern with the 
eradication and reducing of dependence on apartheid South Africa. With the demise of 
apartheid in South Africa, tensions and leadership deficits to drive the process of regional 
integration began to show. Regional integration requires leadership from the dominant 
and economic powerful states as losses and gains in the process tend to predominantly 
be located within the space of influence of these states.  
 
For Southern Africa and Africa in general, leadership from regional powers such as South 
Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, is important to drive regional integration. Drawing from the 
case study on the region’s and the continent’s interaction with Europe  on trade (EPAs) it 
is clear that the divergent interests among the EU countries were not only due to the 
inabilities of some leaders and to the pressure of the euro crisis. The euro countries are 
still different because of longstanding structural divergences challenges. It was naïve to 
think that national leaders were capable of forgetting their interests by adopting artificially 
the same policy preferences. Similarly, Southern Africa and the continent adopted the 
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same posture in its trade negotiations with Europe, as a result showing signs of divisions 
and weak leadership among its different configurations.         
 
Coordinative Discourse - the second area that the dissertation has found to be critical in 
the process of regional integration is that of the coordinative discourse in the region. The 
case study on SADC-EU trade relations and the experience of regional integration in Africa 
generally, points to a need for well-constructed policy discourse about regional integration 
within the boundaries of national states. This discursive process should naturally raise 
intense, differing, dissenting and alternative policy positions on each stage of the process 
of regional integration in respect to national interests and regional interests. It is a crucial 
step in the construction and in the choice of policy instruments, regime and approach to 
regional integration. The African situation can draw lessons, from elsewhere in the world, 
as it grapples with the dilemma of weak and coordinative functions of the RECs with 
powerful political decisions of Council of Ministers and Summits of the Heads of State and 
Government.  
 
Choice of Approach - the choice of the approach to regional integration is important. The 
European experience is showing that even after so many years of experimentation with 
pooling of sovereignty by member states to supranational institutions in Brussels: this 
has been a difficult and challenging process. Ironically, the current euro crisis in the EU 
demonstrates that Africa’s intergovernmental process to integration must be carried with 
gradual caution. But the lesson is also that the intergovernmental approach to regional 
integration that most African experimentations to regional integration reflect will at some 
stage have to confront the challenge of developing firm, collective, and binding regional 
or continental policy instruments and institutions. In this way, the region and the 
continent in general will get closer to resolving the gap between state sovereignty 
(national interests) and regional integration. The lesson of the SADC Tribunal experience 
points to a conflict that will continue to arise when state sovereignty trumps ‘regional’ 
institutions. The creation of a binding regional ‘normative congruence’ or aggregation in 
specific policy areas is the ultimate solution to this paradox.   
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Furthermore, it is important to draw lessons from the European experience of recent 
years. The dissertation concludes that the approach to regional integration that 
emphasises state identity alone is simply the wrong approach for an economic integrated 
area. Some powerful states in the region, with differing degrees, are showing the most 
encouraging model for single economies in a global context, all countries cannot be equal. 
On the contrary, an integrated area thrives from the various specialties of its regions and 
states. Inevitably, each region will have different productivity levels; and each state’s 
balance of payments does not have to be on par with the rest to coexist. But if regional 
integration must prevail on identity, there is no alternative: some form of solidarity is 
intrinsic to regional integration. Eventually, since different economic structures create 
different political preferences in each country, a democratic system of decision making 
must emerge and the regional political and economic union must follow.      
 
Communicative Discourse – the current EU experience, particularly the current sovereign 
debt crisis, has put into sharp relief neoliberal notions about the sanctity of the markets 
– politics follows economics. Missing in the political economy of regional integration in 
Europe has been the communicative discourse that should have placed more premium 
on political legitimisation of the process of regional integration within national states. The 
lesson for Africa is that, the gradualist, limited and cautious intergovernmental approach 
to regional integration is commendable, some binding arrangement will need to be 
adopted at some stage in the process, through a locally, grassroots, nation state based 
communication and dialogue programme - among citizens within and across SADC 
member states.  
 
The SADC should work towards the embedding of regional integration discourse within 
the borders of member states. The discursive and ideational interaction on the gap 
between national interest and regional integration must occur at the grassroots level 
within communities. It must not be the preserve of esoteric policy bureaucrats in 
Gaborone or the preserve of power heads of state and government. Regional integration 
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in Southern Africa and Africa in general has to dispel both the monopoly of national and 
regional interpretations to regional integration. The discursive constructivist process to 
regional integration must bring a new direction to the history of Southern Africa and 
beyond, to the role of the state, and to the relationship between public powers and the 
citizens.  
 
Collective Narrative – the European experience shows that in the absence of a 
communicative discourse that builds political legitimacy on the ground, this results in the 
re-emergence of national narratives that cause states to pull away from the regional 
integration ideal. For Southern Africa, the lesson is to deepen national dialogues through 
the SADC National Committees, for instance. Linked to communicative discourse above, 
this process will generate collective narratives and discourses on regional integration; as 
a result, creating a ground-swell of collective regional and continental stories and 
understandings about the regional integration process. In this way, Southern Africa and 
Africa must emerge with a common – non-national – narrative of the regional integration 
process, failing which, we will not be able to avoid future crisis, like it is happening in 
Europe. Regional integration in Africa should be grounded on national states narratives 
towards the intergovernmental outcome of deeper political integration.      
 
Burden Sharing – the process of regional integration will involve in certain stages of the 
process losses and gains for member states. The findings of this dissertation show that 
binding political strategic interventions can assist to alleviate disproportionate sharing of 
the responsibility of the process among member states. Indeed, powerful states such as 
South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya will endure significant losses and gains in the 
process. The dominant state in the Southern African region, South Africa, does not seem 
to have a clear position about its economic diplomatic role in the region. This is confirmed 
by studies after another of South African State Owned Entities’ activities in Africa showing 
disparate degree of emphasis that point to; i) lack of coordination among the SA’s SOE’s 
in African engagements; ii) lack of a country economic diplomacy framework or strategy 
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that embeds or locates all political, diplomatic and economic activities of the South African 
state actors in Africa (DBSA, 2009 & 2010).  
 
Intersection of Politics-Economics Nexus – the economic reductionism or neoliberal logic 
of the sanctity of the market is continuously exposed as vacuous and bankrupt by the 
current. The lesson for Africa is that the intergovernmental approach to regional 
integration has over-emphasised the political dimension and rendered regional integration 
process too politicist. The challenge for Africa is how to find the intersection between the 
economic and the political dimensions of regional integration process. The lesson from 
the SADC-EU EPA negotiations is that the political and social policy domains among states 
are as important as the economic or trade domains. For SADC, the challenge is how to 
create common values or normative congruence in the policy arena that are binding, 
collective and aggregated especially in respect to how SADC and Africa in general engages 
with third parties.   
 
Preference aggregation: State collaboration, more specifically, the one underpinned by a 
consensual and intergovernmental framework or approach to regional integration is 
complex as it requires each SADC member state to map-up its policy preferences against 
a SADC norm (harmonisation). Ideally, this process is supposed to bring about the 
convergence or the aggregation of national state interests into a core or harmonised 
regional interests pact in foreign policy, trade or regional security. For SADC to undertake 
this exercise, a combination of all the other aspects above is critical with ideas, leadership 
and broad-based institutions critical to the process. The lesson from the case studies 
utilised in this dissertation is that, state sovereignty (interest, preferences, identity) in the 
current conjuncture significantly trumps all other considerations in respect to regional 
integration.   
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APPENDIX  A. 
 
DECLARATION TREATY AND PROTOCOL OF THE 
SOUTHERN AFRIACN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY  
 
PREAMBLE 
 
 
We, the Heads of State or Government of: 
 
The People’s Republic of Angola 
The Republic of Botswana 
The Kingdom of Lesotho 
The Republic of Malawi 
The Republic of Mozambique 
The Republic of Namibia 
The Kingdom of Swaziland 
The United Republic of Tanzania 
The Republic of Zambia 
The Republic of Zimbabwe 
 
 
HAVING REGARD to the objective set forth in ‘SOUTHERN AFRICA: TOWARD ECONOMIC 
LIBERATION – A Declaration by the Governments of independent States of Southern 
Africa, made at Lusaka, on the 1st April, 1980’: 
 
IN PURSUANCE of the principles of ‘TOWARDS A SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
COMMUNITY – a Declaration made by the Heads of State or Government of Southern 
Africa at Windhoek, in August, 1992’, which affirms our commitment to establish a 
Development Community in the Region; 
 
DETERMINED to ensure, through common action, the progress and well-being of the 
peoples of Southern Africa; 
 
CONSCIOUS of our duty to promote the interdependence and integration of our national 
economies for the harmonious, balanced and equitable development of the Region; 
 
CONVINCED of the need to mobilise our own and international resources to promote the 
implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, programmes and projects 
within the framework for economic integration; 
 
DEDICATED to secure, by concerted action, international understanding, support and 
cooperation;  
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MINDFUL of the need to involve the peoples of the Region centrally in the process of 
development and integration, particularly through the guarantee of democratic rights, 
observance of human rights and the rule of law; 
 
RECOGNISING that, in an increasingly interdependent world, mutual understanding, good 
neighbourliness, and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the Region are 
indispensable to the realisation of 
these ideals; 
 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of April 1980, 
and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community signed at Abuja, on the 3rd 
of June, 1991; 
 
BEARING IN MIND the principles of international law governing relations between States; 
 
 
HAVE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION TO BE KNOWN AS 
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC), AND HEREBY 
AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
ARTICLE 1 
 
DEFINITIONS 
 
In this Treaty, unless the context otherwise requires: 
 
1.  “Treaty” means this Treaty establishing SADC; 
  
2. “Protocol” means an instrument of implementation of this Treaty, having the same 
legal force as this Treaty; 
 
3.  “Community” means the organisation for economic integration established by 
Article 
 2 of this Treaty. 
 
4.  “Region” means the geographical area of the Member States of SADC; 
 
5.  “Member State” means a member of SADC; 
 
6.  “Summit” means the Summit of the Heads of State or Government of SADC 
established by Article 9 of this Treaty; 
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7.  “High Contracting Parties” means States, herein represented by Heads of State or 
Government or their duly authorized representatives for purposes of the 
establishment of the Community; 
 
8.  “Council” means the Council of Ministers of SADC established by Article 9 of this 
Treaty; 
 
9.  “Secretariat: means the Secretariat of SADC established by Article 9 of this Treaty; 
 
10.  “Executive Secretary” means the chief executive officer of SADC appointed under 
Article 10(7) of this Treaty; 
 
11.  “Commission” means a commission of SADC established by Article 9 of this Treaty; 
 
12. “Tribunal” means the tribunal of the Community established by Article 9 of this 
Treaty; 
 
13.  “Sectoral Committee” means a committee referred to in Article 38 of this Treaty; 
 
14.  “Sectoral Coordinating Unit” means a unit referred to in Article 38 of this Treaty; 
 
15. “Standing Committee” means the Standing Committee of Officials established by 
Article 9 of this Treaty; 
 
16.  “Fund” means resources available at any given time for application to programmes, 
projects and activities of SADC as provided by Article 26 of this Treaty. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
ARTICLE 2 
 
ESTABLISHMENT 
 
1.  By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish the Southern African 
Development Community (hereinafter referred to as SADC). 
 
2.  The Headquarters of SADC shall be at Gaborone, Republic of Botswana. 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
LEGAL STATUS 
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1. SADC shall be an international organisation, and shall have legal personality with 
capacity and power to enter into contract, acquire, own or dispose of movable or 
immovable property and to sue and be sued. 
 
2.  In the territory of each Member State, SADC shall, pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Article, have such legal capacity as is necessary for the proper exercise of its 
functions. 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
ARTICLE 4 
PRINCIPLES 
 
SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles: 
 
(a)  sovereign equality of all Member States; 
(b) solidarity, peace and security; 
(c)  human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; 
(d)  equity, balance and mutual benefit; 
(e)  peaceful settlement of disputes; 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
 
1. The objectives of SADC shall be to:  
 
a)  achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the 
socially disadvantaged through regional integration; 
 
b)  evolve common political values, systems and institutions; 
 
c)  promote and defend peace and security; 
 
d)  promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and 
the interdependence of Member States; 
 
e)  achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies 
and programmes; 
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f)  promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the 
environment; 
 
g)  achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment; 
 
h)  strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities 
and links among the peoples of the Region. 
 
 
2.  In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, SADC 
         shall: 
 
a)  harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans of Member States; 
 
b)  encourage the peoples of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to 
develop economic, social and cultural ties across the Region, and to participate 
fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of SADC; 
 
c) create appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite 
resources for the implementation of programmes and operations of SADC and its 
Institutions; 
 
d) develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free 
movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the 
Region generally, among Member States; 
 
e)  promote the development of human resources; 
 
f)  promote the development, transfer and mastery of technology; 
 
g)  improve economic management and performance through regional cooperation; 
 
h)  promote the coordination and harmonisation of the international relations of 
Member States; 
 
i)  secure international understanding, cooperation and support, and mobilise the 
inflow of public and private resources into the Region; 
 
j)  develop such other activities as Member States may decide in furtherance of the 
objectives of this Treaty. 
 
 
ARTICLE 6 
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GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS 
 
1.  Member States undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the 
         achievement of the objectives of SADC, and shall refrain from taking any 
          measure likely to jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of 
         its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. 
 
2.  SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of 
gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture or disability. 
 
3. SADC shall not discriminate against any Member State. 
 
4.  Member States shall take all steps necessary to ensure the uniform application of  
 this Treaty. 
 
5.  Member States shall take all the necessary steps to accord this Treaty the force of 
national law. 
 
6.  Member States shall cooperate with and assist institutions of SADC in the 
performance of their duties. 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ARTICLE 7 
 
MEMBERSHIP 
 
States listed in the Preamble hereto shall, upon signature and ratification of this 
Treaty, be members of SADC. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS 
 
1.  Any state not listed in the Preamble to this Treaty may become a member of 
SADC upon being admitted by the existing members and acceding to this Treaty. 
 
2.  The admission of any such state to membership of SADC shall be affected by a 
unanimous decision of the Summit. 
 
3.  The Summit shall determine the procedures for the admission of new members 
and for the accession to this Treaty by such members. 
 
4.  Membership of SADC shall not be subject to any reservations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ARTICLE 9 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
1. The following Institutions are hereby established: 
a) The Summit of Heads of State or Government; 
b) The Council of Ministers; 
c) Commissions; 
d) The Standing Committee of Officials; 
e) The Secretariat; and 
f) The Tribunal. 
 
2. Other institutions may be established as necessary. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
 
THE SUMMIT 
 
1. The Summit shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of all Member 
States, and shall be the supreme policy-making Institution of SADC. 
 
2. The Summit shall be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the 
functions of SADC. 
 
3.  The Summit shall adopt legal instruments for the implementation of the 
          Provisions of this Treaty; provided that the Summit may delegate this authority 
         to the Council or any other institution of SADC as the Summit may deem  
         appropriate. 
 
4. The Summit shall elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman of SADC from among its   
members for an agreed period on this basis of rotation. 
 
5.  The Summit shall meet at least once a year. 
 
6.  The Summit shall decide on the creation of Commissions, other institutions, 
committees and organs as need arise. 
 
7. The Summit shall appoint the Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive 
Secretary, on the recommendation of Council. 
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8.  Unless otherwise provided in this Treaty, the decisions of the Summit shall be by 
consensus and shall be binding. 
 
ARTICLE 11 
 
THE COUNCIL 
 
1.  The Council shall consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a 
Minister responsible for economic planning or finance. 
 
2.  It shall be the responsibility of the Council to: 
a)  oversee the functioning and development of SADC; 
b)  oversee the implementation of the policies of SADC and the proper execution of 
its programmes; 
c)  advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and harmonious 
functioning and development of SADC; 
d)  approve policies, strategies and work programmes of SADC; 
e)  direct, coordinate and supervise the operations of the institutions of SADC 
subordinate to it; 
f)  define sectoral areas of cooperation and allocate to Member States responsibility 
for coordinating sectoral activities, or re-allocate such responsibilities; 
g)  create its own committees as necessary; 
h)  recommend to the Summit persons for appointment to the posts of  Executive 
Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary; 
i)  determine the Terms and Conditions of Service of the staff of the institutions of 
SADC; 
j)  convene conferences and other meetings as appropriate, for purposes of 
promoting the objectives and programmes of SADC; and 
k)  perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit or this Treaty. 
 
3. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council shall be appointed by the Member 
States holding the Chairmanship and the Vice-Chairmanship of SADC respectively. 
 
4. The Council shall meet at least once a year. 
 
5. The Council shall report and be responsible to the Summit. 
 
6. Decisions of the Council shall be by consensus. 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 12 
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COMMISSIONS 
 
1. Commissions shall be constituted to guide and coordinate cooperation and 
integration policies and programmes in designated sectoral areas. 
 
2. The composition, powers, functions, procedures and other matters related to each 
Commission shall be prescribed by an appropriate protocol by the Summit. 
 
3.  The Commission shall work closely with the Secretariat. 
 
4.  Commissions shall be responsible and report to the Council. 
 
ARTICLE 13 
 
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF OFFICIALS 
 
1.  The Standing Committee shall consist of one permanent secretary or an official of 
equivalent rank from each Member State, preferably from a ministry responsible 
for economic planning or finance. 
 
2.  The Standing Committee shall be a technical advisory committee to the Council. 
 
3. The Standing Committee shall be responsible and report to the Council. 
 
4. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee shall be appointed  
from the Member States holding the Chairmanship and the Vice-Chairmanship, 
respectively, of the Council.  
 
5. The Standing Committee shall meet at least once a year. 
 
6. Decisions of the Standing Committee shall be by consensus. 
 
 
ARTICLE 14 
 
THE SECRETARIAT 
 
1.  The Secretariat shall be the principle executive Institution of the SADC, and shall    
         Be responsible for: 
 
a)  strategic planning and management of the programmes of SADC; 
b)  implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council; 
c)  organisation and management of SADC meetings; 
d)  financial and general administration; 
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e)  representation and promotion of SADC; and 
f)  coordination and harmonisation of the policies and strategies of Member States. 
 
2. The Secretariat shall be headed by the Executive Secretary. 
 
3. The Secretariat shall have such other staff as may be determined by the Council 
from time to time. 
 
ARTICLE 15 
 
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
 
1. The Executive Secretary shall be responsible to the Council for the following: 
 
a)  consultation and coordination with the Government and other institutions of 
Member States; 
b)  pursuant to the direction of Council or Summit, or on his/her own initiative, 
undertaking measures aimed at promoting the objectives of SADC and enhancing 
its performance; 
c)  promotion of cooperation with other organisations for the furtherance of the 
objectives of SADC; 
d)  organising and servicing meetings of the Summit, the Council, the Standing 
Committee  and any other meetings convened on the direction of the Summit or 
the Council; 
e)  custodianship of the property of SADC; 
f)  appointment of the staff of the Secretariat, in accordance with procedures, and 
under Terms and Conditions of Service determined by the Council; 
g)  administration and finances of the Secretariat; 
h)  preparation of Annual Reports on the activities of SADC and its institutions; 
i) preparation of the Budget and Audited Accounts of SADC for submission to the 
Council; 
j) diplomatic and other representation of SADC; 
k) public relations and promotion of SADC; 
l)  such other functions as may, from time to time, be determined by the Summit and 
Council. 
 
2.  The Executive Secretary shall liaise closely with Commissions, and other 
institutions, guide, support and monitor the performance of SADC in the various 
sectors to ensure conformity and harmony with agreed policies, strategies, 
programmes and projects. 
 
3. The Executive Secretary shall be appointed for four years, and be eligible for 
appointment for another period not exceeding four years. 
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ARTICLE 16 
 
THE TRIBUNAL 
 
1. The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the proper 
interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to 
adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it. 
 
2.  The composition, powers, functions, procedures and other related matters 
governing the Tribunal shall be prescribed in a Protocol adopted by the Summit. 
 
3.  Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed for a specified period. 
 
4.  The Tribunal shall give advisory opinions on such matters as the Summit or the 
Council may refer to it. 
 
5.  The decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding. 
 
ARTICLE 17 
 
SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS 
 
1.  Member States shall respect the international character and responsibilities of 
SADC, the Executive Secretary and other staff of SADC, and shall not seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their functions. 
 
2.  In the performance of their duties, the members of the Tribunal, the Executive 
Secretary and the other staff of SADC shall be committed to the international 
character of SADC, and shall not seek to receive instructions from any Member 
States, or from any authority external to SADC. They shall refrain from any action 
incompatible with their positions as international staff responsible only to SADC. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
MEETINGS 
 
ARTICLE 18 
 
QUORUM 
 
277 
 
The quorum for all meetings of the Institutions of SADC shall be two thirds of its 
Members. 
 
ARTICLE 19 
 
DECISIONS 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, decisions of the Institutions of 
SADC shall be taken by consensus. 
 
ARTICLE 20 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Institutions of SADC shall 
determine their own rules of procedure. 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
COOPERATION 
 
ARTICLE 21 
 
AREAS OF COOPERATION 
 
1. Members States shall cooperate in all areas necessary to foster regional 
development and integration on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit. 
 
2.  Member States shall, through appropriate institutions of SADC, coordinate, 
rationalise and harmonise their overall macro-economic and sectoral policies and 
strategies, programmes and projects in the areas of cooperation. 
 
3.  In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, Member States agree to 
cooperate in the areas of: 
 
a)  food security, land and agriculture; 
b)  infrastructure and services; 
c)  industry, trade, investment and finance; 
d)  human resources development, science and technology; 
e)  natural resources and environment; 
f)  social welfare, information and culture; and 
g)  politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. 
 
4. Additional areas of cooperation may be decided upon by the Council. 
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ARTICLE 22 
 
PROTOCOLS 
 
1. Member States shall conclude such Protocols as may be necessary in each area of 
cooperation, which shall spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional 
mechanism for, cooperation and integration. 
 
2.  Each Protocol shall be approved by the Summit on the recommendation of the 
Council, and shall thereafter become an integral part of this Treaty. 
 
3.  Each Protocol shall be subject to signature and ratification by the parties thereto. 
 
ARTICLE 23 
 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
1. In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, the 
peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of 
regional integration. 
 
2.  SADC shall cooperate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region 
and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty 
in the areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among the 
communities, associations and peoples of the Region. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
 
ARTICLE 24 
 
1.  Subject to the provisions of Article 6 (1), Member States and SADC shall maintain 
good working relations and other forms of cooperation, and may enter into 
agreements with other states, regional and international organisations, whose 
objectives are compatible with the objectives of SADC and the provisions of this 
Treaty. 
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2.  Conferences and other meetings may be held between Member States and other 
Governments and organisations associated with the development efforts of SADC 
to 
review policies and strategies, and evaluate the performance of SADC in the 
implementation of its programmes and projects, identify and agree on future plans 
of cooperation. 
 
CHAPTER NINE 
 
RESOURCES, FUND AND ASSETS 
 
ARTICLE 25 
 
RESOURCES 
 
1.  SADC shall be responsible for the mobilisation of its own and other resources 
required for the implementation of its programmes and projects. 
 
2.  SADC shall create such institutions as may be necessary for the effective 
 mobilisation and efficient application of resources for regional development. 
 
3. Resources acquired by the SADC by way of contributions, loans, grants or gifts, 
shall be the property of SADC. 
 
4. The resources of SADC may be made available to Member States in pursuance of 
the objectives of this Treaty, on terms and conditions mutually agreed between 
SADC and the Member States involved. 
 
5. Resources of SADC shall be utilised in the most efficient and equitable manner. 
 
 
ARTICLE 26 
 
FUND 
 
The Fund of SADC shall consist of contributions of Member States, income from 
SADC enterprises and receipts from regional and non-regional sources. 
 
ARTICLE 27 
 
ASSETS 
 
1. Property, both movable and immovable, acquired by or on behalf of SADC shall  
 constitute the assets of SADC, irrespective of their location. 
280 
 
 
2.  Property acquired by Member States, under the auspices of SADC, shall belong  
         to the Member States concerned, subject to provisions of paragraph 3 of this    
         Article, and Articles 25 and 34 of this Treaty. 
 
3.  Assets acquired by Member States under the auspices of SADC shall be accessible 
to all Member States on an equitable basis. 
 
CHAPTER TEN 
 
FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
 
ARTICLE 28 
 
THE BUDGET 
 
1.  The budget of SADC shall be funded by contributions made by Member States, 
and such other sources as may be determined by the council. 
 
2.  Member States shall contribute to the budget of SADC in proportions agreed upon 
by the Council. 
 
3.  The Executive Secretary shall cause to be prepared, estimates of revenue and 
expenditure for the Secretariat and Commissions, and submit them to the Council, 
not less than three months before the beginning of the financial year. 
 
4.  The Council shall approve the estimates of revenue and expenditure before the 
beginning of the financial year. 
 
5.  The financial year of SADC shall be determined by the Council. 
 
ARTICLE 29 
 
EXTERNAL AUDIT 
 
1. The Council shall appoint external auditors and shall fix their fees and       
         Remuneration at the beginning of each financial year. 
 
2.  The Executive Secretary shall cause to be prepared and audited annual statements 
of accounts for the Secretariat and Commissions, and submit to the Council for 
approval. 
ARTICLE 30 
 
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 
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The Executive Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Council for approval 
financial regulations, standing orders and rules for the management of the affairs 
of SADC. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 
IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES 
 
ARTICLE 31 
 
1.  SADC, its Institutions and staff shall, in the territory of each Member State, have 
such immunities and privileges as are necessary for the proper performance of 
their functions under this Treaty, and which shall 272 Prospects for a Security 
Community in Southern Africa be similar to those accorded to comparable 
international organisations. 
 
2. The immunities and privileges conferred by this Article shall be prescribed in a  
 Protocol. 
 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
 
ARTICLE 32 
 
Any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this Treaty, which 
cannot be settled amicably, shall be referred to the Tribunal. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
 
SANCTIONS, WITHDRAWAL AND DISSOLUTION 
 
ARTICLE 33 
 
SANCTIONS 
 
1.  Sanctions may be imposed against any Member State that: 
 
a)  persistently fails, without good reason, to fulfill obligations assumed under this 
Treaty; 
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b)  implements policies which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC; or 
 
c)  is in arrears for more than one year in the payment of contributions to SADC, for 
reasons other than those caused by natural calamity or exceptional circumstances 
that gravely affect its economy, and has not secured the dispensation of the 
Summit. 
 
2.  The sanctions shall be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 
ARTICLE 34 
 
WITHDRAWAL 
 
1.  A Member State wishing to withdraw from SADC shall serve notice of its intention   
         in writing, a year in advance, to the Chairman of SADC, who shall inform other 
         Member States accordingly. 
 
2.  At the expiration of the period of notice, the Member State shall, unless the notice 
is withdrawn, cease to be a member of SADC. 
 
3.  During the one year period of notice referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the 
Member State wishing to withdraw from SADC shall comply with the provisions of 
this Treaty, and shall continue to be bound by its obligations. 
 
4. A Member State which has withdrawn shall not be entitled to claim any property 
or rights until the dissolution of SADC. 
 
5. Assets of SADC situated in the territory of a Member State which has withdrawn, 
shall continue to be the property of SADC and be available for its use. 
 
6.  The obligations assumed by Member States under this Treaty shall, to the extent 
necessary to fulfill such obligations, survive the termination of membership by any 
State. 
 
ARTICLE 35 
 
DISSOLUTION 
 
1.  The Summit may decide by a resolution supported by three-quarters of all 
members to dissolve SADC or any of its Institutions, and determine the terms and 
conditions of dealing with its liabilities and disposal of its assets. 
 
2.      A proposal for the dissolution of SADC may be made to the Council by any 
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        Member State, for preliminary consideration, provided, however, that such a  
         proposal shall not be submitted for the decision of the Summit until all Member 
        States have been duly notified of it and a period of twelve months has elapsed 
        after the submission to the Council. 
 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
 
AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY 
 
ARTICLE 36 
 
1.  An amendment of this Treaty shall be adopted by a decision of three quarters of 
all the Members of the Summit. 
 
2.  A proposal for the amendment of this Treaty may be made to the Executive 
Secretary by any Member State for preliminary consideration by the Council, 
provided, however, that the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to the 
Council for preliminary consideration until all Member States have been duly 
notified of it, and a period of three months has elapsed after such notification. 
 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
 
LANGUAGE 
 
ARTICLE 37 
 
The working languages of SADC shall be English and Portuguese, and such other  
languages as the Council may determine. 
 
CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
 
SAVING PROVISIONS 
 
ARTICLE 38 
 
A Sectoral Committee, Sector Coordinating Unit or any other institution, obligation 
or arrangement of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
which exists immediately before the coming into force of this Treaty, shall to the 
extent that it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Treaty, continue to 
subsist, operate or bind Member States or SADC as if it were established or 
undertaken under this Treaty, until the Council or Summit determined otherwise. 
 
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
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SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ENTRY INTO FORCE, 
 
ACCESSION AND DEPOSITARY 
 
 
ARTICLE 39 
 
SIGNATURE 
 
This Treaty shall be signed by the High Contracting Parties. 
 
ARTICLE 40 
 
RATIFICATION 
 
This Treaty shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their 
constitutional procedures. 
 
ARTICLE 41 
 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
 
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification by two thirds of the States lists in the Preamble. 
 
ARTICLE 42 
 
ACCESSION 
 
This Treaty shall remain open for accession by any state subject to Article 8 of this 
Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE 43 
DEPOSITARY 
 
1.  The original texts of this Treaty and Protocols and all instruments of ratification 
         and accession shall be deposited with the Executive Secretary of SADC, who shall 
        transmit certified copies to all Member States. 
 
2. The Executive Secretary shall register this Treaty with the Secretariats of the 
         United Nations Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity. 
 
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
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TERMINATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
ARTICLE 44 
 
This Treaty replaces the Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutions of the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference dated 20th July, 1981 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 
PROTOCOL AND STRUCTURE OF THE ORGAN  
 
 
PROTOCOL ON POLITICS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION  
 
PREAMBLE  
 
We, the Heads of State or Government of:  
 
The Republic of Angola  
The Republic of Botswana  
The Democratic Republic of Congo  
The Kingdom of Lesotho  
The Republic of Malawi  
The Republic of Mozambique  
The Republic of Namibia  
The Republic of Seychelles  
The Republic of South Africa  
The Kingdom of Swaziland  
The United Republic of Tanzania  
The Republic of Zambia  
The Republic of Zimbabwe  
 
TAKING COGNISANCE of the decision of SADC to create the ORGAN on Politics, Defence 
and Security which decision appears in the Gaborone Communique of 28th June 1996;  
 
VOTING Article 9 of the Treaty which establishes the Organ;  
 
BEARING IN MIND that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes the role of regional 
arrangements in dealing with such matters relating Prospects for a Security Community 
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in Southern Africa to the maintenance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate  
for regional action;  
 
RECOGNISING AND RE-AFFIRMING the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighborliness, non-
aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States;  
 
RECALLING the 1964 resolution of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the Organisation of African Unity, declaring that all Member States pledge to respect the 
borders existing on their achievement of national independence;  
 
FURTHER REAFFIRMING the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council 
in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the role of the Central Organ 
of the Organisation of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and  
Resolution;  
 
CONVINCED that peace, security and strong political relations are critical factors in 
creating a conducive environment for regional cooperation and integration;  
 
CONVINCED FURTHER that the Organ constituted an appropriate institutional framework 
by which Member States could co-ordinate policies and activities in the area of politics, 
defence and security;  
 
DETERMINED to achieve solidarity, peace and security in the Region through close co-
operation on matters of politics, defence and security;  
 
DESIROUS TO ENSURE that close co-operation on matters of politics, defence and 
security shall at all times promote the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, 
conciliation, mediation or arbitration;  
 
ACTING in pursuance of Article 10A of the Treasury;  
 
HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:  
 
ARTICLE 1 
 
DEFINITIONS  
 
 
In this Protocol terms and expressions defined in Article 1 of the Treaty shall bear the 
same meaning unless the context otherwise requires. In this Protocol, unless the context 
otherwise requires:  
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“Chairperson” means the Chairperson of the Organ;  
 
“ISDSC” means the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee;  
 
“ISPDC” means the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee;  
 
“Signatory” means a Member State which signs this Protocol;  
 
“State Party” means a Member State that has ratified or acceded to this Protocol.  
 
ARTICLE 2 
 
OBJECTIVES  
 
 
1. The general objective of the Organ shall be to promote peace and security in the 
Region.  
 
2.  The specific objectives of the Organ shall be to:  
 
a)  protect the people and safeguard the development of the Region against 
instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and 
aggression;  
 
b)  promote political co-operation among State Parties and the evolution of common 
political values and institutions;  
 
c)  develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and 
advance such policy collectively in international fora;  
 
d)  promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters  
 
 
e)  prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;  
 
f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter 
of 
last resort where peaceful means have failed;  
 
g)  promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the 
territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human 
rights 
as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the Organisation of African 
Unity 
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and United Nations respectively;  
 
h)  consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual 
Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;  
 
i)        develop close co-operation between the police and state security services of 
          State 
          Parties in order to address: cross border crime; and promote a community based     
          approach to domestic security;  
 
j) observe, and encourage State parties to implement United Nations, African Union 
          and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament 
          and peaceful relations between States;  
 
k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the 
          participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping  
          operations;  
 
l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and co-ordination 
of 
          international humanitarian assistance.  
 
 
ARTICLE 3 
STRUCTURES  
 
The Organ shall be an institution of SADC and shall report to the  
Summit.  
 
The Organ shall have the following structures:  
 
a) the Chairperson of the Organ;  
b)  the Troika;  
c) a Ministerial Committee;  
d)  an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC);  
e) an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC);  
f)  such other sub-structures as may be established by any of the ministerial  
 committees.  
 
The Troika shall consist of:  
 
a) the Chairperson of the Organ  
b) the Incoming Chairperson who shall be the Deputy Chairperson of the Organ; 
         and;  
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c) the Outgoing Chairperson.  
 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
CHAIRPERSON OF THE ORGAN  
 
The Summit shall elect a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson of the Organ on the basis 
of rotation among the members of the Summit except that the Chairperson and the  
 
Deputy Chairperson of the Summit shall not simultaneously be the Chairperson of the 
Organ.  
 
The term of office of the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of Organ shall be one year 
respectively.  
 
The Chairperson of the Organ shall consult with the Troika of SADC and report to the 
Summit.  
 
The Chairperson, in consultation with the Troika of SADC, shall be Prospects for a Security 
Community in Southern Africa responsible for the overall policy direction and the 
achievement of the objectives of the Organ.  
 
The Chairperson may request reports from any ministerial committee of the Organ on 
any matter which is within the competence of the committee.  
 
The Chairperson may request any ministerial committee of the Organ to consider any 
matter which is within the competence of the committee.  
 
The Chairperson may request the Chairperson of SADC to table for discussion any matter 
that requires consideration by the Summit.  
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE  
 
The Ministerial Committee shall comprise the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, 
defence, public security and state security from each of the State Parties.  
 
The Committee shall be responsible for the co-ordination of the work of the Organ and 
its structures.  
 
The Committee shall report to the Chairperson.  
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The Committee shall be chaired by a Minister from the same country as the Chairperson 
for a period of one year on a rotation basis.  
 
The Chairperson of the Committee shall convene at least one meeting on an annual basis.  
 
The Chairperson of the Committee may when necessary convene other meetings of the 
Ministerial Committee at a request of either ISPDC or ISDSC.  
 
The Committee may refer any relevant matter to, and may request reports from ISPDC 
and ISDSC.  
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
INTER-STATE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY COMMITTEE  
 
ISPDC shall comprise the minister responsible for foreign affairs from each of the State 
Parties.  
 
ISPDC shall perform such functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Organ relating to politics and diplomacy.  
 
ISPDC shall report to the Ministerial Committee without prejudice to its obligation to 
report regularly to the Chairperson.  
 
ISPDC shall be chaired by a Minister from the same country as the Chairperson for a 
period of one year on a rotation basis.  
 
The Chairperson of ISPDC shall convene at least one meeting on an annual basis.  
 
The Chairperson of ISPDC may convene such other meetings as he or she deems 
necessary or as requested by another Minister serving on ISPDC.  
 
ISPDC may establish such sub-structures as it deems necessary to perform its functions.  
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
INTER-STATE DEFENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE  
 
ISDSC shall comprise the ministers responsible for defence, ministers responsible for 
public security and ministers responsible for state security from each of the State Parties.  
 
ISDSC shall perform such functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the Organ relating to defence and security, and shall assume the objectives and 
functions of the existing Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.  
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ISDSC shall report to the Ministerial Committee without prejudice to its obligation to 
report regularly to the Chairperson.  
 
ISDSC shall be chaired by a Minister from the same country as the Chairperson for a 
period of one year and on a rotating basis.  
 
The Chairperson of ISDSC shall convene at least one meeting on an annual basis.  
 
The Chairperson of ISDSC may convene such other meetings as he or she deems 
necessary or as requested by another minister serving on ISDSC.  
 
ISDSC shall retain the Defence, State Security and Public Security Sub-Committees and 
other subordinate structures of the existing Inter-State Defence and Security Committee.  
 
ISDSC may establish such other structures as it deems necessary to perform its 
functions.  
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
COMMITTEE PROCEDURES  
 
The following provisions shall apply to the ministerial committees of the Organ:  
 
a) the quorum for all meetings shall be two-thirds of the State Parties;  
b) the ministerial committees shall determine their own rules of procedure; and  
c) decisions shall be taken by consensus.  
 
ARTICLE 9 
SECRETARIAT  
 
SADC Secretariat shall provide secretariat services to the Organ.  
 
ARTICLE 10 
 
CO-OPERATION WITH NON-STATE PARTIES AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS  
 
In recognition of the fact that political, defence and security matters transcend national 
and regional boundaries, co-operation agreements on these matters between State 
Parties and non- State Parties, and between State Parties and organisations, other than 
SAC, shall be accepted provided that such agreements shall not:  
 
a)       be inconsistent with the objectives and other provisions of the Treaty and this  
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          Protocol;  
b) impose obligations upon a State party that is not a party to such cooperation  
agreement, and  
c) impede a State Party from fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty and this    
          Protocol.  
 
Any agreement between the Organ and a non-State party, or between the  
Organ and an international organisation, shall be subject to approval by  
the Summit.  
 
 
ARTICLE 11 
 
CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION  
 
Obligations of the Organ under International Law  
 
a)  In accordance with the Charter of the UN, State Parties shall refrain from the 
         threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
         any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self 
         -defence against an armed attack.  
 
b)  State Parties shall manage and seek to resolve any dispute between  
          two or more of them by peaceful means.  
 
c) The Organ shall seek to manage and resolve inter- and intra-state  
          conflict by peaceful means.  
 
  
293 
 
c)  The Organ shall seek to ensure that the State Parties adhere to and enforce all 
 sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the United Nations 
Security Council.   
 
Jurisdiction of the Organ  
 
a)  The Organ may seek to resolve any significant inter-state conflict between State 
          Parties or between a State Party and non- State Party and a ‘significant  
          interstate conflict’ shall include:  
 
(i)  a conflict over territorial boundaries or natural resources;  
(ii)  a conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has 
occurred or been threatened; and  
(iii)  a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory of a 
State Party which is not a party to the conflict.  
 
b)  The Organ may seek to resolve any significant intra-state conflict within the 
territory of a State Party and a ‘significant intra-state conflict’ shall include:  
 
(i) large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state 
and  
(ii) sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross 
violation of human rights;  
(iii) a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a State;  
(iv) a condition of civil war or insurgency; and  
(v) a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory 
of another State Party.  
(vi) In consultation with the United Nations Security Council and the Central 
Organ of the Organisation of African Unity Mechanisms for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, the Organ may offer to mediate in a 
significant inter- or intra-state conflict that occurs outside the Region.  
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Methods  
 
a) The methods employed by the Organ to prevent, manage and resolve conflict 
by peaceful means shall include preventive diplomacy, negotiations, 
conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an 
international tribunal.  
b) The Organ shall establish an early warning system in order to facilitate 
timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict. 
c) Where peaceful means resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, the Chairperson 
acting on the advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend to the 
Summit that enforcement action to be taken against one or more of the 
disputant parties.  
d) The Summit shall resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last resort 
and, in accordance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, only with 
the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. 
e) External military threats to the Region shall be addressed through collective 
security arrangements to be agreed upon in a Mutual Defence Pact among 
the State Parties.  
 
Procedures  
 
a)  In respect of both inter- and intra-state conflict, the Organ shall seek to obtain 
         the consent of the disputant parties to its peacemaking efforts.  
 
b)  The Chairperson, in consultation with the other members of the Troika, may 
          table any significant conflict for discussion in the Organ.  
 
c) Any State Party may request the Chairperson to table any significant conflict for 
         discussion in the Organ and in consultation with the other members of the Troika 
         of the Organ, the Chairperson shall meet such request expeditiously.  
 
d) The Organ shall respond to a request by a State Party to mediate in a conflict 
          within the territory of that State and the Organ shall endeavour by diplomatic 
          means to obtain such request where it is not forthcoming.  
 
e) The exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence shall be 
          immediately reported to the United Nations Security Council and to the Central 
          Organ of the Organisation of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
          Management and Resolution.  
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ARTICLE 12 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
 
The State Parties undertake not to disclose any classified information, obtained under 
this Protocol or as a result of their participation in the Organ, other than to members of 
their own staff whom such disclosure is essential for purposes of giving effect to this 
Protocol or any decision taken by the Organ.  
 
State Parties shall ensure that the staff referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall at 
all times maintain strict secrecy.  
 
State Parties further undertake not to use any classified information obtained during 
any multilateral co-operation between them to the detriment of any Member State.  
 
A State Party shall remain bound by the requirements of confidentiality under this 
Article even after it withdraws from the Organ.  
 
ARTICLE 13 
 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES  
 
Disputes arising between two or more State Parties from the interpretation or 
application of this Protocol which cannot be settled amicably shall be referred to the 
Tribunal.  
 
 
ARTICLE 14 
 
WITHDRAWAL 
 
A signatory may withdraw from this Protocol upon the expiration of twelve (12) months 
from the date of giving written notice to that effect to the Chairperson of the Organ. 
Such Signatory shall cease to enjoy all rights and benefits under this Protocol upon the 
withdrawal becoming effective.  
 
ARTICLE 15 
 
 
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
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1.  This Protocol in no way detracts from the rights and obligations of State Parties   
          under the Charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.  
2.  This Protocol in no way detracts from the responsibility of the United Nations 
          Council to maintain international peace and security.  
3.  This Protocol shall not derogate from existing agreements between a State Party 
          and another State Party or a non-State Party and an international organisation, 
          other than SADC, provided that such agreements are consistent with the 
          principles and objectives of this Protocol.  
4.  Where an existing agreement is inconsistent with the principles and objectives of 
this Protocol, the Member State shall take steps to amend the agreement 
accordingly.  
 
 
ARTICLE 16 
 
SIGNATURE 
 
This Protocol shall be signed by duly authorized representatives of the Member States.  
 
ARTICLE 17 
 
RATIFICATION 
 
 
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the Signatories in accordance with their 
respective constitutional procedures.  
 
ARTICLE 18 
 
ACCESSION 
 
This Protocol shall remain open for accession by any Member State.  
 
ARTICLE 19 
 
AMENDMENTS 
 
Any State Party may propose an amendment to this Protocol.  
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE, the Heads of State or Government, or  
duly authorized representatives, of SADC Member States, have signed this Protocol.  
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APPENDIX C.  
 
SADC Protocol on Tribunal 
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ARTICLE 29 LEGAL COSTS 
ARTICLE 30 APPLICATION TO BE JOINED AS A PARTY 
ARTICLE 31 FEES AND LEGAL AID 
ARTICLE 32 ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION 
ARTICLE 33 BUDGET 
PART V Final Provisions 
ARTICLE 34 SIGNATURE 
ARTICLE 35 RATIFICATION 
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ARTICLE 37 AMENDMENT 
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ARTICLE 39 DEPOSITARY 
PREAMBLE 
WE, the Heads of State or Government of: 
The Republic of Angola 
The Republic of Botswana 
The Democratic Republic of Congo 
The Kingdom of Lesotho 
The Republic of Malawi 
The Republic of Mauritius 
The Republic of Mozambique 
The Republic of Namibia 
The Republic of Seychelles 
The Republic of South Africa 
The Kingdom of Swaziland 
The United Republic of Tanzania 
The Republic of Zambia 
The Republic of Zimbabwe 
DESIRING to conclude the Protocol on the Tribunal established by Article 9 as read with 
Article 16 of the Treaty, 
HEREBY AGREE as follows: 
PART I 
 
Preliminary 
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ARTICLE 1 
 
DEFINITIONS 
1. In this Protocol terms and expressions defined in Article 1 of the SADC Treaty shall 
bear the same meaning unless the context otherwise requires. 
2. In this Protocol, unless the context otherwise requires; 
"Committee of Ministers" means the Committee of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys-General 
referred to in the Legal Sector Protocol; 
"Member" means a Member of the Tribunal appointed in terms of Article 4 of this Protocol; 
"President" means President of the Tribunal elected in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 7 
of this Protocol; 
"Rules" means the Rules of Procedures referred to in Article 23 of this Protocol; and 
"State" means a Member State of the Community 
 
PART II 
Organisation 
ARTICLE 2 
 
CONSTITUTION OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The Tribunal of the Community (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), is hereby 
constituted in terms of Article 16 of the Treaty and shall function in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
 
CONSTITUTION AND COMPOSITION 
1. The Tribunal shall consist of not less than ten (10) Members, appointed from nationals 
of States who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices in their respective States or who are jurists of recognised competence. 
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2. The Council shall designate five (5) of the Members as regular Members who shall sit 
regularly on the Tribunal. The additional five (5) Members shall constitute a pool from 
which the President may invite a Member to sit on the Tribunal whenever a regular 
Member is temporarily absent or is otherwise unable to carry out his or her functions. 
3. The Tribunal shall be constituted by three (3) Members; provided that the Tribunal 
may decide to constitute a full bench composed of five (5) Members. 
4. The President shall be responsible for selecting the Members who shall constitute the 
Tribunal for the purpose of hearing any case brought before it. 
5. On a proposal from the Tribunal, the Council may increase the number of Members. 
6. No two or more members may, at any time, be nationals of the same State. 
 
ARTICLE 4 
 
NOMINATION, SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS 
1. Each State may nominate one candidate having the qualifications prescribed in Article 
3 of this Protocol. 
2. Due consideration shall be given to fair gender representation in the nomination and 
appointment process. 
3. The Members shall be selected by the Council from the list of candidates so nominated 
by States. Nominations for the first appointment shall be called within three (3) months, 
and the selection shall be held within six (6) months, of the date of entry into force of 
this Protocol. 
4. The Members shall be appointed by the Summit upon recommendation of the Council. 
5. Where a Member is appointed to replace a Member whose terms of office has not 
expired, the Member so appointed shall serve for the remainder of his or her 
predecessor's term. 
6. Any appointment to fill a vacancy referred to in paragraph 5 shall be conducted within 
three (3) months of the vacancy occurring. The procedure referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
ARTICLE 5 
301 
 
SOLEMN DECLARATION 
Every Member shall, before taking up his or her duties, make a solemn declaration in 
open session that he or she will carry out his or her duties independently, impartially and 
conscientiously. 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
TENURE OF OFFICE OF MEMBERS 
1. The Members shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years and may only be re-
appointed for a further term of five (5) years. However, of the Members initially 
appointed, the terms of two (2) of the regular and two (2) of the additional Members 
shall expire at the end of three (3) years. The Members whose term is to expire at the 
end of three (3) years shall be chosen by a lot to be drawn by the Executive Secretary 
immediately after the first appointment. 
2. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, the Tribunal shall sit when required to consider 
a case submitted to it. The Members shall, therefore, not be appointed on a full-time 
basis. 
3. On the recommendation of the President, the Council may at any time decide that the 
workload of the Tribunal requires that the Members should serve on a full-time basis. In 
that event: 
(a) existing Members who elect to serve on a full-time basis shall not hold any other office 
or employment; and 
(b) the Members subsequently appointed shall not hold any other office or employment. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
THE PRESIDENT 
1. The Tribunal shall elect its President for a term of three (3) years. 
2. If the President is temporarily absent or otherwise unable to carry out his or her 
functions, the other Members shall elect an Acting President. 
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ARTICLE 8 
 
RESIGNATION AND TERMINATION OF OFFICE 
1. The President may at any time resign his or her office by a letter to the Council 
delivered through the Executive Secretary. 
2. A Member other than the President may at any time resign his or her office by a letter 
delivered to the President for transmission to the Council through the Executive Secretary. 
3. No Member may be dismissed unless in accordance with the rules. 
4. Notwithstanding the expiration of his or her term of office, a Member shall continue to 
hear and to complete those cases partly heard by him or her. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
 
DISQUALIFICATION OR REFUSAL 
1. No Member may exercise any political or administrative function, or may hold any 
political office or any office in the service of a State, the Community or an organisation 
or engage in any trade, vocation or profession or any other occupation which might 
interfere with the proper exercise of his or her judicial functions, impartiality or 
independence. 
2. No Member may participate in the decision of any case in which he or she has 
previously taken part as an agent, counsel, advocate or adviser, or as a member of a 
national or international court or tribunal or in any other capacity or in any matter in 
which a State of which he or she is a national is a party to a dispute before the Tribunal. 
3. Any dispute regarding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be 
resolved by a decision of the Tribunal sitting without the Member concerned. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
 
IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
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The Members shall be immune from legal proceedings in respect of anything said or done 
by them in their judicial capacity. They shall continue to enjoy such immunity after they 
have ceased to hold office. 
  
ARTICLE 11 
 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND SALARIES OF MEMBERS 
The terms and conditions of service, salaries and benefits of the Members shall be 
determined by the Council. 
 
ARTICLE 12 
 
REGISTRAR 
1. The Tribunal shall appoint a Registrar who shall, subject to overall supervision of the 
President, be responsible for the day to day administration of the Tribunal. 
2. The Tribunal shall employ such other staff as may be required to enable it to peform 
its functions. 
3. The terms and conditions of services, salaries and benefits of the Registrar and other 
staff shall be determined by the Council on the recommendation of the Tribunal. 
 
ARTICLE 13 
 
SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL 
The Tribunal shall have its seat at a place designated by the Council, provided it may in 
any particular case sit and exercise its functions anywhere within the Community if it 
considers it desirable. 
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PART III 
 
Jurisdiction 
ARTICLE 14 
 
BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes and all applications referred to it in 
accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol which relate to: 
(a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
(b) the interpretation, application or validity of the Protocols, all subsidiary instruments 
adopted within the framework of the Community, and acts of the institutions of the 
Community; 
(c) all matters specifically provided for in any other agreements that States may conclude 
among themselves or within the community and which confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 
 
ARTICLE 15 
 
SCOPE OF JURISDICTION 
1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States, and between natural 
or legal persons and States. 
2. No natural or legal person shall bring an action against a State unless he or she has 
exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction. 
3. Where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal by any party the consent of other parties 
to the dispute shall not be required. 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 16 
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PRELIMINARY RULINGS 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, the Tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in proceedings of any kind and between any parties 
before the courts or tribunals of States. 
2. The Tribunal shall not have original jurisdiction but may rule on a question of 
interpretation, application or validity of the provisions in issue if the question is referred 
to it by a court or tribunal of a State for a preliminary ruling in accordance with this 
Protocol. 
 
ARTICLE 17 
 
DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND COMMUNITY 
Subject to the provisions of Article 14 of this Protocol, the Tribunal shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes between the States and the Community. Such disputes may 
be referred to the Tribunal either by the State concerned or by the competent institution 
or organ of the Community. 
 
ARTICLE 18 
 
DISPUTES BETWEEN NATURAL OR LEGAL PERSONS AND COMMUNITY 
Subject to the provisions of Article 14 of this Protocol the Tribunal shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes between natural or legal persons and the Community. Such 
disputes may be referred to the Tribunal either by the natural or legal person concerned 
or by the competent institution or organ of the Community. 
 
ARTICLE 19 
 
DISPUTES BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND STAFF 
Subject to the provisions of Article 14 of this Protocol the Tribunal shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes between the Community and its staff relating to their 
conditions of employment. 
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ARTICLE 20 
 
ADVISORY 
The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, which may be requested by 
the Summit or by the Council in terms of paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE 21 
 
APPLICABLE LAW 
The Tribunal shall: 
(a) apply the Treaty, this Protocol and other Protocols that from part of the Treaty, all 
subsidiary instruments adopted by the Summit, by the Council or by any other institution 
or organ of the Community pursuant to the Treaty or Protocols; and 
(b) develop its own Community jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, 
general principles and rules of public international law and any rules and principles of the 
law of States. 
 
ARTICLE 22 
 
WORKING LANGUAGES 
The working languages of the Tribunal shall be English, Portuguese and French. The 
Council may determine that any other language be used as a working language. 
 
PART IV 
 
Procedure of the Tribunal 
ARTICLE 23 
 
RULES OF PROCEDURES 
307 
 
The rules annexed to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof. 
  
ARTICLE 24 
 
DECISIONS 
1. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be in writing and delivered in open court and shall state 
the reasons on which they are based. 
2. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be taken by a majority. 
3. Decisions and rulings of the Tribunal shall be final and binding. 
  
ARTICLE 25 
 
DEFAULT DECISIONS 
 
1. The Tribunal may give a decision in default. 
2. Before giving such decision the Tribunal shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction over 
the dispute and that the claim is well-founded in fact and law. 
3. A party against whom a default decision is made may apply to the Tribunal for the 
rescission of such decision. The applicant shall set out the grounds for such application. 
 
 
ARTICLE 26 
 
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION 
An application for review of a decision may be made to the Tribunal if it is based upon 
the discovery of some fact which by its nature might have had a decisive influence on the 
decision if it had been known to the Tribunal at the time the decision was given, but 
which fact at the time was unknown to both the Tribunal and the party making the 
application; provided always that such ignorance was not due to negligence. 
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ARTICLE 27 
 
REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL 
1. The States and the institutions of the Community shall be represented before the 
Tribunal by an agent appointed for each case. The agent may be assisted by an advisor. 
2. Other parties shall be represented by an agent or other persons before a court of a 
State. 
3. Such agents, advisers and lawyers shall, when they appear before the Tribunal, enjoy 
the rights, privileges and immunities necessary for the independent exercise of their 
duties, under conditions laid down in the rules of procedure. 
4. As regards such agents, advisers who appear before it, the Tribunal shall have the 
powers normally accorded to courts of law, under conditions laid down in the rules of 
procedure. 
  
ARTICLE 28 
 
INTERIM MEASURES 
The Tribunal or the President may, on good cause, order the suspension of an act 
challenged before the Tribunal and may ta 
ke other interim measures as necessary. 
ARTICLE 29 
 
LEGAL COSTS 
Unless the Tribunal decides otherwise, each party to a dispute shall pay its, his, or her 
own legal costs. 
 
ARTICLE 30 
 
APPLICATION TO BE JOINED AS A PARTY 
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Should a State, natural or legal person consider that it or he or she has an interest of a 
legal nature that may affect or be affected by the subject matter of a dispute before the 
Tribunal, it or he or she may submit by way of a written application in such a form and 
manner as the rules of procedure may prescribe a request to be permitted to intervene. 
 
ARTICLE 31 
 
FEES AND LEGAL AID 
Fees payable by parties other than States and the granting of legal aid, within limits 
agreed by the budgetary authorities of the Community, may be prescribed by the rules. 
  
ARTICLE 32 
 
ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION 
1. The law and rules of civil procedure for the registration and enforcement of foreign 
judgements in force in the territory of the State in which the judgment is to be enforced 
shall govern enforcement. 
2. States and institutions of the Community shall take forthwith all measures necessary 
to ensure execution of decisions of the Tribunal. 
3. Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in respect of 
that particular case and enforceable within the territories of the States concerned. 
4. Any failure by a State to comply with a decision of the Tribunal may be referred to the 
Tribunal by any party concerned. 
5. If the Tribunal establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its finding to the 
Summit for the latter to take appropriate action. 
 
ARTICLE 33 
 
BUDGET 
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The budget of the Tribunal shall be funded through the regular budget of the Community, 
in accordance with criteria that the Council may, from time to time determine, and from 
such other sources as may be determined by the Council.. 
 
PART V 
 
Final Provisions 
ARTICLE 34 
 
SIGNATURE 
1. This Protocol shall be signed by the Heads of State or Government, or their duly 
authorised representatives. 
2. This Protocol shall remain open for signature by the States listed in the Preamble, until 
the date of its entry into force. 
 
ARTICLE 35 
 
RATIFICATION 
This Protocol shall be ratified by Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional 
procedures. 
 
 
ARTICLE 36 
 
ACCESSION 
This Protocol shall remain open for accession by any State subject to Article 8 of the 
Treaty. 
ARTICLE 37 
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AMENDMENT 
1. Any State which is a Party to this Protocol may propose an amendment thereto. 
2. Proposals for amendment to this Protocol may be made to the Executive Secretary 
who shall duly notify all States of the proposed amendment or amendments at least thirty 
(30) days in advance of consideration of the amendment by the Committee of Ministers. 
Such period of notice may be waived by the States. 
3. An amendment to this Protocol shall be adopted by a decision of three (3) quarters of 
all the members of the Summit who are Parties to this Protocol, and shall become effective 
subject to Article 36 of this Protocol. 
 
ARTICLE 38 
 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
This Protocol shall enter into force thirty (30) days after deposit, in terms of Article 43 of 
the Treaty, of instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the States. 
 
ARTICLE 39 
 
DEPOSITARY 
The original text of this Protocol and all instruments of ratification and accession shall be 
deposited, and certified copies thereof shall be transmitted, in terms of Article 43 of the 
Treaty. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF WE, the Heads of State or Government, or duly authorised 
representatives, of SADC Member States have signed this Protocol. 
 
Done at Windhoek, this 7th day of August 2000 in three original texts in the English, 
French and Portuguese languages, all texts being equally authentic. 
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA 
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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
KINGDOM OF LESOTHO 
REPUBLIC OF MALAWI 
REPUBLIC OF MAURITIUS 
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE 
REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA 
REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND 
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE 
 
 
APPENDIX D.  
 
SEM-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
 
The utility of semi-structured interviews in qualitative research is that they allow 
understanding of the subject from the interviewees’ point of view. Semi-structured 
interviews are narrative conversations and are defined and controlled (Yin, 2003). The 
structure and number of the questions is important. Gathering of data from the interviews 
is also of critical importance. This research is utilising three case studies with practical 
examples of state actions and behaviour to draw differences between and within the 
three cases. The aim is to explore the research questions in respect to the pattern of 
behaviour and action in the process of regional integration policy making among states 
in SADC region (Yin, 2003).  
 
The following outline is the schematic representation of how the semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken in 2012. The case for the choice of semi-structured interviews 
and case study method for this research is provided in chapter 2 on the methodology. 
The combination of case study and semi-structured interviews methods is to focus the 
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research to answer the research question “how” and “why” (Yin, 2003).   Both research 
questions cannot be manipulated, they must cover contextual conditions that are relevant 
to regional integration; within boundaries that not clear between phenomenon and 
context (Yin, 2003).       
 
 
 
Case Studies and Examples/Unit 
of Analysis    
 
 
Research Questions  
 
 
 
1. SADC Common or Collective 
Security 
 
a) Lesotho Intervention (1998) 
b) SADC Tribunal’s Demise  
 
 
 
 
How is SADC Common or Collective 
Security Diplomacy negotiated? 
 
What is the trajectory of SAD policy making 
in Security Affrairs 
 
Can you explain the following in respect to 
Security Affairs in the SADC?  
 
the more congruent states’ [interests, 
values, motivations] preferences are, 
the less likely they are to prefer 
divergent policy [military] actions in 
the [security] choices they make; 
 
states will make policy security, 
[diplomatic, trade] policy preferences 
in relation to self-interest, 
preferences will be made in relation 
to utility derived; 
 
the less clear the external threat to 
regional security, [diplomacy, trade] 
the less likely that countries would 
achieve mutual security [diplomacy, 
trade] (Hull, 1996: 38). 
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2. SADC’s Trade Agreement with EU  
 
a) TDCA 
b) SADC Regional EPAs 
Configurations  
 
 
 
How is SADC Trade Diplomacy with 
External Parties negotiated? 
 
What is the trajectory of SADC trade policy 
making with European Union (EPAs)?   
 
Can you explain the following in respect to 
Trade Relations with the EU on EPAs?  
 
the more congruent states’ [interests, 
values, motivations] preferences are, 
the less likely they are to prefer 
divergent policy [military] actions in 
the [security] choices they make; 
 
states will make policy security, 
[diplomatic, trade] policy preferences 
in relation to self-interest, 
preferences will be made in relation 
to utility derived; 
 
the less clear the external threat to 
regional security, [diplomacy, trade] 
the less likely that countries would 
achieve mutual security [diplomacy, 
trade] (Hull, 1996: 38). 
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3. SADC’s Collective Diplomacy  
 
a) Zimbabwean Political Situation  
b) Nigerian Abacha  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How is SADC’s Collective or Common Foreign 
Diplomacy Negotiated? 
 
What is the trajectory of SADC Foreign Policy 
Posture with the Rest of the World?   
 
Can you explain the following in respect to 
SADC’s External and Internal Diplomacy?  
 
 
the more congruent states’ [interests, 
values, motivations] preferences are, the 
less likely they are to prefer divergent 
policy [military] actions in the [security] 
choices they make; 
 
states will make policy security, 
[diplomatic, trade] policy preferences in 
relation to self-interest, preferences will 
be made in relation to utility derived; 
 
the less clear the external threat to 
regional security, [diplomacy, trade] the 
less likely that countries would achieve 
mutual security [diplomacy, trade] (Hull, 
1996: 38). 
 
 
 
 
List of Interviewees and the Interview Schedule  
 
 
Interviewees List                                       Schedule Date 
1. Sindiso Ngwenya’ – COMESA     12-13 August 2012 
2. Amos Marawa – COMESA     12-13 August, 2012       
3. Simal O. Amor – COMESA                                      12-13 August 2012 
4. Lovemore Bingandadi –SADC                                 9-14 February 2012   
5. R. Makhumbe – SADC                                           9-14 February 2012   
5. Mojgan Bingandadi - SADC                               9-14 February 2012   
6. Chowa John Chanda – SADC                                  9-14 February 2012   
7. Dr. Thembinkosi Mhlongo – Regional Consultant      15 August 2012                                     
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7. Dumisani Mahlinza – SACU     14-16 March 2013   
8.  David Maleleka – SACU                                                 14-16 March 2013  
9. Dr. Mzwandile Mfunwa – UNECA                                     8-10 February 2013  
10. Dr. Sizo Mhlanga – UNECA                                           8-19 March 2013    
11. Dr. Oliver P. Maponga – UNECA                                    8-10 March 2013  
12. Said Adejumobi – UNECA                                             8-10 March 2013  
13. Dr. Johnson OGUNTOALA                                             8-10 March 2013  
14. John Rocha – NEPAD                                                   23-26 September 20103  
15. Dr. Gengezi Mgidlana – NEPAD    23-26 September 2013  
16. Dr. John Tambi – NEPAD                                              23-26 September 2013  
17. Dr. Theo Lyimo – TMEA                                                10 February 2013 
18. Paulina M. Elago – TMEA                                              10 February 2013 
19. Lamin Manneh – AfDB                                                  12 April 2012  
20. Zakhele Mayisa – AfDB                                                 12 April 2012  
21. Iza Lejarraga – AfDB                                                    12 April 2012  
22. Dr. Mandla Gantsho – AfDB                                          12 April 2012 
23. Prof. Omotayo Olanyan – AU                                        17 September 2013  
24. Philip W. Wambugu – EAC                                            17 September 2013  
25. Gideon Phiri – Regional Integration Advisor                    18 August 2013 
26. Dr. Dirk Hansom – Trade Advisor                                  15 March 2013   
27. Dr. Matlotleng P. Matlou – AISA                                    12 May 2012  
28. Dr. Sehlare Makgetlaneng – AISA                                  12 May 2012 
29. Frode Davanger – World Bank                                       12 May 2012 
30. Conrad Jardine – World Bank                                        12 may 2012 
31. Charles Chiwara – Zimbabwean MP                                19 August 2013  
32. Willard L. Manungo – PS Treasury Zimbabwe                  19 August 2013  
33. Dr. Daniel Ndlela – USAID Zimbabwe                             19 August 2013  
34. Zonke Magenge – Presidency South Africa                      21 September 2013  
35. Dr. Ayanda Ntsaluba – ex-DG Foreign Affairs, SA             11 March 2012   
36. Dr. Aziz Pahad – ex-Dep. Min. Foreign Affairs/SA             11 March 2012  
37. Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter – Chief Director, DTI                     19 March 2012 
38. Ngona Mwelwa Chibesakunda – Amb. Zambia, (SA)         25 June 2013 
39. Khaya Moyo – Amb. Zimbabwe, (SA)                              22 April 20102  
40. Mkululi Chikuba – Zambia (Finance)                               20 March 2012  
41. Charles E. Minega – Mozambique, MP   18 April 2013   
42. Taku Fundira – TRALAC      12 April 2012 
